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deontic	 constraints	 also	 required	 forays	 into	 moral	 philosophy	 and	 deeper	
epistemological	theory.	
I	have	benefited	from	discussions	with	a	great	number	of	colleagues	and	scholars.		Among	
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François	Tanguy-Renaud,	 Jenia	Turner,	 and	Harmen	van	der	Wilt.	 	 In	 addition,	 I	 have	
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practices	 and	 principles	 of	 domestic	 criminal	 are	 still	 contested.	 	 In	 comparison,	
international	criminal	law	(ICL)2	is	a	new	and	nascent	innovation.		After	some	sporadic	
historic	forerunners	and	a	brief	surge	after	World	War	II,	ICL	really	burst	onto	the	scene	




























and	 systemic	 coherence	 of	 ICL.	 	 Contemporary	 ICL	 was	 produced	 through	 a	 rapid	
transnational	 conversation	 involving	 thousands	of	 jurists,	drawing	on	diverse	 sources	
and	legal	systems.	 	The	elaboration	of	ICL	began	in	earnest	in	the	mid-1990s,	with	the	
creation	 of	 international	 criminal	 tribunals.	 	 While	 there	 were	 some	 important	
international	 and	 national	 precedents,	 those	 precedents	 were	 often	 sparse	 and	
inconsistent.		As	a	result,	jurists	had	to	make	significant	choices	in	shaping	the	doctrines.		
They	made	those	choices	under	relatively	severe	time	pressures;	there	was	not	time	to	












in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 relevant	 rules,	 drawing	on	 canons	of	 statutory	 interpretation,	









flourished	 and	 diversified,	 with	 scholars	 scrutinizing	 ICL	 from	 a	 multiplicity	 of	
perspectives,	including	inter-disciplinary,	critical	and	theoretical	approaches.6			
One	 prominent	 strand	 of	 this	 new	 scholarship	 was	 the	 liberal	 critique	 of	 ICL,	
which	brings	criminal	law	theory	to	bear	on	ICL	problems,	with	particular	emphasis	on	
the	fundamental	constraints	of	a	liberal	justice	system.		Some	scholars	pointed	out	that	
ICL	 often	 seems	 to	 contravene	 fundamental	 principles,	 even	 though	 it	 declares	 its	
adherence	 to	 such	 principles.7	 	 Concerns	 initially	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘joint	 criminal	
enterprise’,	 but	 critical	 attention	quickly	 spread	 to	other	doctrines,	 such	as	 command	
responsibility	and	duress.		Many	scholars	are	now	doing	thoughtful	work	in	this	vein.	
But	things	move	quickly	in	ICL.		In	the	last	decade,	ICL	has	already	demonstrated	its	




Indeed,	 there	 is	 a	very	 real	danger	 that	 the	 system	may	even	over-correct.	 	 It	 is	
entirely	 understandable	 that	 judges,	 after	 sustained	 academic	 criticism	 for	 being	 too	
expansive,	 might	 swing	 to	 the	 opposite	 extreme,	 adopting	 approaches	 that	 are	
excessively	 conservative,	 demanding,	 and	 rarified,	 all	 in	 the	 name	 of	 rigour.	 	 It	 has	
become	 arguable	 that	 judges,	 particularly	 at	 the	 ICC,	may	 be	 falling	 at	 times	 into	 the	



























as	 ‘conviction	machines’,	 the	 ICC	 is	 if	 anything	 in	 danger	 of	 emerging	 as	 an	 ‘acquittal	
machine’,	given	that	most	cases	so	far	have	ended	in	acquittals,	collapses	at	trial,	and	even	
failures	at	the	charge	confirmation	stage.		This	trend	has	culminated	in	the	controversial	
acquittals	 of	 Jean-Pierre	 Bemba	 in	 2018	 and	 then	 Charles	 Gbagbo	 in	 2019.12	 A	 reflex	
narrative	among	many	commentators	is	to	ascribe	every	failed	case	at	the	ICC	to	faulty	
investigations	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Prosecutor.	 	 While	 investigative	 shortcomings	 are	
undoubtedly	part	of	the	problem,	observers	appear	to	be	waking	to	the	fact	that	judicial	



































increase	 the	 time	 and	 resources	 for	 each	 investigation	 and	 prosecution,	 or	 at	 worst	
contribute	 to	 the	 continued	 collapsing	 of	 cases.	 Either	 outcome	 entails	 unnecessary	
expenditure	of	social	resources	and	a	diminishment	of	the	Court’s	impact	and	expressive	





Scholars	 sometimes	 suggest	 that	 the	 way	 out	 of	 this	 quandary	 is	 to	 ‘balance’	
utilitarian	 and	 deontological	 considerations.14	 	 But	 ‘balance’,	 while	 sound	 as	 an	
aspiration,	is	still	a	bit	too	vague.		It	does	not	provide	us	with	a	conceptual	framework	of	
how	 and	 why	 these	 considerations	 would	 be	 ‘balanced’,	 nor	 does	 it	 provide	 a	
methodology	to	do	so.				
A	helpful	 first	 step	was	 famously	suggested	by	HLA	Hart,	who	helped	clarify	 the	
interplay	of	 consequentialist	and	deontological	 considerations.15	 	Purely	deontological	
accounts	of	criminal	 law	are	generally	unconvincing,	because	the	objective	of	 ‘righting	
the	 cosmic	 balance’	 by	meting	 out	 deserved	punishment	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 justify	 the	
expense	and	hardships	flowing	from	criminal	law.		Conversely,	purely	consequentialist	
accounts	of	criminal	law	are	also	inadequate,	because	they	fail	to	capture	our	abhorrence	





















still	 requires	 individual	desert.	 	There	have	been	many	discussions	and	developments	
since	then,	questioning	whether	the	justifications	are	quite	so	separate.17		Nonetheless,	
this	basic	model	 is	sufficient	for	now	to	illuminate	the	importance	of	constraints.	 	The	
point	 is	 that,	 regardless	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 justification	 of	 the	 system	 as	 a	 whole,	 it	 is	
important	to	respect	constraints	of	justice.		In	this	thesis,	I	will	use	the	term	‘deontic’	to	
refer	to	these	constraints,	which	arise	from	respect	for	the	individual.	I	will	set	aside	until	
Chapter	 4	 the	 question	 of	 the	 more	 precise	 philosophical	 underpinnings	 of	 those	
constraints.18		






























culpability,	namely	that	persons	are	held	responsible	only	 for	 their	own	conduct.	 ICL	
recognizes	 as	 ‘the	 foundation	 of	 criminal	 responsibility’	 that	 ‘nobody	 may	 be	 held	
criminally	responsible	for	acts	or	transactions	in	which	he	has	not	personally	engaged	or	
in	some	other	way	participated’.20	The	principle	also	requires	sufficient	knowledge	and	

















































Numerous	 thoughtful	 criticisms	have	highlighted	 the	difficulty	 of	 identifying	 the	
relevant	 principles.	 	 Do	 familiar	 formulations	 of	 fundamental	 principles,	 which	 were	







































thesis	 is	 the	 importance	 of	 attending	 to	 reasoning.	 	 While	 most	 scholarship	
understandably	 focuses	on	 the	soundness	of	 the	outcomes	reached	by	an	analysis	 (for	
example,	the	rule	adopted	in	a	judgment),	I	suggest	that	we	must	attend	carefully	to	the	
reasoning	 employed.	 	 Law	 is	 a	 reasoning	 enterprise,	 and	 if	 there	 are	 systematic	
distortions	 in	 reasoning,	 then	 sooner	 or	 later	 that	 reasoning	 will	 lead	 to	 errors	 and	
problems.			
To	better	 isolate	what	 I	mean	by	 ‘deontic’	 reasoning,	 I	can	contrast	 it	with	 two	
other	 types	 of	 reasoning:	 source-based	 reasoning	 and	 teleological	 reasoning.	 	Source-
based	 reasoning	 involves	 parsing	 statutes	 and	 instruments,	 and	 applying	 or	








I	 propose	 the	 term	 ‘deontic’	 as	 a	 valuable	 addition	 to	 the	 lexicon	 of	 ICL	
jurisprudence	and	literature.	Even	in	criminal	law	theory	literature,	we	have	struggled	
with	various	wordy	or	 imperfect	 terms	(eg.	 ‘mindful	of	constraints	of	 justice’,	 ‘justice-
oriented’,	‘desert-based’,	‘culpability-based’,	‘tracking	moral	responsibility’,	‘principled’,	
‘liberal’)	 to	convey	 this	 type	of	 reasoning.	 	The	 term	 ‘deontic’	 succinctly	and	elegantly	
captures	this	distinct	and	necessary	form	of	reasoning,	and	handily	distinguishes	it	from	











one	 would	 use	 to	 evade	 any	 inconvenient	 rule.30	 	 In	 early	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 and	
scholarship,	the	word	‘justice’	was	often	used	in	an	over-simplistic	way,	in	which	‘justice’	
















establishing	 that	 it	 would	 even	 be	 fair	 to	 consider	 the	 accused	 culpable	 in	 the	
circumstances.31	 	A	richer	conception	of	 ‘justice’	 includes	 facilitating	prosecutions,	but	
only	 where	 the	 deontic	 question	 of	 fairness	 of	 punishment	 has	 been	 answered	
affirmatively.		
Because	reasoning	matters,	I	believe	it	is	also	important	to	be	on	the	lookout	for	




















implement	 in	 any	 system,	 and	 in	 ICL	 in	 particular	 raises	 numerous	 additional	
uncertainties	 and	 difficulties	 (see	 §1.2).	 	 I	 will	 highlight	 five	 central	 points	 of	 my	
framework:		
(a)	 Liberal:	 Some	 thoughtful	 scholars	 have	 raised	 important	 questions	 about	





must	 apply,	 because	 they	 are	 not	 just	 artifacts	 of	 positive	 law;	 they	 reflect	 important	
commitments	to	the	individual.		The	term	‘liberal’	is	used	to	mean	many	different	things,	
and	is	often	used	perjoratively.		I	use	the	term	here	in	the	minimal	sense	in	which	it	is	














behaviour	 can	 consider	 group	 dynamics,	 community,	 social	 construction,	 and	 social	
roles.34	 The	 account	 is	 cosmopolitan	 in	 that	 it	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 parochial	



















acknowledges	 that	 its	 hypotheses	 are	 revisable	 and	 fallible,	 and	 that	 it	 works	 with	
contingent	human	constructs,	but	argues	that	we	can	nonetheless	do	valuable	analytical,	
normative	and	critical	work.		
	(e)	 A	 two-way	 exchange:	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	will	 highlight	 that	 the	 application	 of	
general	criminal	 law	theory	to	ICL	is	not	necessarily	a	one-way	process.	 	Criminal	 law	
theory	has	much	to	offer	ICL,	but	conversely	ICL	has	much	to	offer	general	criminal	law	
theory.		Contemporary	criminal	law	theory	developed	around	what	is	the	‘normal’	case	
in	 today’s	 world:	 people	 in	 a	 relatively	 orderly	 society	 in	 a	 Westphalian	 state.		
Accordingly,	many	of	the	commonplaces	of	criminal	 law	theory	may	implicitly	assume	
preconditions	that	do	not	always	apply.	 	The	extreme	cases	and	novel	problems	of	ICL	
can	 reveal	 that	 seemingly	 elementary	 principles	 contain	 unnoticed	 conditions	 and	
parameters.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	ICL	cases	can	raise	new	questions	about	legality	
without	 a	 legislature,	 about	 culpability	 in	 collective	 contexts,	 about	 duress	 and	 social	
rules,	and	about	why	state	authority	matters	in	criminal	law	thinking.		The	special	case	of	






will	 apply	 the	 framework	 to	 some	 specific	 controversies.	 	 I	 will	 dissect	 two	 major	
controversies	 in	 command	 responsibility.	 	 The	 command	 responsibility	 doctrine	
emerged	 in	 international	 law,	and	therefore	has	not	had	the	centuries	of	scrutiny	that	
other	modes	of	liability	have	had	in	national	deliberations.		Thus,	command	responsibility	
offers	relatively	new	and	fertile	territory	for	careful	theoretical	and	deontic	investigation.		





of	 command	 responsibility	 (whether	 it	 is	 a	 mode	 of	 liability,	 a	 separate	 offence,	 or	
something	sui	generis)	is	now	shrouded	in	uncertainty.		I	will	look	at	two	controversies:	
causal	contribution	and	the	special	fault	element.			
My	 first	 illustration	 looks	 at	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 question	 of	 causal	
contribution.	 	 I	 show	 that	 early	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 approached	 the	 question	
responsibility	with	somewhat	hasty	source-based	and	consequentialist	reasoning.		As	a	
result,	 early	 cases	 rejected	 a	 requirement	 of	 causal	 contribution,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 a	
recognized	requirement	for	personal	culpability.		In	doing	so,	the	jurisprudence	created	
a	 latent	 contradiction	between	 the	doctrine	 and	 the	 culpability	 principle	 as	 expressly	
recognized	 by	 the	 system.	 	 I	 seek	 to	 show	 how	 subsequent	 efforts	 to	 deny,	 evade	 or	
resolve	that	basic	contradiction	that	 led	the	doctrine	to	become	incredibly	convoluted	
and	shrouded	in	ambiguity.37			
My	 proposed	 solution	 is	 to	 recognize	 command	 responsibility	 as	 a	 mode	 of	
accessory	 liability,	 as	 it	 was	 in	 World	 War	 II	 jurisprudence,	 in	 early	 Tribunal	
jurisprudence,	 and	 in	 the	 ICC	 Statute.38	 	 Accordingly,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 commander’s	
dereliction	must	at	least	encourage,	facilitate,	or	have	an	effect	on	subordinate	crimes.		
This	 approach	 reconciles	 World	 War	 II	 jurisprudence,	 national	 jurisprudence,	
instruments	such	as	the	ICC	Statute,	and	the	culpability	principle.		However,	even	if	one	




	 As	 a	 second	 illustration,	 I	 examine	 the	 controversy	 over	 the	 modified	 fault	
standards,	 such	as	 the	 ‘should	have	known’	 test.	 	Many	cases	and	commentators	have	
raised	concerns	about	a	criminal	negligence	standard,	and	that	caution	is	commendable	
because	 it	 shows	 concern	 for	 personal	 culpability.	 	 However,	 I	 argue	 that,	 on	 a	more	
careful	account,	the	‘should	have	known’	standard	is	justified	and	in	fact	it	is	the	unique	
insight	and	value-added	of	the	command	responsibility	doctrine.	 	Early	Tribunal	cases	







that	 many	 criticisms	 of	 command	 responsibility	 have	 overlooked	 the	 important	
distinction	 between	 principal	 and	 accessory	 liability:	 an	 accessory	 need	 not	 have	 the	
same	mens	rea	required	of	a	principal.		Finally,	I	argue	that	given	the	notorious	and	ever-
present	 danger	 of	 overseeing	 armed	 forces	 and	 the	 vigilance	 demanded	 by	 this	
extraordinary	dangerous	activity,	criminal	negligent	disregard	is	sufficiently	equivalent	
to	subjective	foresight,	and	is	a	deontically	justified	and	valuable	standard	in	that	context.		
Indeed	 the	 ‘should	have	known’	standard	 is	 the	 ‘genius’	of	command	responsibility:	 it	
reflects	an	astute	insight	into	the	culpability	of	the	commander.	As	a	result,	whereas	the	





























More	 specifically,	 the	 methodology	 I	 adopt	 is	 coherentist.	 	 ‘Coherentism’	 is	 the	
second	important	term	I	must	introduce,	because	it	describes	the	proposed	methodology,	





The	 most	 common	 misunderstanding	 of	 coherentism	 is	 that	 it	 merely	 aims	 at	
internal	 consistency,	 and	hence	 that	 it	 cannot	be	very	 radical	 or	profound.	 	However,	
coherentism	is	far	more	ambitious.		We	draw	not	only	on	patterns	of	practice,	but	also	on	
the	 entire	 range	 of	 clues	 available	 to	 us:	 normative	 arguments,	 practical	 reason,	 and	
casuistic	testing	of	our	considered	judgments.	 	We	can	use	all	of	our	critical	reasoning	
tools	 to	 test	 past	 understandings	 for	 bias	 and	 inapt	 assumptions.	 On	 a	 coherentist	
approach,	 we	 can	 take	 common	 formulations	 of	 fundamental	 principles	 as	 starting	
hypotheses,	and	then	continue	to	test	and	refine	them.		We	can	develop	constructs	(‘mid-
level	 principles’)	 and	 then	 test	 whether	 those	 constructs	 are	 analytically	 useful	 and	
normatively	convincing,	and	use	them	to	reform	our	practice.41		
A	coherentist	account	is	anti-Cartesian:	it	openly	acknowledges	that	it	does	not	offer	
certainty,	 that	 all	 of	 the	 inputs	 and	 sources	 may	 be	 biased	 or	 flawed,	 and	 that	 our	
hypotheses	 are	 revisable	 and	 fallible.	 	 The	 account	 is	well	 familiar	with	 post-modern	
critique;	it	acknowledges	the	historic	contingency	of	familiar	formulations,	and	that	they	
can	be	deconstructed.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	willing	 to	work	with	 them	as	a	starting	point,	
while	examining	them	for	possible	biases	and	assumptions	and	being	ready	to	replace	
them	with	better	formulations.		The	account	lets	us	do	valuable	analytical,	normative	and	
critical	 work,	 including	 calling	 for	 reform	 of	 doctrines	 to	 comply	 with	 better	
understandings	of	the	underlying	principles.			
I	apply	my	approach	in	two	case	studies,	in	order	to	illustrate	the	operation	of	this	





















	One	of	my	central	messages	 is	 that	criminal	 law	theory	and	ICL	can	 illuminate	
each	other.	 	My	specific	focus	is	on	providing	a	framework	for	articulating	the	deontic	
constraints	 appropriate	 for	 ICL.	 	 There	 are	 numerous	 other	 important	 questions	 that	
could	be	asked	by	criminal	law	theory	about	ICL,	and	for	which	I	believe	a	coherentist	
method	 would	 be	 fruitful,	 even	 though	 they	 are	 beyond	 the	 topic	 selected	 for	 this	
particular	thesis.			
Justification	 of	 Criminal	 Law	 -	 A	 lot	 of	 interesting	 criminal	 law	 theory	 now	
focuses	not	on	the	deontic	justification	of	specific	doctrines,	but	rather	the	political	theory	
















some	extent,	 those	questions	of	 general	 justification	are	 logically	prior	 to	 the	 issues	 I	
address	here.	After	all,	if	the	system	as	a	whole	is	not	justified	and	should	not	exist,	then	








directions.	 For	 example,	 ICL	 is	 accused	 of	 being	 a	 hegemonic	 tool	 of	 powerful	 states	
designed	to	unfairly	target	perpetrators	in	less	powerful	countries.		At	the	same	time,	ICL	



























are	 all	 crucial	 and	 urgent	 issues	 for	 ICL,	 and	 they	 are	 also	 certainly	 questions	 about	





powerful.	 	Second,	assuming	that	the	ICC	is	applying	reasonable	 interpretations	of	 the	
posited	selection	criteria,	 there	may	be	plausible	argument	 to	add	diverse	geographic	
distribution	as	a	legitimate	criterion.		Third,	one	could	tap	into	thinking	on	distributive	









Sociology	 of	 Knowledge	 and	 Critical	 Discourse	 Analysis:	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	
advocate	a	coherentist	method,	which	accepts	that	current	understandings	are	a	product	
of	 human	 conversations,	 and	 seeks	 to	 improve	 those	 understandings	 through	 further	
inspection	and	debate.		As	a	result,	one	could	take	a	more	sociological	angle,	taking	ICL	as	
a	‘field’	and	looking	critically	at	who	is	speaking	and	the	ideologies	and	power	imbalances	














critical	 discourse	 analysis,51	 because	 coherentism	 requires	 vigilance	 for	 distortions,	
biases	 and	 assumptions	 embedded	 in	 available	 understandings.52	 	 Thus,	 this	 type	 of	





























53	 Despite	 the	 above-mentioned	 affinities,	 coherentism	 and	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 have	 some	
differences	in	preoccupation,	vocabulary	and	valence.	As	for	preoccupations,	critical	discourse	analysis	is	
primarily	 sociological,	 whereas	 my	 inquiry	 is	 primarily	 normative	 and	 philosophical:	 setting	 up	 the	
framework	 for	 normative	 inquiry.	 	 My	 framework	 draws	 on	 sociological	 and	 critical	 inquiry	 where	 it	
illuminates	 a	 problem.	 As	 for	 vocabulary,	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 draws	 on	 different	 and	 distinctive	
vocabularies	 (eg	 Bourdieu’s),	 often	 with	 a	 strong	 postmodern	 flavour.	 	 Coherentism	 falls	 within	 an	
analytical	philosophical	tradition,	which	prizes	clarity	and	avoids	the	obscurantism	seen	in	some	critical	
works.	As	for	valence,	many	critical	works	bog	down	in	deconstruction,	unveiling	that	every	practice	and	





literature.	 	 And	 yet	 I	 am	 acutely	 aware	 that,	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 conciseness	 and	
accessibility,	 I	am	at	many	points	skimming	the	surface	of	many	intricate	debates.	 	To	




Furthermore,	 this	 initial	 foray	 draws	 heavily	 on	 works	 written	 in	 English,	 and	 the	





outline	 some	 the	 other	 issues	 ripe	 for	 inquiry:	 the	 legality	 principle	 and	 the	 role	 of	












































liberal	 principles	 and	 ‘law	 and	 order’	 considerations.	 	 I	 seek	 to	 point	 out	 that	 ICL	
discourse	often	features	an	additional	dynamic.		In	ICL,	the	distortions	often	result	from	
habits	 of	 reasoning	 that	 are	 progressive	 and	 appropriate	 in	 human	 rights	 law	 and	
humanitarian	law,	but	which	become	problematic	when	transplanted	without	adequate	
reflection	to	a	criminal	law	system.		I	highlight	three	kinds	of	such	reasoning:	interpretive	











both	 in	earlier	stages	after	World	War	 II	and	again	with	 the	renaissance	of	 ICL,	when	
Tribunals	 were	 created	 in	 the	 mid-1990s.1	 	 (By	 ‘fundamental	 principles’	 I	 refer	 to	
principles	such	as	the	culpability	and	legality	principles.2)	Such	principles	distinguish	a	










enterprise’,6	 but	 scholars	 also	 raised	 concerns	 about	many	 other	 doctrines,	 including	






















taking	 seriously	 ICL’s	 proclamations.	 	 After	 all,	 mainstream	 ICL	 does	 not	 reject	
fundamental	principles,	but	rather	sees	itself	as	fully	compliant.	I	propose	that	we	first	
look	for	more	subtle	causes	of	distortion.		I	do	so	in	the	hopes	that	we	can	become	aware	







that	 were	 transplanted	 from	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 law,	 without	 adequate	
recognition	that	the	new	context	–	criminal	law	–	requires	different	thinking.	In	creating	
ICL,	jurists	drew	on	criminal	law	as	well	as	international	human	rights	and	humanitarian	
law.	 	 Human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 law	 provided	 substantive	 content	 as	 well	 as	 a	
familiar	 framework	 for	 internationalized	 oversight.	 I	 argue	 that,	 in	 bringing	 together	
criminal	 law	 and	 human	 rights/humanitarian	 law,	 ICL	 initially	 absorbed	 some	



























offering	 a	 valuable	 remedy	 and	 means	 of	 enforcement	 by	 punishing	 violators.	 ICL	
professionals	eagerly	adopted	and	sought	to	respect	the	forms	and	principles	of	criminal	




them	as	 if	 they	were	mere	 ‘doctrinal’	constraints,	and	thus	narrowed	or	circumvented	
them	 with	 standard	 interpretive	 moves.	 	 I	 agree	 that	 criminal	 justice	 required	 an	
additional	type	of	reasoning	–	deontic	reasoning	–	that	directly	and	normatively	explores	
the	 principled	 limitations	 on	 blame	 and	 punishment.	 	 Even	 more	 interestingly,	 the	
problem	is	not	just	inadequate	engagement	with	these	special	moral	constraints,	but	that	
assumptions	of	human	rights	and	humanitarian	law	reasoning	can	actively	work	at	cross-
purposes	 to	 fundamental	 principles,	 when	 those	 assumptions	 are	 uncritically	
transplanted	into	a	penal	system.			
In	this	chapter,	I	present	three	of	the	‘modes’	by	which	this	distortion	occurs.	One	
mode	 is	 the	 influence	of	 interpretive	approaches	 from	human	rights	and	humanitarian	
law,	such	as	victim-focused	teleological	reasoning.		Such	reasoning	not	only	undermines	













and	 consequences	 of	 these	 areas	 of	 law,	 and	 thus	 neglecting	 the	 additional	 deontic	
principles	 that	 constrain	 punishment	 of	 individual	 human	 beings.	 A	 third	 mode	 is	
ideological	 assumptions,	 for	 example,	 about	 ‘progress’	 and	 ‘sovereignty’.	 	 These	
assumptions	can	 lead	 to	overly	hasty	embrace	of	expansive	doctrines	and	rejection	of	




cause	 of	 departures	 from	 fundamental	 principles.	 They	 are	 not.	 	 Other	 influences	 are	
undoubtedly	in	play.	For	example,	ICL	deals	with	violations	of	exceptional	magnitude	and	
severity,	and	studies	indicate	that	the	more	severe	the	crime,	the	greater	the	perceived	
pressure	 to	 convict	 and	 the	greater	 the	 likelihood	of	perceiving	an	accused	person	as	
responsible	for	the	crime.11	Another	possible	influence	could	be	the	incentive	of	judges	
and	professionals	in	an	emerging	field	to	demonstrate	the	efficacy	of	their	field	and	to	
increase	 their	 influence	 and	 prestige	 by	 expanding	 the	 scope	 and	 role	 of	 ICL.12	
Reputational	incentives	may	also	have	a	subtle	impact;	for	example,	at	least	in	the	early	
days	 of	 the	 renaissance	 of	 ICL,	 the	 judge	 or	 jurist	 who	 espoused	 conviction-friendly	
interpretations	could	reliably	expect	to	be	applauded	as	progressive	and	compassionate	























However,	 my	 topic	 here	 is	 the	 reasoning,	 and	 what	 is	 important	 for	 present	
purposes	 is	 that	 the	 reasoning	 in	 ICL	 is	 often	 different,	 in	 interesting	ways,	 from	 the	
national	law	discourse.		Particularly	in	the	first	decade	of	the	renaissance	of	ICL	(roughly	
1995-2005),	there	was	relatively	little	awareness	of	any	incongruity	with	fundamental	
principles;	 indeed,	 the	 system	 prided	 itself	 as	 an	 exemplary	 liberal	 system.	 The	
interesting	 and	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 these	 distortions	 in	 ICL	 reasoning	 is	 that	 the	
participants	 are	 often	 applying	 what	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 sound	 legal	 methods	 with	
appropriately	liberal	aims.		
Thus,	 even	 if	 other	 factors	 may	 be	 in	 play,	 the	 impact	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
humanitarian	 assumptions	 remains	 of	 particular	 interest	 because	 it	 offers	 not	 only	 a	
‘why’	 but	 also	 a	 ‘how’.	 Reliance	 on	 these	 assumptions	 and	methods	 of	 argumentation	
furnishes	 the	analytical	 steps	 by	which	 such	departures	are	effected	and	provides	 the	




law	 context,	 liberal	 sensitivities	 focus	 on	 protecting	 individuals	 from	 inappropriate	
coercive	 power	 of	 the	 state.	 In	 ICL,	 however,	 prosecution	 and	 conviction	 are	 often	
conceptualized	 as	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 victims'	 human	 right	 to	 a	 remedy.14	 Such	 a	
conceptualization	subtly	encourages	reliance	on	human	rights	methodology	and	norms,	
and	also	shifts	the	preoccupation	of	participants.15	Many	traditionally	liberal	actors	(such	

























from	 the	 criminal	 law	machinery,	 i.e.	 the	 principles	 now	 restrain	 us.	 Thus	 advocates	




addressed	 to	 collective	 entities	 (eg.	 states),	 and	 thus	 are	 not	 directly	 constrained	 by	
	
16	W	Schabas,	‘Sentencing	by	International	Tribunals:	A	Human	Rights	Approach’,	(1997)	7	Duke	Journal	of	
Comparative	 and	 International	 Law	 461,	 at	 515,	 observes	 this	 shift	 with	 respect	 to	 human	 rights	
nongovernmental	organizations	(NGOs).	More	subtly,	human	rights	NGOs	generally	retain	their	affinity	for	
procedural	rights,	but	on	substantive	principles	they	tend	to	favour	broad	inculpatory	principles	and	to	









25	Yale	 Journal	 of	 International	Law	89,	 at	95	 (‘escape	 conviction’);	B	Womack,	 ‘The	Development	and	
Recent	Application	of	the	Doctrine	of	Command	Responsibility,	with	Particular	Reference	to	the	Mens	Rea	









principles	 like	 culpability	 or	 fair	 labeling.	 	 Thus,	 copying	 rules	 and	 assumptions	 from	
human	rights	law	can	corrode	liberal	protective	principles,	if	one	fails	to	fully	consider	
the	context	shift	to	criminal	law.	






2005).	 	After	that	period,	there	was	an	interesting	shift	 in	ICL	discourse	–	the	 ‘deontic	






As	 the	 following	 analysis	 may	 at	 times	 seem	 rather	 critical,	 some	 important	
qualifications	 are	 in	 order.	 First,	 I	 by	 no	 means	 suggest	 that	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 is	







The	 doctrinal	 contradictions	 can	 be	 unearthed	 and	 resolved	 by	 reforms	 that	 align	
doctrines	 and	 principles.	 	 Indeed,	 that	 process	 is	 already	 well	 underway,	 and	 later	









techniques	 described	 here	 were	 particularly	 prevalent	 in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 re-
emergence	of	ICL,	but	they	have	been	diminishing	significantly.20		As	I	will	discuss	in	the	
final	 section	 (‘After	 the	 Identity	 Crisis’	 §2.5),	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 is	 already	 far	 more	
sophisticated	and	attentive	to	culpability	and	legality	than	it	initially	was.		Nonetheless,	
it	 is	 useful	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 reasoning	 techniques	 discussed	 here,	 as	 they	 do	 still	
frequently	 crop	 up	 in	 ICL	 argumentation.	 	 Given	 that	 ICL	 draws	 content	 from	human	
rights	 law	and	humanitarian	 law,	 it	 is	understandable	and	predictable	 that	 inapposite	
assumptions	may	still	be	absorbed	along	with	that	content.		
Third,	 and	 most	 crucially,	 where	 I	 highlight	 a	 problematic	 structure	 of	
argumentation	in	a	case,	 it	does	not	mean	I	disagree	with	the	outcome	reached	in	that	
case.21	 	A	court	or	scholar	might	employ	a	problematic	argument	and	yet	the	outcome	
might	 be	 defensible	 on	 more	 thoughtful	 grounds.	 	 Furthermore,	 where	 I	 discuss	 an	
internal	contradiction,	it	should	not	be	assumed	that	I	believe	that	the	doctrine	is	wrong	
and	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 principle	 is	 necessarily	 correct.	 	 To	 evaluate	 how	 best	 to	





setting	 aside	 for	 now	 substantive	 normative	 evaluation	 of	 the	 principles.	 	 That	
substantive	evaluation	will	be	the	focus	of	the	remaining	chapters	of	this	work.	My	goal	

















ICL	 jurisprudence	 proclaims	 that	 it	 follows	 particularly	 stringent	 standards	 in	














strictly	 construed	 and	 shall	 not	 be	 extended	 by	 analogy.	 In	 case	 of	 ambiguity,	 the	
definition	shall	be	interpreted	in	favour	of	the	person	being	investigated,	prosecuted	or	
convicted.’	
Notwithstanding	 these	 proclamations	 of	 principle,	 ICL	 thinking	 has	 frequently	
been	 influenced	 by	 the	 distinctively	 ‘liberal’,	 ‘broad’,	 ‘progressive’,	 and	 ‘dynamic’	










HR	 2,	 Judge	 Rodolfo	 Piza,	 paras.	 6	 and	 12	 (‘necessity	 of	 a	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 the	 norms	 that	 it	
guarantees	and	a	restrictive	interpretation	of	those	that	allow	them	to	be	limited’);	Bámaca	Velásquez	Case	
-	Series	C	No.	70	[2000]	IACHR	7,	separate	Judgment	of	Judge	Sergio	Garcia	Marquez,	para.	3	(‘progressive	
interpretation’,	 ‘guiding	 momentum	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 law,	 which	 strives	 to	 take	 the	 real	
protection	of	human	rights	increasingly	further’).	Similarly,	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	is	









practitioners	 to	 draw	 not	 only	 on	 the	 norms	 but	 also	 on	 these	 familiar	 interpretive	
approaches.	 ICL	 discourse	 has	 frequently	 borne	 the	 fingerprints	 of	 the	 distinct	
interpretive	 approach	 from	 human	 rights	 law.	 	 As	 just	 one	 example,	 the	 Darfur	
Commission,	in	interpreting	genocide,	invoked	the	principle	of	effectiveness	and	giving	
maximal	effect.28	 	That	approach	is	familiar	from	general	international	law	and	human	
rights	 in	particular.	 	Without	getting	 into	 the	merits	of	 the	 two	approaches	here,	 I	am	
simply	pointing	out	that	a	practice	of	maximal	construction	is	the	diametric	opposite	of	
the	announced	principle	of	strict	construction.		
A	 reasoning	 technique	 commonly	 used	 in	 ICL	 is	 (i)	 to	 adopt	 a	 purposive	
interpretive	 approach;	 (ii)	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 exclusive	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 an	 ICL	
enactment	is	to	maximize	victim	protection;	and	(iii)	to	allow	this	presumed	object	and	
purpose	to	dominate	over	other	considerations,	including	if	necessary	the	text	itself.	The	
principle	 of	 strict	 construction	 fails	 to	 constrain	 this	 technique	 because,	 as	 in	 many	
national	 systems,	 this	 principle	 is	 applied	only	 as	 a	 final	 resort,	after	 other	 canons	of	
construction	have	failed	to	solve	the	question.29	If	we	apply,	at	a	prior	stage,	a	single-value	
teleological	 approach	 that	 simply	maximizes	victim	protection,	 then	 there	 is	never	an	
ambiguity	left	for	strict	construction	to	resolve.30	All	ambiguities	will	have	already	been	
	
27	 ‘[S]ince	 the	primary	beneficiaries	of	human	rights	 treaties	are	not	States	or	governments	but	human	
beings,	the	protection	of	human	rights	calls	for	a	more	liberal	approach	than	that	normally	applicable	in	
the	 case	 of	 ambiguous	 provisions	 of	 multilateral	 treaties’:	 Keith	 Cox	 v	 Canada,	 Communication	 No.	
539/1993,	Views	31	October	1994,	A/50/40,	Vol.	 II,	Annex	X,	sect.	M,	at	105-29,	reproduced	 in	(1994)	






















stages.	 	 It	 is	 ‘reductive’	 because	 it	 assumes	 a	 single	 purpose	 (maximizing	 victim	
protection),	 ignoring	 that	 every	 enactment	 delineates	 a	 boundary	 between	 multiple	
competing	purposes.		It	is	‘aggressive’	because	it	uses	that	(presumed)	single	purpose	to	
override	other	tools	of	construction,	such	as	the	text	and	context.	
Here	is	an	example	of	the	 ‘reductive’	(or	 ‘blinkered’)	approach,	 i.e.	presuming	a	
single	purpose.	 	 ICTY	jurisprudence	has	often	asserted	that	the	purpose	of	the	Geneva	
Conventions	is	to	‘ensure	the	protection	of	civilians	to	the	maximum	extent	possible’,31	
using	 this	 proposition	 to	 prefer	 a	 ‘less	 rigorous	 standard’	 in	 interpretation	 of	 its	
provisions.32	However,	it	is	doubtful	that	the	Geneva	Conventions	can	credibly	be	said	to	
reflect	a	singular	purpose.33	 If	 the	Geneva	Conventions	really	had	one	sole	purpose	of	
‘maximizing’	 the	 protection	 of	 civilians,	 then	 they	would	 contain	 only	 a	 single	 article,	
forbidding	any	use	of	 force	or	violence	that	could	affect	civilians.	 	 Instead,	 the	Geneva	



















one	presumed	purpose	to	eclipse	all	other	 interpretive	considerations.	 	 In	Čelebići	the	
Appeals	Chamber	held	that	
to	 maintain	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 legal	 regimes	 [international	 and	 internal	 armed	
conflicts]	and	 their	criminal	consequences	 in	respect	of	similarly	egregious	acts	because	of	 the	




warrants	 scepticism.	 The	 Geneva	 Conventions	 contain	 over	 300	 articles	 regulating	
international	armed	conflict	and	only	one	short	article	on	internal	conflicts,	which	was	
adopted	only	after	acrimonious	debate.36	The	Conventions	criminalize	some	violations	in	
international	 conflicts	 but,	 pointedly,	 do	 not	 do	 so	 in	 internal	 conflicts.	 It	 strains	










































































dissenting	 opinion	 of	 Judge	 Shahabuddeen	 in	Hadžihasanović.47	 He	 argued	 that	 strict	
construction	is	applied	only	at	the	final	stage,	after	other	methods	have	been	applied;48	
that	the	provision	must	first	be	interpreted	by	reference	to	object	and	purpose;49	and	that	
the	 purpose	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 crimes	 do	 not	 go	 unpunished.50	 	 The	 third	 step	 of	 this	
argument	is	an	example	of	reductive	(‘single-issue’)	of	teleological	reasoning.		Moreover,	



















































while	off	duty	and	without	her	knowledge.59	However,	what	he	does	not	 show	 is	 that	






















A	 common	 type	 of	 argument	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 ‘the	 scope	 of	 liability	 is	
formally	 over-inclusive,	 but	 only	 in	 order	 to	make	 up	 for	 severe	 practical	 dangers	 of	
under-inclusiveness’.61	Thus	‘the	hope	is	that	the	threat	of	serious	criminal	liability	for	
‘mere’	 negligence	 will	 lead	 even	 the	 most	 reluctant	 commander	 (in	 order	 to	 protect	
himself)	to	take	all	reasonable	measures	to	prevent	war	crimes	by	subordinates’.62	The	





Another	 illustration	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 ‘joint	 criminal	 enterprise’	 (JCE)	
doctrine	in	Tribunal	jurisprudence.		JCE	doctrine,	developed	by	Tribunal	judges,	came	to	
amalgamate	the	most	sweeping	inculpatory	features	of	various	national	doctrines	into	a	
single	 doctrine	 of	 unusual	 breadth.	 	 Under	 JCE,	 a	 relatively	 minor	 contribution	 to	 a	
criminal	enterprise,	 including	a	reluctant	contribution,	can	render	a	person	 liable	as	a	
principal	 for	 every	 crime	 committed	 in	 the	 criminal	 enterprise,	 which	 can	 involve	
thousands	 of	 crimes,	 nationwide,	 structurally	 and	 geographically	 remote	 from	 the	
accused.64		As	a	result	of	these	features,	the	doctrine	has	been	wryly	referred	to	as	‘Just	
Convict	Everybody’.65			





























1)	…	 If	 this	 is	 so,	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 Statute	does	not	 confine	 itself	 to	 providing	 for	
jurisdiction	 over	 those	 persons	 who	 plan,	 instigate,	 order,	 physically	 perpetrate	 a	 crime	 or	
otherwise	aid	and	abet	in	its	planning,	preparation	or	execution.	The	Statute	does	not	stop	there.67		
The	reasoning	employed	in	this	passage	is	single-issue	teleological	reasoning	(it	focuses	
on	 maximizing	 reach	 and	 does	 not	 consider	 other	 possible	 aims,	 such	 as	 restricting	





















joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 liability	 does	 not	 require	 awareness	 of	 a	 ‘probability’	 that	 a	 crime	would	 be	














































must	 be	 rendered	 harsher	 still:	 ‘it	 is	 unacceptable	 to	 allow	 commanders	 to	 escape	
criminal	 responsibility	 for	 their	 subordinates’	 gender	 crimes	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	
commanders	lacked	“knowledge”’.78	Her	proposal	is	to	deem	the	knowledge	requirement	
to	 be	 satisfied	 automatically	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 historic	 frequency	 of	 sexual	 offences	 by	
troops.	 	 Such	 an	 approach	 would	 certainly	 facilitate	 convictions,	 but	 it	 would	 create	
vicarious	absolute	liability	for	serious	international	crimes,	which	may	conflict	with	the	












difficulties	 in	 making	 the	 treatment	 compatible	 with	 its	 generally	 enlightened	 ideas:	 I	 Tallgren,	 ‘The	
Sensibility	and	Sense	of	International	Criminal	Law’,	(2002)	13	EJIL	561,	at	576.	Wessel	argues	that,	when	













some	 commentators	 for	 lacking	 sensitivity	 to	 fundamental	 principles,82	 for	 departing	
from	previous	ICL	pronouncements	on	the	role	of	moral	choice,83	and	for	disregarding	
the	 fact	 that	 the	only	way	 for	Erdemović	 to	be	 innocent	was	 to	be	dead.84	What	 is	 of	
interest	 for	 present	 purposes,	 however,	 is	 not	 whether	 the	 decision	 was	 correct	 or	




violations	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 occurring	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 former	
Yugoslavia	and	to	contribute	thereby	to	the	restoration	and	maintenance	of	peace'.85	By	
focusing	 on	 this	 onerous	 responsibility	 of	 ‘halting’	 violations,	 the	majority	 could	 only	
favour	sending	a	strong	message:	






to	 satisfy.	 The	 majority	 dismissed	 deontic	 concerns	 about	 personal	 culpability	 as	
‘intellectual	hair-splitting’	and	 ‘metaphysics’,88	and	 instead	emphasized	the	 ‘normative	

























message.	 Ironically,	 although	 the	 majority	 purported	 to	 reject	 ‘utilitarian	 logic’,90	 its	
reasoning	was	entirely	utilitarian	and	focused	on	future	deterrence.91	It	was	through	this	
process	of	reasoning	that	a	system	that	aims	to	deal	only	the	persons	most	responsible	for	







In	 conclusion,	 ICL	 –	 at	 least	 in	 its	 early	 resurgence	 –	 showed	 a	 contradictory	
allegiance	to	interpretive	assumptions	from	two	different	regimes.	For	example,	at	the	
same	time	that	the	ICTY	insisted	that	it	scrupulously	applies	only	rules	that	are	‘beyond	
any	doubt	 customary	 international	 law’,93	 it	 also	 took	credit	 for	having	 ‘expanded	 the	
boundaries	of	 international	humanitarian	 and	 international	 criminal	 law’.94	 This	 is	 an	
overt	contradiction:	the	Tribunal	cannot	both	apply	the	law	strictly	as	it	was	and	expand	
it.	 Such	 contradictions	 are	 the	 products	 of	 the	 conflicting	 normative	 assumptions	
simultaneously	 permeating	 ICL.	 While	 criminal	 law	 principles	 forbid	 the	 judicial	
expansion	of	norms,	human	rights	and	humanitarian	law	assumptions	lead	us	to	embrace	





















Faced	 with	 familiar-looking	 provisions,	 ICL	 practitioners	 often	 assume	 that	 the	 ICL	
prohibitions	are,	or	ought	to	be,	coextensive	with	their	human	rights	or	humanitarian	law	
counterparts.	 	 The	 problem	 arises	 when	 one	 assumes	 co-extensiveness	 of	 content	
without	 considering	 that	 these	 bodies	 of	 law	 have	 different	 purposes	 and	 different	
consequences,	and	thus	entail	different	constraints.	
Human	 rights	 law	 and	 humanitarian	 law	 apply	 to	 collective	 entities	 -	 states	 or	
parties	to	conflict.	They	focus	on	systems,	seeking	to	improve	the	practices	of	collective	
entities	(states	or	parties	to	conflict)	in	order	to	advance	protection	of	and	respect	for	
identified	 beneficiaries.	 The	 remedies	 are	 civil	 remedies,	 such	 as	 a	 cessation	 of	 the	
conduct,	 an	 apology,	 an	 undertaking	 of	 non-repetition,	 and	 possibly	 compensation	 or	
other	efforts	to	restore	the	status	quo	ante.95		
The	primary	focus	of	ICL,	on	the	other	hand,	 is	on	the	culpability	of	 individuals.		
Furthermore,	 the	 scope	 of	 ICL	 is	 rightly	 narrower:	 it	 addresses	 only	 the	most	 serious	
crimes	of	concern	to	the	international	community	as	a	whole.96	Moreover,	ICL	is	enforced	
through	the	arrest,	stigmatization,	punishment,	and	imprisonment	of	individual	human	













A	 simple	 form	 of	 substantive	 conflation	 is	 the	 assumption	 that,	 because	 a	
prohibition	is	recognized	in	human	rights	or	humanitarian	law,	it	therefore	must	be	(or	
ought	to	be)	criminalized	in	ICL	as	well.	An	example	of	this	is	the	frequently-voiced	view	
that	 ‘there	 is	 widespread	 recognition	 that	 every	 violation	 of	 the	 law	 of	war	 is	 a	war	
crime’.97	Given	that	the	laws	of	war	contain	detailed	regulations	concerning,	for	example,	
waterproofing	of	identity	cards,	it	is	implausible	to	claim	that	every	violation	of	the	law	
of	 war	 constitutes	 a	 war	 crime.	 	 Other	 examples	 of	 conflation	 assume	 that	 conduct	
violating	 human	 rights	 law	 is	 also	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity,	without	 considering	 the	
additional	 constraints	 relevant	 to	 ICL.98	 	 The	 additional	 constraints	 include	 not	 only	
fundamental	principles	(such	as	legality	and	personal	culpability),	but	also	the	questions	
of	 whether	 criminal	 law	 (and	 indeed	 ICL)	 is	 the	 appropriate	 tool	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
problem.99		 	





those	 rules	 are	 not	 originally	 criminal	 law	 rules,	 and	 hence	 that	 they	 need	 to	 be	
scrutinized	for	compliance	with	the	principles	peculiar	to	criminal	law.	










Global	 Gag	 Rule	 in	 Peru	 and	 Its	 Criminal	 Consequences’,	 Michigan	 State	 University's	 Women	 and	
International	Development	Program,	Working	Paper	#29,	2004,	at	12	(available	at	www.isp.msu.edu/wid),	








guarantees	have	been	 identified	as	 ‘indispensable’.101	Assume	that	a	 judge	has	made	a	
ruling	that	an	accused	was	too	disruptive	to	remain	in	the	courtroom,	but	in	hindsight	the	
judge	is	found	to	have	applied	the	standard	erroneously.	It	would	follow	that	(i)	the	error	
breached	 the	guarantee	of	 the	 right	 to	be	present;	 (ii)	 the	breach,	 although	 it	may	be	






individual	 criminal	 responsibility	 for	war	 crimes.103	However,	 if	 an	 identical	 standard	
were	applied	 in	 ICL,	 as	authorities	assume,104	 then	by	 the	 same	chain	of	 reasoning	as	
above	 it	would	 follow	 that	 the	 breach	 of	 even	 one	 guarantee	not	 only	 requires	 a	 civil	
remedy	but	also	constitutes	a	war	crime.	 	On	a	 literal	application	of	the	provision,	the	










































However,	 this	 criticism	 overlooks	 the	 structural	 difference.	 In	 human	 rights	 law,	 the	
knowledge	of	the	individual	denying	the	detention	is	irrelevant,	because	the	focus	is	on	

















jurists	 did	 not	 always	 adequately	 ponder	 the	 additional	 moral	 constraints,	 such	 as	
personal	 culpability,	 that	are	necessary	when	a	provision	 is	 converted	 into	a	 criminal	
prohibition.	
	In	 order	 to	 show	why	 the	 conflation	was	problematic,	 I	must	 briefly	 outline	 a	
contradiction	 with	 the	 culpability	 principle.	 	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 recognizes	 the	
principle	 of	 culpability	 as	 the	 ‘foundation	 of	 criminal	 responsibility’.108	 	 Tribunal	
jurisprudence	 declares	 it	 ‘firmly	 established’	 that	 ‘for	 the	 accused	 to	 be	 criminally	
culpable	 his	 conduct	 must	 have	 …	 contributed	 to,	 or	 have	 had	 an	 effect	 on,	 the	
commission	of	the	crime’.109		Nonetheless,	Tribunal	jurisprudence	allows	a	commander	
to	be	held	liable	as	a	party	to	offences	of	subordinates110	even	when	there	was	no	possible	











Additional	 Protocol	 I	 to	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 (AP	 I)	 rightly	 distinguished	

































humanitarian	 law.	 The	 humanitarian	 law	duty	 quite	 reasonably	 does	 not	 require	 any	
causal	contribution	by	the	commander	to	the	crimes.		The	purpose	of	the	humanitarian	
law	provision	is	to	create	better	systems	and	thus	to	improve	compliance	–	in	this	case,	to	
promote	 compliance	of	 subordinates	with	humanitarian	 law	by	 requiring	 a	 system	of	
prevention	 and	 repression.116	 But	 before	 copying	 and	 pasting	 humanitarian	 law	
provisions	 into	 criminal	 law,	 we	 have	 to	 pause	 to	 consider	 the	 different	 focus	 and	
consequences	of	criminal	law,	and	hence	the	additional	moral	constraints.		



























should	 create	 liability	 only	 if	 that	 failure	 encouraged	 or	 facilitated	 later	 crimes.120	 In	
rejecting	 the	 defence	 argument,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 relied	 on	 Article	 87(3)	 of	 the	
Protocol,	noting	that	it	imposes	a	duty	to	punish	persons	responsible	for	past	crimes.121	
However,	 the	 Chamber's	 argument	 overlooks	 that	 Article	 87(3)	 deals	 with	 a	 duty	 in	
humanitarian	law	(collective	civil	responsibility),	not	the	assignment	of	personal	criminal	
liability.		Had	the	Chamber	studied	the	precedents	with	more	attention	to	the	structural	
differences	 between	 IHL	 and	 ICL,	 it	 might	 have	 noticed	 that	 Additional	 Protocol	 I	
specifically	separated	the	broader	humanitarian	law	duty	from	the	narrower	criminal	law	
provision	 in	 Article	 86(2),	 and	 that	 the	 separation	 tracked	 the	 limits	 of	 personal	
culpability.		
Substantive	 conflation	 allows	 judges	 and	 jurists	 to	 proceed	 in	 complacent	
confidence	 that	 they	 are	 simply	 following	 ‘precedents’,	 missing	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
‘precedents’	are	actually	from	non-criminal	areas	of	law.	As	a	result,	broader	norms	are	




























The	 third	 set	 of	 transplanted	 assumptions	 is	 what	 I	 will	 call	 ‘ideological’	
assumptions.	 	 These	 include	 common	 narratives	 and	 heuristics	 around	 concepts	 like	
‘progress’	or	‘sovereignty’.		I	will	show	how	such	assumptions,	familiar	in	human	rights	






elemental	 opposition	 to	 ‘progress’.	 Sovereignty	 is	 the	 ‘traditional	 enemy’,123	 the	


















‘which	 human	 rights	 law	 is	 still	 in	 the	 process	 of	 extirpating’.125	 Sovereignty	 is	 often	
portrayed	as	the	obstacle	raised	by	short-sighted	lawyers,	diplomats,	and	bureaucrats,126	














































somewhat	 overstated,	 because	 ‘sovereignty’	 may	 often	 reflect	 other	 legitimate	 pro-
human	 objectives,	 and	 is	 not	 always	 a	 matter	 of	 elites	 ‘jealously	 clinging’	 to	 their	
prerogatives.	135)		The	crucial	point	here	is	that	that	the	importation	of	these	assumptions	
into	 ICL	discourse	 routinely	 overlooks	 a	 significant	difference	between	 ICL	 and	 those	
other	 fields.	 In	 human	 rights	 or	 humanitarian	 law,	 it	 is	 usually	 accurate	 to	 ascribe	
limitations	in	instruments	to	states'	wishes	to	preserve	governmental	freedom	of	action	
(sovereignty),	since	the	treaties	limit	state	behaviour.			





ascribe	 limitations	 to	 ‘sovereignty’	 or	 ‘compromise’,	 i.e.	 the	 usual	 business	 of	 short-





























Scholars	 such	 as	 Robert	 Cryer	 have	 convincingly	 demonstrated	 the	 double	
standards	of	states:	namely,	states	tend	to	take	a	wider	view	of	definitions	of	crimes	and	
principles	when	 they	are	 imposing	 them	on	others	 than	when	 their	 own	officials	 and	
nationals	may	be	scrutinized.138	While	such	double	standards	certainly	warrant	reproach,	
we	are	 still	 left	with	 the	question	of	whether	 the	broader	or	narrower	version	of	 the	
doctrine	 is	 the	more	 appropriate	one.	Confronted	with	 such	discrepancies,	 ICL	 jurists	
routinely	 adopt	 the	 same	 assumption	 as	 would	 human	 rights	 practitioners:	 that	 the	










sharpening	 many	 people’s	 sensitivity	 to	 fairness.	 	 Conversely,	 drafters	 or	 judges	
articulating	 rules	 for	 ‘others’	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 direct	 incentive	 to	 scrutinize	
compliance	with	fundamental	principles.140	
Thus,	 the	simplistic	 ‘progress-versus-sovereignty’	dichotomy	can	 lead	 jurists	 to	
dismiss	 more	 principled	 formulations	 too	 quickly.	 Ironically,	 ICL	 practitioners	 can	
embrace	 the	more	 illiberal	 doctrines	 as	 the	more	 ‘progressive’,	 and	 reflexively	 reject	















has	 argued	 that	definitions	of	 crimes	 against	humanity	 subsequent	 to	 the	Nuremberg	
definition	‘are	severely	limited	in	their	reach,	and	do	not	reflect	customary	international	










codification	 is	 generally	 welcomed	 as	 valuable	 or	 even	 essential	 in	 a	 modern	 liberal	




Their	 analyses	 adopt	 ‘progress	 versus	 sovereignty’	 assumption,	 focusing	 only	 on	 the	
benefits	 of	 expansive	 norms,	 benefits	 which	 they	 perceived	 to	 be	 frustrated	 by	 the	
unfortunate	myopia	 of	 governmental	 officials.	 Hunt's	 concern	 is	 that	 codification	will	
‘preclude	significantly	the	necessary	judicial	development	of	the	law’,	and	he	attributes	


















and	the	result	 is	 that	 ‘the	authors	of	 the	State	have	 limited	 the	chances	of	making	 the	





ended	 criminal	 norms	 originated	 in	 victors'	 justice,	 and	 fail	 to	 ask	whether	 that	 is	 a	




human	 rights	 context	 can	 assumptions	 can	 lead	 to	 hasty	 preference	 for	 expansive	











when	 a	 US	 court	 applied	 command	 responsibility	 to	 its	 own	 forces	 in	 Vietnam,	 the	











The	drafters	of	 the	 ICTY	and	 ICTR	Statutes,	 applying	 rules	uni-directionally	 to	others,	
wiped	out	the	requirement	of	causal	contribution,	perhaps	inadvertently,	by	blending	the	
criminal	and	non-criminal	provisions	of	AP	I.151	(5)	The	drafters	of	the	ICC	Statute,	once	
again	 in	 a	 position	 somewhat	 akin	 to	 the	 ‘veil	 of	 ignorance’,	 reinstated	 causal	
contribution.152			
The	double	standard	is	objectionable,	but	we	are	still	left	with	question	of	whether	










Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 accords	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 ‘significant	 legal	 value’.154	 The	
reinstatement	of	causal	contribution	in	the	Rome	Statute	could	have	served	as	a	clue	that	
fundamental	 principles	 are	 at	 stake,	 and	 an	 opportunity	 to	 discover	 contradictions	
between	Tribunal	jurisprudence	and	fundamental	principles.	Instead,	Judge	Hunt	simply	
observed	that	the	Statute	provision	was	the	result	of	‘negotiation	and	compromise’,	as	
was	 ‘patent	 …	 from	 the	 vast	 differences	 between	 …	 those	 provisions	 and	 existing	
instruments	such	as	 the	Statutes	of	 the	ad	hoc	Tribunals’,	and	hence	he	dismissed	the	
Statute	provision	as	 ‘of	very	limited	value’.155	Among	the	suppressed	premises	in	such	
















requirement	 in	 the	Rome	Statute	provision	as	a	 tragic	 concession	 to	 self-interest	and,	
satisfied	with	this	as	a	complete	explanation,	have	not	explored	the	possibility	that	it	has	
a	principled	basis.156		
Thus,	assumptions	about	progress	and	sovereignty	can	 lead	 ICL	participants	 to	
look	with	suspicion	upon	the	processes	most	likely	to	generate	liberal	doctrines,	and	to	
















only	speculate	as	 to	why	 ICL	has	shifted	 in	 this	way.	 	Part	of	 the	reason	could	be	 that	
practitioners	have	heeded	the	liberal	critique,	including	the	works	of	scholars	such	as	Kai	














experience),	 the	 increased	 conversation	 between	 legal	 systems	 (e.g.	 civil	 law	 and	
common	law),	and	the	ongoing	maturation	of	the	field	of	ICL.		Whatever	their	underlying	
causes,	 these	 developments	 are	 welcome	 and	 consistent	 with	 my	 stated	 hope	 that	





After	 sustained	 academic	 criticism	 for	 being	 too	 loose	 and	 liberal,	 it	 is	 entirely	
understandable	that	judges	might	swing	to	the	opposite	extreme,	by	adopting	approaches	
that	are	extremely	demanding	and	rarified,	in	the	name	of	rigour.		It	has	become	arguable	
that	 judges,	particularly	at	 the	 ICC,	may	be	 falling	at	 times	 into	 this	opposite	pitfall	of	
'Überdogmatisierung'	or	 ‘hypergarantismo‘:	overdoing	 the	criminal	 law	 theorizing	and	
overstating	the	deontic	constraints.	159		There	is	a	danger	that	judges,	aiming	to	show	that	
they	 are	 setting	 the	 highest	 standards,	may	 adopt	 incorrectly	 rarified	 conceptions	 of	
deontic	 constraints,	 as	 well	 as	 evidentiary	 and	 procedural	 requirements,	 which	 are	
beyond	 what	 transnational	 practice	 and	 underlying	 principles	 require.	 	 Such	 over-
corrections	may	contribute	(and	may	have	already	contributed)	to	the	collapses	of	cases	
that	 cost	millions	of	 euros	 to	 investigate	and	prosecute,	dashing	 the	hopes	of	victims,	
witnesses,	and	affected	communities.	
I	mentioned	two	potential160	examples	in	Chapter	1,	noting	widespread	criticisms	
of	 the	 reasoning	 in	 the	 acquittals	 in	Bemba	 (overturning	 a	 unanimous	Trial	 Chamber	

















method	(Chapters	3-5)	and	a	careful	study;	but	 I	note	that	 Judge	Monageng	 in	dissent	
makes	a	convincing	case	that	the	majority	misapplied	the	standard	given	the	evidence.163		
The	 stakes	 are	 high.	 	 If	 we	 contravene	 fundamental	 principles	 (properly	
understood)	 then	 we	 treat	 persons	 unjustly.	 	 However,	 if	 we	 are	 unnecessarily	
conservative	because	of	 an	unsupported	and	 inflated	understanding	of	 the	principles,	
then	we	undermine	the	beneficial	impact	of	the	system	without	good	reason.	Thus,	it	is	






All	 criminal	 justice	 systems	 at	 least	 occasionally	 adopt	 doctrines	 that	 arguably	
depart	 from	 fundamental	 principles.	 	 	 There	 are	 many	 possible	 reasons	 for	 such	
departures:	 preoccupation	 with	 law	 and	 order,	 revulsion	 at	 particular	 crimes,	 hasty	
analyses,	 authoritarian	 systems	 unmindful	 of	 principled	 constraints,	 or	 legitimate	
differences	of	understanding	about	the	principles.		In	this	chapter,	I	have	sought	to	reveal	

















such	 assumptions	 without	 adequate	 reflection	 on	 the	 context	 shift	 can	 create	 subtle	



















From	 a	 purely	 internal	 perspective,	 contradictions	 between	 a	 doctrine	 and	 principle	
could	be	 resolved	by	 correcting	 the	doctrine	or	by	 refining	 the	principle.	 	 In	order	 to	
decide	on	the	correct	resolution,	we	would	need	considerable	groundwork,	 to	help	us	
discuss	 the	 appropriate	 formulations	 of	 principles.	 	 This	 is	 what	 I	 attempt	 in	 the	
remainder	of	this	thesis.	



















































whether	 fundamental	 principles	 are	 even	 appropriate	 in	 the	 extraordinary	 contexts	
encountered	by	ICL.		I	argue	that,	even	in	extreme	contexts	of	collective	action	and	peer	
pressure,	we	must	still	consider	moral	constraints	like	culpability.	Second,	I	argue	that	































In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 address	 important	 preliminary	 challenges	 to	 any	 discussion	 of	








deontic	 principles.	 	 (2)	 This	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 replicating	 formulations	 of	




In	 response	 to	 various	 criticisms	 of	 criminal	 justice	 and	 liberal	 principles,	 I	
emphasize	 the	 ‘humanity’	 of	 criminal	 justice.	 	 Criminal	 justice	 and	 its	 restraining	
principles	 are	 sometimes	 portrayed	 as	 abstract,	 metaphysical,	 retributive,	 vengeful,	
Western,	or	ideologically	unmoored	from	experience.		But	criminal	law	serves	pro-social	
aims.	 	 Its	constraints	are	rooted	 in	compassion,	empathy,	and	regard	for	humanity.	An	











The	 simplest	 way	 to	 introduce	 this	 framework	 is	 to	 outline	 three	 significant	 ways	 of	



























The	 second	 movement	 was	 the	 liberal	 critique	 of	 ICL,	 which	 was	 introduced	 in	
Chapter	 2.3	 	 Under	 a	 liberal	 approach,	 formalist	 and	 teleological	 reasoning	 is	 not	
sufficient:	 one	 must	 also	 consider	 deontic	 constraints	 such	 as	 the	 limits	 of	 personal	
culpability.	 Sophisticated	 engagement	with	 fundamental	 principles	 led	 to	 a	 revitalized	
genre	of	 scholarship.	 	 It	has	also	entered	mainstream	 judicial	 thinking,	which	 today	 is	
much	more	mindful	of	deontic	constraints	and	rights	of	the	accused	(see	§2.5).		
The	 third	movement	 is	 the	critique	of	 the	 liberal	 critique.	 	 Scholars	 such	as	Mark	
Drumbl,	Mark	Osiel	and	others	have	pointed	out	that	the	assumptions	and	principles	of	
ordinary	 criminal	 law	 may	 not	 even	 be	 applicable	 or	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	
international	crimes	and	thus	should	not	be	extended	automatically	to	the	international	
plane.4	 	 For	 example,	 ICL	 crimes	 involve	 extraordinary	 collective	 dimensions	 and	
extensive	communal	engagement,	in	which	participation	is	not	so	self-evidently	‘deviant’,	
frustrating	 classic	 assumptions	 about	 ‘moral	 choice’	 and	 individual	 agency.5	 	Western	







































Although	 the	 liberal	 critique	 and	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 liberal	 critique	 appear	 to	 be	 in	
opposition,	my	aim	is	to	show	that	they	can	be	reconciled	in	a	new	account	that	overcomes	
the	most	plausible	objections	to	each	of	the	two	prior	approaches.	 	One	can	coherently	




those	 principles	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 special	 contexts	 encountered	 by	 ICL,	 which	




rooted	 in	 respect	 for	 the	 moral	 agency	 of	 individuals.	 	 I	 suggest	 that	 we	 have	 a	
responsibility	and	an	opportunity	to	explore	how	our	deontic	commitment	may	manifest	
differently	in	different	circumstances.	
My	 reflections	 on	 criticisms	 of	 liberal	 accounts	 in	 ICL	 have	 led	 me	 to	 a	 set	 of	













the	 purpose	 of	 the	 system	 is	 forward-looking,	 meliorative	 and	 pro-social;	 it	 seeks	 to	
advance	valuable	human	aims.	 	It	 is	not	just	about	vengeance,	nor	is	 it	a	symptom	of	a	
‘liberal	 legal	 disorder’	 that	 mindlessly	 reproduces	 a	 familiar	 system	 out	 of	 habit.		
Assessing	those	aims	helps	us	assess	how	criminal	law	can	work	productively	with	other	
social	mechanisms.	





(iii)	 Human	 experience	 (not	 individualist	 ideology):	 	 A	 criticism	 of	 liberal	
principles	 it	 that	 they	assume	an	unrealistic	worldview	that	 treats	humans	as	 isolated	
individuals	 abstracted	 from	 their	 social	 environment.	 	 However,	 a	 sound	 account	 of	








(v)	Human	 constructs	 (not	metaphysical):	 Another	 criticism	 rightly	 questions	
any	claims	that	deontic	principles	are	timeless	and	abstract	laws	deduced	from	a	priori	
metaphysical	 premises.	 	 However,	 I	 argue	 instead	 for	 a	 ‘coherentist’	 conception	 (see	
Chapter	4),	which	acknowledges	that	principles	of	justice	are	human	constructs	that	can	
be	explored	through	human	debates.			
(vii)	 Human	 activity	 (not	 Westphalian	 states):	 It	 is	 sometimes	 thought	 that	
criminal	law	can	only	be	carried	out	by	states,	which	makes	ICL	a	problematic	anomaly.		I	
argue,	however,	that	criminal	law	is	an	activity	carried	about	by	human	beings.		A	more	
general	 theory	 can	 contemplate	 criminal	 law	 not	 only	 states	 but	 also	 under	 other	
82	
	
structures	 of	 human	 governance.	 	 Doing	 so	 may	 expose	 assumptions	 in	 mainstream	
criminal	law	theory	and	raise	new	questions.				
In	 the	 above	 brief	 summaries,	 I	 am	 deliberately	 using	 the	 term	 ‘humanity’	 in	
different	 senses;	 each	usage	has	 to	be	understood	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	debate	 to	
which	it	responds.		Thus,	for	example,	when	I	emphasize	the	human	aims	of	criminal	law,	
I	am	not	excluding	protecting	the	environment	or	preventing	cruelty	to	animals	(on	the	
contrary,	 those	 should	 certainly	be	human	aims).	 	The	 context	 for	 that	point	 is	 that	 it	
responds	to	objections	that	criminal	 law	is	merely	about	vengeance	or	about	restoring	






























can	 however	 engage	 in	 a	 deontic	 analysis	 to	 see	what	 the	 underlying	 commitment	 to	
individuals	 requires	 in	 new	 and	 unusual	 contexts.	 In	 §	 3.3,	 I	 argue	 that	 a	 thoughtful	




against	 humanity	 or	 the	 requirements	 of	 command	 responsibility.	 A	 ‘fundamental	
principle’	 presumably	 includes	 (for	 now,	 and	 subject	 to	 further	 work	 in	 Chapter	 4)	
principles	 of	 culpability,	 legality,	 and	 possibly	 fair	 labeling.	 	 A	 ‘formulation	 of	 a	




























arguments	 that	 treat	 principles	 as	 black	 letter	 rules	 that	 might	 be	 sidestepped	 or	
downplayed,	 I	 lay	 out	 the	 deeper	 normative	 basis	 for	 compliance.	 	 Second,	 I	 address	


































mere	 stipulations	 of	 positive	 law,	 and	 one	 observes	 them	 hindering	 successful	
prosecutions,	 it	 is	 entirely	 understandable	 that	 one	 would	 employ	 the	 same	 clever	
doctrinal	techniques	that	are	used	to	avoid	or	minimize	any	problematic	rule.	
Accordingly,	it	is	worth	highlighting	some	of	the	reasons	why	ICL	should	comply	
with	 fundamental	 principles.	 	 There	 are	 at	 least	 four	 reasons;	 I	 will	 note	 two	 less	
important	 ones	 and	 proceed	 to	 the	 two	 more	 important	 ones.	 The	 first	 reason	 is	 to	





Robinson	 and	 John	 Darley	 have	 sought	 to	 demonstrate,	 ‘desert’	 may	 have	 ‘utility’:17	
conforming	 to	 broadly	 shared	notions	 of	 justice	 strengthens	 law’s	 influence	 on	norm-
internalization	(which	may	be	more	important	to	prevention	than	rational	calculations	of	

































The	 fourth	 reason	 is	 the	 deeper	 conceptual	 coherence	 of	 the	 system.23	 ICL	 is	 a	
project	 aimed	 at	 upholding	 human	 dignity	 and	 autonomy.	 	 If	 ICL,	 in	 its	 eagerness	 to	
protect	human	dignity	and	autonomy,	abandons	principles	that	are	themselves	based	on	


































and	humanity	are	 important	 in	 criminal	 justice.	 	This	 seems	counter-intuitive	because	
criminal	 law	 is	 obviously	 punitive.	 	 Moreover,	 criminal	 law	 theory	 can	 often	 be	 very	
cerebral	 and	analytical.	 	Nonetheless,	 I	 think	 that	 the	kernel	of	 justice	 is	 empathy.	 	As	


































weakness	 of	 the	 system	 and/or	 the	 urgent	 need	 for	 deterrence.29	 	 In	 such	 situations,	
fundamental	 principles	 like	 culpability	 and	 legality	 may	 seem	 like	 ‘unaffordable	
luxuries.’30			The	problem	with	most	such	arguments	is	that	they	rather	simply	‘shrug	off’	






The	second	argument	 is	 that	complicity	 in	major	atrocities	 leads	the	accused	to	



























law	and	no	 longer	protected	 it.33	 	 It	 also	might	 draw	 support	 from	 international	 legal	
doctrines	 that	 describe	 the	 transgressor	 as	 hostis	 humanis	 generis	 –	 the	 enemy	 of	

















which	 privileged	 authorities	 punish	 others,	 possibly	 from	 very	 different	 and	
























for	 one’s	 actions.39	 	 Moreover,	 criminal	 law	 differs	 from	 our	 responses	 to	 harms	 not	
caused	 by	 responsible	 agents,	 and	 it	 also	 differs	 from	 other	 legal	 responses,	 such	 as	
quarantine,	which	acts	for	public	safety	without	regard	to	‘fault’.		Criminal	law	recognizes	
and	 honours	 the	 accused	 as	 persons:	 as	 agents	 responsible	 and	 answerable	 for	 their	
actions.40	Criminal	law	is	predicated	precisely	on	that	personhood	and	responsibility;	its	
task	 is	 assessing	 the	 extent	 of	 accused	persons’	 criminal	 responsibility	 based	on	 their	
actions.		Criminal	law	is	not	employed	against	sharks,	or	bears,	or	rocks,	or	machines;	it	is	

































The	most	 important	 challenge	 is	 the	 normative	 argument	 that	 familiar	 principles	 are	
simply	not	appropriate	in	the	unusual	contexts	of	ICL	crimes.	Mark	Drumbl,	Mark	Osiel	
and	 others	 have	 convincingly	 argued	 against	 the	 automatic	 replication	 of	 the	
assumptions,	methods	and	principles	of	national	doctrinal	frameworks	in	ICL.42			Drumbl	




























contexts.	 	 However,	 I	would	 add	 a	 crucial	 caveat	 to	 these	 observations.	 	 Namely,	 this	





formulations?	 Mainstream	 criminal	 law	 theory	 is	 understandably	 predicated	 on	 the	
‘normal’	case:	a	generally	orderly	society,	in	which	a	single	overarching	state	is	the	law-
giver,	law-adjudicator	and	law-enforcer.	A	host	of	implicit	assumptions	about	that	context	
are	 unproblematic	 for	 the	 normal	 case.	 	 However,	 examining	 desert	 in	 the	 abnormal	




















criminal	 enterprises	 involving	 thousands	 of	 perpetrators	 playing	 very	 different	 roles,	
which	invites	us	to	clarify	individual	culpability	in	complex	mass	endeavours.		Causally	
over-determined	 crimes	 raise	 questions	 about	 causation	 and	 blame.48	 	 Crimes	 of	
obedience	challenge	some	normal	thinking	about	deviance,	conformity	and	wrongdoing.	
Criminal	 governments	 overturn	 the	 normal	 role	 of	 state	 as	 law-provider.	 	 Competing	
authority	structures	invite	us	to	reflect	on	the	significance	of	legal	‘authorization’	of	acts.		






My	 aspiration	 is	 that	 this	 modified	 account	 will	 be	 convincing	 both	 to	 ‘liberal’	
theorists	and	to	those	who	have	critiqued	liberal	accounts.	 	I	expect	that	most	scholars	





Insofar	 as	 scholars	 such	 as	 Drumbl	 and	 Osiel	 are	 simply	 calling	 for	 thoughtful	
inspection	of	liberal	principles,50	the	position	I	outline	is	compatible	with	theirs.		There	




















sources	 of	 violence.51	 	 	 I	 agree	 that	 the	 pressure	 to	 expand	 liability	 doctrines	 is	
understandable	in	a	psychological	sense.		My	caveat	is	that,	if	vicarious	liability	refers	to	
liability	 without	 culpability,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 justifiable	 in	 a	 system	 of	 criminal	 law.		







contemplates	 some	 degree	 of	 non-compliance,	 suggesting	 that	 ICL	 should	 ‘ideally’	
comply,56	that	it	should	not	‘unduly’	depart,57	and	that	incompatibility	should	be	kept	to	a	
‘morally	acceptable	minimum’.58		(3)	At	other	times	he	seems	more	skeptical,	lamenting	
the	prevalence	of	deontological	 thinking	 in	 criminal	 theory	and	 the	 ‘reverential	 status	
accorded	to	the	culpability	principle	in	current	criminal	theory’.59		The	first	suggestion	is	
entirely	compatible	with	the	approach	I	advance	here.		The	second	suggestion	could	be	
























skepticism	 is	 directed	 toward	 historically	 contingent	 formulations	 of	 the	 culpability	
principle,	or	to	the	‘punctilious’61	manner	in	which	it	is	sometimes	applied.		I	would	argue	
that	criminal	law	should	carefully	respect	the	culpability	and	legality	principles,	once	they	









are	 we	 also	 respecting	 the	 autonomy,	 rights,	 and	 agency	 of	 others	 (the	 right)?	
Consequentialist	considerations	can	play	an	important	role	in	criminal	law	analysis,	but	
we	also	have	to	respect	deontic	constraints	of	justice.67	 	The	question	of	culpability	is	a	


































conceive	 of	 persons	 as	 socially	 unencumbered	 individuals	 and	 fail	 to	 account	 for	
communitarian	values	and	social	meaning;	and	(3)	that	they	impose	Western	constructs.		
On	 each	 issue,	 my	 answer	 emphasizes	 the	 ‘humanity’	 of	 justice.	 	 We	 can	 develop	 a	









that	 familiar	conceptions	are	no	 longer	convincing	 in	 these	new	contexts,	and	thus	we	
may	 need	 to	 reflect	 more	 about	 what	 the	 deeper	 underlying	 commitments	 entail.		
Nonetheless,	I	would	insist	we	must	still	inquire	into	individual	agency,	choice	and	desert,	















thought.	However,	 I	 think	 this	criticism	slightly	misses	 the	reason	 for	 the	 focus	on	 the	
individual.	 	I	think	that	the	focus	on	the	individual	arises	because,	once	criminal	law	is	
employed,	 the	 individual	 is	 the	 unit	 of	 punishment.	 	 Once	 we	 decide	 to	 punish	 and	








state	 responsibility,	 human	 rights	 law,	 civil	 liability,	 administrative	 law,	 and	
constitutional	 law,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 enormous	 array	 of	 social	 and	 political	 mechanisms	
(commissions	of	inquiry,	reforms,	etc).		What	ICL	does	is	add	a	mechanism	in	addition	to	
those	 other	 existing	 mechanisms,	 which	 have	 historically	 proven	 inadequate	 in	
preventing	mass	atrocities.		Criminal	law	focuses	on	individual	wrongdoing,	not	because	
of	 some	myopic	 defect,	 but	 because	 that	 is	 the	 distinctive	 lens	 it	 is	 asked	 to	 bring,	 to	
supplement	 other	 mechanisms.	 	 The	 hope	 is	 that	 assessment,	 stigmatization,	 and	
punishment	of	 individual	wrongdoing	might	eventually	 create	additional	disincentives	
and	help	instantiate	new	norms	of	behaviour.		But	other	mechanisms	continue	to	examine	
other	 dynamics	 (such	 as	 the	 collective	 liability	 of	 a	 state,	 or	 civil	 responsibility	 of	
individual	 or	 collective	 actors,	 or	 to	 examine	 roots	 of	 conflict	 and	 to	 make	 reform	











to	 one	 and	 only	 one	 individual.70	 A	 liberal	 account	 can	 easily	 recognize	 that	 when	
individuals	pool	their	efforts	together,	they	can	share	in	various	forms	of	responsibility	
for	 their	 collective	 doings.71	 	 On	 a	 careful	 liberal	 account	 of	 mass	 crimes,	 we	 would	





atrocity	 entails	 collective	 behavior’,73	 or	 that	 ‘the	 collective	 nature	 of	 crimes	 of	 war	
escapes	the	bounds	of	the	individualist	paradigm	of	Western	criminal	law’.74			It	would	be	
a	mistake	 to	 suggest	 that	 criminal	 law	 or	 liberal	 criminal	 law	 theory	 is	 so	 fixated	 on	




experience	 concerning	 individuals	 pooling	 their	 efforts	 to	 produce	 crimes.	 	 This	 has	
generated	 tools	 such	 as	 joint	 commission,	 commission	 through	 an	 organization,	
complicity,	 and	 the	 distinction	 between	 principals	 and	 accessories.	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	




































theory	misconceives	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 completely	 separate	 from	 society,	 and	must	
disaggregate	 complex	 events	 into	 ‘socially	 unencumbered	 individuals	 independently	
interacting’,	 producing	 distorted	 understandings.77	 	 Certainly,	 some	 political	 theories,	
such	 as	 classical	 liberal	 contractarian	 theories,	 might	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 such	 critique.		
However,	we	can	advance	a	liberal	criminal	law	theory	without	necessarily	subscribing	
to	 an	 empirically	 untenable	 worldview	 in	 which	 we	 were	 all	 atomistic,	 self-created	
individuals	who	entered	 into	a	 social	 contract	 to	 advance	our	personal	 aims.	 	As	Alan	


















see	 in	 Chapter	 5	 in	 the	 discussion	 on	 duress)	 by	 bringing	 into	 question	 some	 easy	
conclusions	of	more	atomistic	theories.		
An	 intelligent,	 humanistic	 approach	 to	 criminal	 law	 theory	 also	 draws	 from	
empirical	 studies,	 and	 in	 particular	 from	 criminology,	 in	 order	 to	 refine	 its	
understandings.	After	all,	normative	arguments	often	entail	empirical	suppositions	(for	
example,	about	the	extent	to	which	capacity	for	choice	is	undermined	in	particular	social	






























such	 as	 how	we	 delineate	 between	 principals	 and	 accessories,82	 or	 how	we	 assessing	
culpability	in	contexts	of	superior	orders.83			
















In	 a	 humanistic	 account,	 we	 want	 to	 do	 the	 best	 we	 can	 to	 identify	 principles	
reflecting	broadly	shared	human	concerns.		In	Chapter	4,	I	discuss	how	we	can	attempt	to	
do	this	by	drawing	on	all	possible	clues,	which	includes	practices	and	perspectives	from	


















and	 hence	 that	 a	 cosmopolitan	 account	 based	 on	 widely	 shared	 human	 concerns	 is	
impossible.			This	issue	is	too	enormous	to	address	adequately	here.		Many	entire	volumes	








delegates	 from	 all	 regions	 and	 legal	 traditions	 exhibited	 a	 shared	 commitment	 to	
principles	such	as	legality	and	personal	culpability.88	The	standard	counter-argument	is	
that	the	delegates	may	have	reflected	a	Westernized	elite.		The	response	in	turn	is	to	point	
to	 a	 survey	 of	 domestic	 systems,	 which	 indicates	 that	 the	 principles	 seem	 to	 have	
recognition	and	support	across	traditions.		The	counter-argument	is	that	liberal	principles	


























generally,	 as	well	 as	 restraining	deontic	 principles,	 developed	 in	multiple	 regions	 and	
cultures	long	before	they	emerged	in	Europe.		Thus,	these	practices	and	principles	may	
reflect	more	widely-shared	human	ideas	about	justice	than	is	commonly	assumed.	
For	 example,	 Egypt	 had	 a	 system	 of	 criminal	 law	 as	 early	 as	 3000	 B.C.,	 which	


































held	 vicariously	 responsible	 for	 acts	 of	 family	members,	 but	 only	 for	 his	 or	 her	 own	
conduct;	 ‘criminal	 responsibility	 is	 individual,	 nontransferable,	 and	 based	 on	 the	
conscious	intentional	conduct	of	a	person	in	full	possession	of	his/her	mental	faculties	
and	who	is	not	acting	under	…	exonerating	conditions’.95		
	China	 also	 had	 criminal	 law	 as	 early	 as	 the	 11th	 to	 8th	 century	 BC,	 with	 royal	
instructions	 requiring	 local	 rulers	 to	 make	 accessible	 the	 laws	 on	 offences	 and	
punishments	 and	 ‘to	 ensure	 that	 officials	 apply	 the	 existing	 law	and	not	on	 their	 own	
initiative	 introduce	 innovations’.96	 	 There	 followed	 in	 China	 a	 considerable	 legacy	 of	
codification	and	publication,97	including	placing	descriptions	of	penal	laws	outside	of	the	
palace	for	the	information	of	the	public.98		Ancient	laws	reflected	not	only	the	principle	of	
legality	 but	 also	 the	 principle	 of	 culpability,	 including	 distinguishing	 intentional	 from	
accidental	acts	and	mitigating	punishment	for	the	young.99			
Such	developments,	millennia	before	Europe	saw	 its	 ‘enlightenment’,	 cast	critical	





have	 been	 the	 opposite:	 European	 interest	 in	 written	 criminal	 law	 and	 personal	
culpability	may	have	been	inspired	by	the	Egyptian	legal	system.100			
Contemporary	empirical	evidence	also	casts	serious	doubt	on	claims	that	concern	



































reason	 to	 doubt	 the	 empirical	 premise	 of	 the	 cultural	 ‘ad	 hominem’	 argument.	 	 At	































fundamental	 principles	 may	 be	 culturally	 conditioned,	 but	 such	 scholars	 seem	 to	 be	
generally	 flagging	 a	 hypothetical	 possibility	 of	 disagreement	 with	 the	 principles,	 as	
opposed	to	actually	disagreeing	with	them.		In	other	words,	does	anyone	actually	advocate	
a	criminal	law	system	that	punishes	human	beings	without	regard	for	culpability?106		If	
so,	we	 should	get	 the	arguments	on	 the	 table	 so	 that	 they	 can	be	discussed.	 	 Is	 that	 a	
normatively	feasible	proposition?		Would	such	doctrines	be	coherent	with	the	enterprise	
of	 ICL?	 	Hopefully,	 as	 the	 conversation	continues	and	broadens	over	 time,	we	will	 see	
whether	 the	 disagreement	 is	 purely	 a	 hypothetical	 one,	 or	whether	 there	 are	 actually	
substantive	 arguments	 for	 punishment	 without	 culpability.	 	 I	 suspect	 that	 the	 much	







The	 three	most	plausible	objections	 to	 the	proposed	conversation	are	as	 follows.		














At	 this	more	 granular	 level,	we	 consider	 the	 divergent	 formulations,	 as	 they	 show	 us	












That	 difficulty	 is	 daunting	 indeed:	 how	do	we	 contend	with	potential	 biases	 that	may	
permeate	 our	 source	 materials	 and	 shape	 our	 own	 outlook	 and	 assumptions?108		
Unfortunately,	 this	 risk	 of	 undetected	 biases	 arises	 in	 almost	 all	 of	 our	 intellectual	
endeavours.	 	 The	 alternative	 to	 trying	 is	 to	 give	 up.	 	 If	 we	 say	 that	 a	 possibility	 of	
undetected	bias	should	make	us	stop,	then	that	policy	would	end	almost	all	inquiries	into	





























underlying	deontic	 commitment.	 	 ICL	 should	not	 uncritically	 replicate	 principles	 from	
national	systems,	nor	should	it	uncritically	abandon	them.			
Engaging	 with	 common	 critiques	 of	 liberal	 accounts	 helps	 light	 the	 way	 to	 a	
nuanced	and	humanistic	liberal	account.		I	have	emphasized	the	‘humanity’	of	principles	
in	multiple	senses.		First,	principles	are	not	just	arbitrary	stipulations	of	positive	law;	it	is	
recognition	and	respect	 for	 the	humanity	of	 subjects	of	 the	system	that	 requires	us	 to	




I	 argue	 that	 we	 need	 a	 conversation	 that	 draws	 on	 the	 broadest	 range	 of	 clues	 for	
inspiration,	including	patterns	of	legal	practice	as	well	as	normative	arguments.			
In	Chapter	5,	I	outline	some	of	the	questions	raised	by	ICL	that	may	be	explored	by	
this	 approach.	 	 ICL	presents	 some	new	and	 interesting	problems,	whose	 investigation	
might	generate	new	and	interesting	answers.		I	argue	that	this	approach	might,	in	addition	
to	shedding	light	on	ICL,	also	have	exciting	implications	for	general	criminal	law	theory.		
The	 study	 of	 abnormal	 situations	 can	 help	 us	 discern	 conditions	 and	 parameters	
embedded	 in	 what	 we	 thought,	 based	 on	 our	 everyday	 experience,	 to	 be	 elementary	
principles.		Doing	so	helps	us	to	develop	a	theory	that	is	truly	more	‘general’.	ICL	problems	


































our	 starting	 points	 are	 contingent,	 and	 that	 we	 have	 no	 guarantees	 of	 ‘correctness’.		
Nonetheless,	it	is	important	to	try	to	determine	whether	institutions	are	just,	using	the	
best	available	methods	that	we	have.		Discussion	of	fundamental	principles	is	not	a	matter	











are	 ‘fundamental’	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 rules	 and	 doctrines	 in	 the	 system.	 	 By	
‘foundations’	I	mean	ultimate	bedrock	justifications	for	beliefs;	in	ethical	discourse	the	
term	is	also	used	to	refer	to	general	comprehensive	moral	theories.			My	point	is	that	we	
can	make	meaningful	 progress	 in	 discussing	 and	 refining	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 a	
criminal	justice	system	without	resolving	ultimate	moral	questions,	without	necessarily	
subscribing	 to	one	of	 the	main	comprehensive	 theories,	 and	without	having	 to	decide	
which	comprehensive	theory	is	the	‘right’	one.	
I	 also	 use	 the	 term	 ‘mid-level	 principle’,	 but	 in	 doing	 so	 I	 am	 not	 drawing	 a	
hierarchy	between	‘fundamental’	and	‘mid-level’.		I	am	simply	adopting	terms	used	in	two	
bodies	of	literature.	In	ethics	literature,	the	term	‘mid-level	principles’	refers	to	principles	
that	 are	 arguably	 immanent	 within	 a	 body	 of	 practice.	 	 Mid-level	 principles	 are	
analytically	 useful,	 because	 they	 help	 explain	 and	 systematize	 the	 practice,	 and	 also	
normatively	 convincing.	 	 They	 are	 ‘mid-level’	 because	 they	 mediate	 between	 legal	
practice	and	the	foundational	moral	theories;	they	are	more	general	than	the	former	and	
more	concrete	than	the	latter.		My	argument	is	that	fundamental	principles	of	criminal	

















How	would	we	determine	 if	 there	might	be	others?	 	Where	do	we	 turn	 to	see	how	to	
formulate	 their	 specific	 requirements?	 	 By	 ‘formulations’,	 I	 mean	 the	 articulations	 of	
specific	implications.		For	example,	does	the	legality	principle	require	written	legislation	
or	 can	 other	 notice	 suffice?1	 	 Does	 the	 culpability	 principle	 require	 some	 causal	
contribution	to	a	crime,	and	if	so,	how	much	contribution	is	enough?2		
At	present,	when	ICL	literature	invokes	or	articulates	a	principle,	it	draws	on	any	
of	 three	 sources	 of	 reference:	 (1)	 formulations	 in	 ICL	 authorities;	 (2)	 induction	 from	
national	 legal	 systems;	 and	 (3)	 deduction	 from	philosophical	 argument.	 	 Each	of	 these	
three	sources	of	reference	is	routinely	invoked	in	ICL	scholarship	and	jurisprudence.		The	
way	that	all	three	are	freely	invoked	may	at	first	seem	haphazard,	but	I	will	suggest	below	
that	 the	 recourse	 to	 these	 reference	 sources	 is	 justified	 and	 appropriate,	 and	 that	
















a	 methodology	 that	 openly	 acknowledges	 and	 responds	 to	 these	 problems.	 	 I	 will	

















at	 all	 with	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 ICL	 has	 adopted	 flawed	 or	 problematic	









specify	 how	 a	 particular	 principle	 should	 be	 formulated.	 	 We	 need	 some	 external	
framework	for	these	kinds	of	evaluations.6				
Furthermore,	 a	purely	 internal	account	 cannot	 tell	us	how	 to	 resolve	a	 conflict	
between	a	doctrine	and	a	principle.	From	the	standpoint	of	formal	non-contradiction,	a	
conflict	between	an	ICL	doctrine	and	an	ICL	principle	can	be	resolved	by	reforming	the	


















































basis	 to	 distinguish	 principals	 and	 accessories,	 noting	 inter	 alia	 that	 the	 approach	 is	
applied	in	numerous	legal	systems.10		Scholars	and	jurists	frequently	employ	induction	
from	national	systems	when	articulating	fundamental	principles.11			
This	 approach	 has	 intermediate	 levels	 of	 positivity	 and	 normativity.	 	 As	 for	
positivity,	the	‘general	principles	of	law	derived…	from…	legal	systems	of	the	world’	have	
recognized	legal	applicability:	they	are	a	well-accepted	subsidiary	interpretive	source	of	






































the	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 accord	 some	normative	weight	 to	 principles	
derived	from	national	systems.		After	all,	principles	recognized	across	regions,	cultures	





systems	 through	 colonization.16	 	 Thus,	we	 cannot	 automatically	 assume	 that	 national	
principles	 reflect	 local	 intuitions	 of	 justice;	we	must	 be	 ready	 to	 examine	 biases	 and	
impositions	 of	 power	 that	may	have	 led	 to	 the	 predominant	 formulations.17	 	 Another	
problem	 is	 that,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 ICL	 operates	 in	 contexts	 that	 are	 often	
profoundly	different	from	the	‘normal’	societal	context	in	which	the	familiar	formulations	
of	principles	evolved.	 	So,	even	 if	every	system	 in	 the	world	concurred	 in	a	particular	
formulation	 of	 a	 principle,	 that	 would	 not	 necessarily	 be	 a	 conclusive	 case	 for	 its	
























certain	 societal	 conditions.	 	 ICL,	 at	 least	 in	 its	 early	 phases,	 provides	 an	 interesting	
context	to	explore	the	possible	unstated	preconditions	of	the	lex	scripta	requirement.19		
Thus,	 the	 second	 source,	 induction	 from	 national	 systems,	 offers	 intermediate	
positivity	 and	 normativity.	 	 National	 formulations	 provide	 some	 guidance	 to	 widely-
shared	understandings	of	justice,	worked	out	over	time	in	diverse	settings.		However,	we	
must	be	alert	to	possible	biases	in	existing	practice	and	formulations	of	principles,	as	well	


































Here	 we	 encounter	 a	 problem	 that	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 positivity-normativity	
tension.		Suppose	that	we	decide	not	to	worry	about	legal	‘positivity’	at	all:	we	wish	to	
have	 a	 purely	 normative	 discussion.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 want	 to	 discuss	 what	 the	
principles	ought	to	be.			We	might	decide,	for	the	reasons	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	that	we	
want	 to	 avoid	 assumptions	 based	 on	 formulations	 of	 principles	 in	 national	 systems,	
because	they	might	be	inapposite.24		In	this	hypothesized	conversation,	we	presumably	
want	to	be	‘rigorous’,	and	we	might	understand	rigour	in	the	traditional	Cartesian	way:	






our	 first	 thought	 might	 be	 to	 adopt	 that	 as	 our	 foundation:	 we	 will	 apply	 a	 Kantian	
analysis	 to	 assess	whether	 new	 articulations	 of	 principles	 are	 justifiable	 in	 abnormal	
contexts.	 	 	 An	 attraction	 of	 Kant’s	 deontological	 theory	 is	 that	 it	 purports	 to	 offer	 an	
















anthropological	 or	 cultural	 inputs.26	 	 This	 would	 be	 wonderful,	 as	 it	 would	 sidestep	
concerns	 and	 objections	 about	 social	 contingency	 or	 cultural	 imposition27:	 principles	
would	be	derived	by	logic	from	a	priori	premises	applicable	to	all	rational	beings.			
Alas,	 however,	 as	 we	 look	 at	 the	 conclusions	 reached	 by	 Kant	 under	 his	
methodology	of	pure	 reason,	we	notice	 that	he	happens	 to	deduce	many	of	 the	 social	
institutions	familiar	in	Germany	in	the	1700s,	some	of	which	we	would	today	consider	
unjust.28	 	 It	 seems	 improbable	 that	 those	arrangements	were	dictated	by	pure	 reason	
alone.		I	am	not	engaging	here	in	the	easy	sport	of	criticizing	historical	figures	for	holding	
views	typical	of	their	era.	Rather,	I	am	showing	the	problem	with	Kant’s	claim	that	his	
theory	was	not	based	on	empirical	 inputs	(anthropological,	 sociological,	 cultural),	and	
hence	its	promise	of	neutral	rational	objectivity.		The	fact	that	Kant	happened	to	deduce	
familiar	 features	 of	 his	 own	 society	 strongly	 suggests	 that	 the	 process	 is	 not	 one	 of	




























law	 doctrines.	 	 For	 example,	 even	 if	 we	 agree	 that	 the	 personal	 culpability	 principle	
requires	 some	 ‘causal	 contribution’	 to	 a	 crime,	 we	 might	 see	 multiple	 plausible	
formulations	 for	 that	 requirement	 (e.g.	 discernible	 minor	 impacts	 versus	 risk	
aggravation).29	 	 Most	 comprehensive	 moral	 theories	 will	 not	 generate	 ‘answers’	 to	
questions	of	 that	 level	of	granularity.30	 	At	best,	 such	 theories	provide	us	with	helpful	






that	 could	 conceivably	 underpin	 the	 fundamental	 principles.	 	 Earlier	 I	 referred	 to	
‘deontic’	 commitments.	 	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘deontic’	 (i.e.	 relating	 to	 a	 duty)	 as	 a	 succinct	
contrast	 to	 the	relatively	simplistic	consequentialist	arguments	often	seen	 in	 ICL	(and	



























theories	 to	 generate	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 culpability	 and	 legality.	 	 A	 contractualist	
theory	might	 look	 for	 principles	 that	 persons	would	 adopt	 if	 they	were	 laying	 down	
general	rules	when	negotiating	in	the	‘original	position’,	behind	a	veil	of	ignorance	as	to	
their	actual	identity	and	circumstances.33		Or,	we	might	look	for	principles	that	could	not	
be	 reasonably	 rejected	 by	 persons	moved	 to	 find	 principles	 for	 regulation	 of	 human	
conduct	that	others,	similarly	motivated,	could	not	reasonably	reject.34		Alternatively,	one	
might	 adopt	 a	 communitarian	 theory	 and	 yet	 still	 share	 a	 commitment	 to	 these	
fundamental	principles,	if	one’s	theory	values	autonomy	and	responsibility.35		It	is	even	




Any	 of	 these	 moral	 foundational	 theories	 might	 underlie	 the	 principles	 of	
culpability	and	legality	as	we	know	them.	 	In	a	 liminal	case,	where	we	need	to	further	
clarify	a	fundamental	principle,	each	theory	might	generate	a	different	method	of	analysis	
and	possibly	 a	 different	 answer.	 	 	 Accordingly,	 our	 aspiration	 of	 being	 foundationally	

























































approach	 is	 to	 ‘start	 in	 the	 middle’.	 37	 	 I	 will	 outline	 an	 account	 here	 that	 works	
provisionally	 with	 ‘mid-level	 principles’.	 	 That	 approach	 falls	 within	 a	 broader	






































that	 are	 arguably	 embodied	 in	 a	 body	 of	 practice	 (ie.	 they	 analytically	 fit)	 and	 also	
normatively	attractive.41		Mid-level	principles	can	be	supported	by	multiple	foundational	
theories:	 	 	 people	 may	 agree	 on	 the	 mid-level	 principles	 even	 if	 they	 have	 different	
underlying	 reasons	 to	 do	 so.	 	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 culpability	 principle	 and	 the	 legality	
principle	can	fruitfully	be	analyzed	as	‘mid-level	principles’	in	this	broader	sense.42		
One	virtue	of	mid-level	principles	 is	convergence.43	 	 Participants	 in	 a	 field	may	
agree	 on	 certain	 mid-level	 principles,	 even	 if	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 deeper	 underlying	
philosophical	outlooks.44		Different	moral	theories	may	support	the	mid-level	principles	
for	 different	 reasons,	 but	 nonetheless	 overlap	 in	 supporting	 the	 principles.	 This	
convergence	 is	 like	 Rawlsian	 ‘overlapping	 consensus’45	 or	 Sunstein’s	 ‘incompletely	
theorized	agreements’.46	 	Where	such	convergence	exists,	one	can	fruitfully	work	with	
mid-level	principles	without	having	to	isolate	the	ultimately	soundest	basis	for	them.		Of	
course,	 there	may	 be	 some	 difficult	 liminal	 cases,	 where	 a	 principle	must	 be	 further	
clarified	to	resolve	the	case,	and	where	different	underlying	moral	theories	may	generate	
different	 answers,	 and	 thus	 a	 choice	 must	 be	 made	 when	 specifying	 the	 principle.	
































not	 generate	 sufficiently	 specific	 answers.	 	 	Mid-level	 principles	 enable	 us	 to	 identify	
morally	or	legally	relevant	characteristics	and	to	note	specific	normative	questions	both	
‘more	dependably	and	more	quickly’	 than	we	could	 if	directly	applying	a	 foundational	
theory.50		
A	 third	 virtue	 is	 that	 mid-level	 principles	 enable	 an	 inclusive,	 pluralistic	
conversation.51	 	Mid-level	principles	can	enable	us	to	debate	and	often	resolve	certain	
concrete	problems	without	 first	having	 to	agree	on	ultimate	questions	of	morality.	 	A	
central	 theme	 in	 my	 thesis	 is	 that	 discussion	 of	 principles	 is	 a	 type	 of	 conversation.		
Working	with	mid-level	principles	can	help	facilitate	that	conversation.	As	Paul	Tremblay	
observes	that	mid-level	principles	‘permit	conversation	through	common	language	and	
agreement	 about	 normative	 terms’.52	 Similarly,	 Robert	 Merges	 describes	 mid-level	
principles	 as	 providing	 ‘a	 shared	 language	 consistent	 with	 diverse	 foundational	
commitments’;53	 they	 allow	 us	 to	 ‘play	 together	 even	 if	 we	 disagree	 about	 the	 deep	
wellspring’.54		
The	relationship	between	moral	theories,	mid-level	principles,	and	practice	is	not	
just	a	one-directional	deductive	chain.	 	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	not	simply	 that	 the	moral	
theories	 support	 the	 principles	 and	 then	 the	 principles	 dictate	 the	 correct	 rules	 and	





















patterns	 of	 practice	worked	 out	 by	 actors	 seeking	 to	 do	 justice	may	 reveal	 plausible	
implicit	 underlying	 conceptions	of	 justice.57	 	 Thus,	 practice	 is	not	purely	 subordinate;	
practice	is	not	merely	the	object	to	be	evaluated	by	normative	tools.		The	practice	may	
also	 provide	 a	 clue	 helping	 us	 to	 reflect	 upon	 and	 revise	 the	 principles	 as	 we	 have	
formulated	them.	Accordingly,	where	a	doctrine	departs	from	our	current	best	theory	of	
the	principles,	 there	 are	 two	possibilities.	 	 In	most	 cases,	 the	 analytically	 elegant	 and	
normatively	 sound	 conclusion	 will	 be	 that	 the	 outlying	 doctrine	 is	 problematic	 and	
should	be	harmonized	with	the	principle.		But	it	is	also	possible	that	the	outlying	practice	
could	 provide	 a	 normative	 insight	 that	 leads	 us	 to	 revise	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	





and	 working	 analytically	 or	 normatively.	 Analytically,	 we	 can	 strive	 to	 articulate	
principles	that	provide	the	best	descriptive	‘fit’,	and	which	may	be	seen	as	unifying	the	
practice,	or	at	least	helping	to	systematize	or	guide	the	practice.		This	analytical	approach	






















My	 argument	 is	 that	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 justice	 in	 ICL	 (and	 indeed	 in	
criminal	law)	are	most	fruitfully	approached	as	‘mid-level	principles’	as	the	term	is	used	
in	the	ethics	literature.		Notice	that	I	am	not	saying	that	the	only	mid-level	principles	in	





























Coherentism	 seeks	 to	 advance	 understanding	 by	 reconciling	 all	 of	 the	 available	
clues	 as	 best	 as	 one	 can,	 without	 demanding	 demonstration	 of	 ultimate	 bedrock	
justification	 or	 comprehensive	 first-order	 theory.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 expectation	 that	 every	
proposition	should	be	‘grounded’	in	an	even	deeper	theory	is	ultimately	unattainable	and	
hence	unsound.62			
Coherentism	 is	 the	main	 rival	 to	 foundationalism.	 	 Foundationalism	 is	 the	more	
traditional	 understanding	 of	 justification,	 in	 which	 each	 of	 our	 beliefs	 should	 be	
supported	by	a	more	basic	belief	below	(eventually	reaching	down,	ideally,	to	a	reliable	





is	 develop	models	 that	 best	 reconcile	 our	 beliefs	 and	 observations;	 we	 are	 given	 no	
guarantees	of	correctness.		As	William	James	has	written,	our	beliefs	‘lean	on	each	other,	































increases	 the	more	 that	 our	 beliefs	 reconcile	 experiences	 and	 inputs.	 	 For	many,	 this	
approach	of	 reconciling	available	clues	and	simply	accepting	 foundational	uncertainty	






about	 the	 histories	 of	 species	 and	 their	 migration.	 	 Each	 clue	 in	 isolation	 should	 be	
approached	with	caution	and	skepticism,	but	we	formulate	models	that	best	bring	the	
available	evidence	 into	coherence,	and	our	confidence	 in	each	clue	and	supposition	 is	
bolstered	by	its	coherence	with	other	clues.			
One	might	object	 that	morality	 is	different	 from	science:	 in	science,	 there	can	be	
observations	that	clearly	contradict	a	model,	whereas	morality	involves	more	subjective	




Coherentism	 underlies	 not	 only	 the	 scientific	 method	 but	 also	 some	 normative	



















promise	 ‘certainty’;	 it	 openly	 acknowledges	 that	 its	 conclusions	 are	 fallible.71	
Propositions	 (e.g.	 mid-level	 principles)	 are	 continually	 revisable	 based	 on	 new	
experiences	 and	 new	 arguments.	 At	 each	 juncture,	 we	 are	 formulating	 the	 best	
hypotheses	we	can	to	reconcile	the	available	clues.	 	Coherentism	is	a	form	of	practical	
reasoning.	 It	 does	 not	 strive	 to	 unearth	 the	 ultimate	moral	 truths;	 it	 aims	 to	 address	
concrete	human	problems	and	questions	as	best	we	can.			
My	proposed	 account	 readily	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	
criminal	justice	are	human	constructs.		As	William	James	noted,	‘you	cannot	weed	out	the	
human	 contribution’;72	 ‘the	 trail	 of	 the	human	 serpent	 is	 thus	 over	 everything’.73	 	My	
account	 is	 post-post-modern:	 we	 acknowledge	 that	 each	 of	 these	 principles	 can	 be	




of	 the	human	conversation	 to	date.	 	As	Ronald	Dworkin	acknowledges,	 ‘justice…has	a	







































are	 conflicts	with	other	models	 that	work	 in	other	 contexts,	 until	 such	 time	as	better	
models	emerge.80	
My	 account	 is	 melioristic,	 meaning	 that	 I	 believe	 that	 we	 can	 improve	 our	
institutions,	practices,	doctrines	and	even	our	formulations	of	principles	through	thought	
and	effort.		While	the	principles	may	be	human	constructs,	we	can	still	strive	to	develop	
better	 human	constructs.	 	 ‘Better’	 is,	 of	 course,	neither	a	 simple	nor	 certain	matter	 to	





















include	 moral	 theories,	 patterns	 of	 practice,	 and	 considered	 judgments	 (casuistically	
testing	our	sense	of	justice	of	the	outcomes	in	particular	cases,	including	hypotheticals.81)		




particular	 cases)	 and	analogical	 coherence	 (whether	 judgments	 fit	with	 judgments	 in	
analogous	 cases).	 	 More	 profoundly,	 we	 look	 for	 deliberative	 coherence,	 i.e.	 whether	
formulated	principles	cohere	with	the	plausible	accounts	of	the	underlying	values	and	
goals	of	the	system.83	Indeed,	the	enterprise	of	law	itself	may	entail	recognizing	persons	
as	 agents,	 and	 thus	we	would	 seek	 coherence	with	 ‘the	 inner	morality	 of	 law’.84	 	 The	
coherentist	method	also	seeks	elegance	and	consilience.	For	example,	a	simple	principle	






























include	 comparative	 analysis	 (looking	 at	 other	 jurisdictions,	 other	 areas	 of	 law,	 or	
possibly	 even	 other	 social	 practices).	 	We	 look	 at	 normative	 arguments	 and	 practical	
reason,	 as	 well	 as	 intuition	 and	 considered	 judgments	 in	 casuistic	 testing.	 	 We	 seek	
coherence	in	the	deepest	sense	with	what	appear	to	be	the	best	understandings	of	the	




conservativism	 objection	 by	 arguing	 that	 once	 ‘we	 grasp	 the	 difference	 between	
[coherence]	 and	 narrow	 consistency’	 we	may	 come	 to	 see	 that	 coherence	 ‘is	 a	more	
dynamic	and	radical	standard	than	it	first	seemed’,	as	it	encourages	us	to	be	wide-ranging	
and	imaginative	in	the	search	for	deep	coherence.	89			
I	 submit	 that	 that	 the	 coherentist	 process	 of	 testing	 incompatible	 beliefs	 and	
practices	has	engendered	the	numerous	radical	changes	in	human	history.	90			Consider	
for	example	the	abolition	of	slavery.		Slavery	was	not	abolished	because	someone	proved	



















exception	 for	 slaves,	 due	 to	 their	 ‘slave	 nature’.91)	 	 Instead,	 people	 in	 slave-owning	
societies	reached	conclusions	and	changed	their	minds	based	on	a	wide	range	of	clues	
and	 inputs,	 including	 diverse	 important	 ideas	 such	 as	 freedom,	 dignity,	 equality,	
happiness,	 as	well	 as	 empathic	 responses	 to	 suffering.	 	Arguments	of	 the	era	 came	 to	
realize	that	the	attempted	justifications	of	slavery	entailed	jarring	inconsistencies	with	a	
great	 many	 moral	 beliefs,	 and	 hinged	 on	 fallacies	 and	 unconvincing	 rationalizations.		
Empathy	assisted	these	conclusions,	as	people	in	slave-owning	societies	came	to	grasp	
that	 it	 was	 an	 abhorrent	 and	 cruel	 practice.	 Importantly,	 even	 people	who	 had	 been	
initially	conditioned	to	accept	the	practice	as	‘normal’	came	to	change	their	mind	through	
this	process	of	reflection	and	argumentation.		




applied	 only	 between	 free	 people	 and	 not	 slaves.	 	 At	 a	 superficial	 level,	 consistency	
between	 the	 practice	 (slavery)	 and	 the	 principle	 (equality)	might	 indeed	be	 achieved	
either	by	abolishing	the	practice	or	by	declaring	a	limitation	to	the	principle.		But	which	
is	the	more	normatively	convincing	answer,	all	things	considered?		Coherence	is	a	more	
ambitious	 and	 deeper	 concept	 than	 mere	 consistency	 amongst	 a	 limited	 set	 of	























The	 example	 illustrates	 another	 merit	 of	 coherentism.	 	 A	 proponent	 of	 a	
comprehensive	theory	rooted	in	a	single	value	(e.g.	freedom,	dignity,	happiness)	might	
argue	 that	 the	 real	 problem	 with	 slavery	 was	 its	 contradiction	 of	 the	 single	 value	
cherished	by	that	theory.		But	there	are	many	possible	values	that	would	entail	a	rejection	
of	 slavery,	and	many	possible	 theories	 that	could	draw	on	 those	values	with	different	
emphases.		Often,	we	will	have	vastly	more	confidence	in	a	mid-level	determination	(e.g.	




and	 experiences	 is	 even	 more	 ambitious	 than	 the	 foregoing	 suggests,	 because	 it	 is	
iterative:	 	 each	 revision	 of	 practices	 and	 beliefs	 in	 turn	 enables	 people	 to	 notice,	
analogically,	other	practices	that	conflict	with	better	conceptions	of	equality.	Over	time,	













formulations	of	principles	as	 its	working	hypotheses.	 	By	accepting	 these	historically-






The	 coherentist	 account	 accepts,	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 the	 conversation	 that	 is	 already	
underway.	 	 It	 does	 so	 because	 no	 other	 more	 compelling	 starting	 point	 has	 been	
identified.	 	 If	 a	more	compelling	 starting	point	were	 identified,	 then	coherence	would	
require	us	to	start	with	the	new	more	compelling	starting	point,	and	the	conversation	
would	shift	accordingly.			
Consulting	 formulations	 developed	 in	 national	 and	 international	 practice	 is	














start	 from	what	has	already	gone	before,	we	draw	 lessons	and	 form	 theories,	 and	we	
suggest	modifications	to	what	is	there.		Some	starting	assumptions	may	later	turn	out	to	

































An	even	greater	danger	still	 lurks:	 it	 is	entirely	possible	that	every	one	of	 those	






























to	 taking	 every	 possible	 measure	 for	 error-correction	 (maximum	 corrigibility).	 	 The	
coherentist	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 latter	 is	 the	 more	 mature	 and	 honest	 route.	 	 The	
































For	 example,	 where	 an	 outlying	 body	 of	 practice	 conflicts	 with	 a	 formulated	
principle,	 should	 we	 amend	 the	 practice,	 or	 is	 the	 practice	 a	 clue	 (reflecting	 the	
practitioners’	 sense	of	 justice)	 that	 should	 lead	 to	a	 reformulation	or	exception	 in	 the	
principle?	 	When	 there	 is	a	 conflict	between	national	 formulations,	moral	 theories,	or	
considered	judgments,	which	should	prevail?		The	coherentist	account	does	not	offer	a	
fixed	 mechanical	 protocol	 for	 such	 decisions;	 there	 may	 be	 plausible	 arguments	 for	
different	 solutions.	 	 Some	coherentist	 thinkers	have	 tried	 to	articulate	more	precisely	
what	people	do	when	they	seek	to	maximize	coherence	in	their	models.102	Nonetheless,	
as	in	science,	there	is	still	room	to	differ	about	how	best	to	reconcile	contradictory	clues.		






are	 inconsistent	 with	 currently	 favoured	 models,	 scientists	 often	 differ	 on	 how	 to	
reconcile	 the	 conflicting	 clues.	 	 Some	 may	 adhere	 to	 the	 existing	 models,	 with	 the	























	 (d)	 	Conclusion:	 In	conclusion,	all	 three	objections	are	correct:	 the	coherentist	
approach	does	not	guarantee	certainty,	it	does	not	provide	a	precise	operator’s	manual,	
and	it	draws	on	past	thought	and	therefore	might	perpetuate	old	assumptions.		However,	
these	 objections	 can	 be	 made	 against	 any	 approach	 to	 articulating	 fundamental	
principles.	 There	 is	 no	method	 that	 is	 certain,	 straightforward,	 is	 divorced	 from	 past	
thought.			
These	 three	 objections	 (fallibility,	 untidiness,	 and	 contingency)	 are	 actually	








	 In	 this	 final	 section,	 I	 outline	 some	 features	 of	 the	 envisaged	 coherentist	
conversation	about	 the	principles	of	 justice.	 	 (To	 re-iterate,	by	 ‘conversation’	 I	do	not	









































depend	 on	 the	 type	 of	 contribution	 it	 seeks	 to	 make:	 for	 example,	 explanatory,	
justificatory,	critical,	or	reconstructive.			
(2)	External	and	internal.		Second,	a	conversation	about	fundamental	principles	
of	 justice	can	adopt	a	perspective	 that	 is	both	external	and	 internal	 to	 the	 field	of	 ICL.		
What	I	mean	is	that	fundamental	principles	are	both	an	external	normative	yardstick	by	
which	 to	 judge	 the	 system,	 but	 they	 are	 also	 internally	 recognized	 by	 the	 system	 as	
interpretive	guides	or	even	imperatives.		Thus,	if	we	identify	a	doctrine	that	conflicts	with	
















	 (3)	No	 fixed	priority.	 	Third,	 there	 is	no	single	 fixed	priority	among	 the	 three	







internal	 formulations	 the	 highest	 priority,	 but	 even	 that	 project	 will	 be	 informed	 by	
induction	from	national	systems	and	by	normative	reflection.		For	a	normative	project,	




practice.	 	 Doing	 so	 helps	 us	 stay	 tethered,	 with	 humble	 awareness	 that	 even	 the	
foundational	 moral	 theories	 are	 also	 human	 constructs.109	 	 Thus,	 the	 process	 is	
necessarily	 recursive	 and	 untidy.	 	 I	 think	 that	 the	 back-and-forth	 process,	 oscillating	
between	 practices,	 principles,	 theories	 and	 judgments,	 looking	 at	 analytical	 ‘fit’	 and	










is	no	special	magic	 in	 theories	or	abstractions,	and	 that	 theories	are	simply	 the	(humanly	constructed)	






best	 explanation	 of	 much	 of	 the	 scholarship	 and	 juridical	 practice	 that	 works	 with	






area,	 is	 best	 explained	 and	 best	 supported	 as	 an	 application	 of	 coherentist	methods.		
Scholars	are	drawing	on	the	available	clues	to	construct	the	best	understanding	that	they	
can	of	the	principles.		If	so,	my	contribution	here	is	largely	to	make	explicit	some	of	the	
implicit	 underpinnings	 of	 these	 efforts.	 	 I	 have	 articulated	 some	 of	 the	 groundwork	
underlying	much	of	the	scholarship	and	juridical	discourse.		If	that	is	right,	then	we	may	







framing	 a	 question	 and	 potentially	 generating	 helpful	 insights.	 	 A	 coherentist	
conversation	 can	 still	 draw	on	 the	main	moral	 theories,	 not	 as	 ultimate	 truths	but	 as	
‘models’	(i.e.	they	can	show	what	the	implications	would	be	if	one	focuses	on	a	given	set	
























which	obligations.	 	However,	 it	 is	at	 least	conceivable	that	some	criminal	 law	problem	
may	arise	 that	requires	us	 to	specify	 the	relevant	attribute	with	more	precision,	or	 to	
decide	between	different	foundational	theories.	 	The	conversation	descends	as	needed	
into	ethical	theories.	














not	 produce	 definitive	 ‘answers’.	 	 At	 best,	 it	 provides	 working	 hypotheses	 about	
fundamental	principles.		The	conversation	is	nonetheless	valuable	because	it	requires	us	
to	 grapple	 with	 questions	 of	 justice.	 	 	 The	 discourse	 around	 mass	 atrocity	 is	 often	
dominated	by	revulsion	and	the	wish	that	someone	be	punished;	the	justice	conversation	
recalls	 that	 we	 must	 consider	 the	 constraints	 of	 justice.	 	 	 Of	 course,	 there	 are	 very	




human	 enterprise,	 the	 best	 we	 can	 do	 is	 to	 make	 our	 best	 efforts	 to	 work	 out	 the	
normative	underpinnings	and	to	comply	with	them.			
In	conclusion,	the	justice	conversation	is	a	fallible,	human	conversation	working	
with	 fallible,	human	constructs.	 	But	 that	does	not	make	 it	 superficial	or	meaningless.		





evidence.	 	 If	 we	 care	 about	 morality	 and	 justice,	 then	 we	 have	 to	 try	 to	 discuss	 our	





















In	 the	 last	 two	 chapters,	 I	 established	 that	 deontic	 principles	 do	matter	 in	 ICL	
contexts,	and	outlined	a	coherentist	method	to	help	us	formulate	those	principles.		In	this	





The	 study	 of	 extreme	 cases	 can	 challenge	 our	 understandings	 of	 the	 principles	
developed	in	everyday	experience.		I	will	show	that	a	theoretical	framework	equipped	to	
study	 ICL	 may	 require	 a	 ‘cosmopolitan’	 perspective,	 which	 can	 actually	 lead	 us	 to	
question	even	the	central	role	of	the	state	itself	in	criminal	law.		I	will	show	how	studying	
ICL	problems	may	require	us	 to	unpack	 the	roles	 traditionally	played	by	 ‘the	State’	 in	
criminal	law	thinking,	and	to	re-examine	many	familiar	tools	of	criminal	law	thought.	
	I	 also	 note	 some	 ‘promising	 problems’	 that	 are	 worthy	 of	 investigation,	 and	







wisdom	 of	 general	 criminal	 law	 theory	 to	 ICL	 issues.	 	 Instead,	 the	 process	 provides	
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	 With	 the	 benefit	 of	 long	 experience	 and	 debate,	 criminal	 law	 scholars	 and	
practitioners	 have	 been	 developing	 a	 fairly	 elaborate	 set	 of	 propositions	 about	 the	
requirements	of	criminal	justice,	with	many	points	of	broad	agreement	and	many	points	
of	 dispute.	 	 	 These	 debates	 have	 generally	 taken	 place	 in	 one	 particular	 context,	 the	
‘normal’	context:	the	practice	of	criminal	law	as	known	in	the	modern	state.		In	the	normal	
context,	 criminal	 law	 is	 applied	 by	 authorities	 of	 a	 single	 modern	 state	 to	 human	




















law	 theory.	 	 Unusual	 contexts	 (e.g.	 law	 applied	 by	 international	 tribunals,	 possibly	 in	
situations	 of	 state	 collapse	 or	 involving	 multiple	 state	 actors)	 may	 help	 us	 to	 notice	
broader	assumptions	made	in	criminal	law	theory	that	we	had	not	previously	confronted.		
Issues	that	are	marginal	or	peripheral	in	a	‘normal’	context	,	and	that	which	can	be	set	





help	 us	 more	 precisely	 confront	 causation	 and	 culpability	 in	 such	 circumstances.1		






law	 never	 encounters	 extreme	 cases,	 or	 that	 ICL	 is	 entirely	 different	 from	 national	
criminal	law,	or	that	ICL	theory	is	entirely	different	from	national	criminal	law	theory.		I	
am	 saying	 that	 salient	 differences	 in	 context	 can	 help	 us	 reconsider	 underlying	
suppositions	and	clarify	ideas	in	ways	that	we	would	not	have	considered	if	we	think	only	





















and	 international	 legal	 theory,3	 and	 in	 ICL	 literature,4	with	differing	connotations,	but	




ends.	 	 Cosmopolitans	 are	 prepared	 to	 see	 states	 supplemented	 by	 other	 governance	
structures	as	needed.5	This	outlook	is	particularly	salient	for	the	study	of	ICL	norms,	since	
ICL	 embraces	 alternative	 governance	 structures	 to	 supplement	 state	 structures,	 and	
enables	them	to	apply	law	directly.6			
	

























utopic	 fantasy.	 Cosmopolitanism	 acknowledges	 the	 contemporary	 socio-political	
constructs	 of	 states.	 	 Hence	 borders	 do	 matter,	 and	 we	 may	 be	 more	 involved	 with	
members	of	our	own	polity,	but	we	also	have	concern	and	regard	for	all	human	beings.		
Cosmopolitan	 regard	 is	 also	 salient	 for	 an	 account	 of	 ICL	 norms,	 since	 ICL	 delineates	
violations	 that	 are	 not	 just	 of	 domestic	 concern,	 but	 that	 can	 also	 be	 transnationally	
prosecuted.		
Third,	cosmopolitanism	searches	 for	commonalities	between	cultures,	but	 it	also	
recognizes	 and	 respects	 differences,	 thus	 embracing	 pluralism	 and	 the	 building	 of	 a	
modus	vivendi.8		Cosmopolitanism	is	sometimes	incorrectly	conflated	with	universalism,	
but	such	conflation	misses	the	key	nuances	of	cosmopolitanism.		Cosmopolitanism	is	a	
deliberate	 contrast	with	 universalism:	 it	 does	 not	 assume	 that	we	 share	 all	 the	 same	
values.	 	 Instead	 it	 assumes	 we	 have	 enough	 common	 ground	 to	 at	 least	 carry	 out	 a	
conversation	 between	 those	 with	 different	 outlooks.9	 	 Similarly,	 some	 warn	 that	
cosmopolitanism	might	be	invoked	as	a	mask	for	hegemony,	but	this	is	an	objection	to	




























Cosmopolitanism’s	 departure	 from	 a	 state-centric	 approach	 is	 both	 very	
challenging	 and	 very	 promising	 for	 criminal	 law	 theory.	 Cosmopolitanism	 recognizes	




easily	 envisage	 a	 ‘neo-medieval’	 landscape,	 featuring	 overlapping	 and	 diverse	
governance	structures.12		
By	contrast,	criminal	law	theory	traditionally	–	and	entirely	understandably,	given	




inhabitants.	 	 In	 this	 picture,	 one	 can	 readily	 rely	 on	 concepts	 such	 as	 citizenship	 or	
community	to	help	explain	aspects	of	criminal	law.			





might	 find	 on	 inspection	 that	what	 is	 really	 required	 is	 not	 the	 entire	 package	 of	 the	
modern	Westphalian	state,	but	rather	certain	features	of	the	state.		We	might	also	see	how	
those	 features	 could	 be	 allocated	 differently	 or	 vested	 in	 other	 institutions.	 	 The	


























thinking	 is	 a	 single	 entity,	 claiming	 a	 monopoly	 of	 force	 in	 a	 territory	 and	 uniquely	
empowered	 to	 sit	 in	 judgment	 of	 all	 the	 other	 actors.15	 It	 is	 the	 law-maker,	 law-
interpreter,	 and	 law-enforcer;	 it	 is	 the	 keeper	 of	 the	 peace,	 custodian	 of	 public	 right,	
embodiment	of	the	community,	and	beneficiary	of	duties	of	allegiance.		








































particular	 feature	 of	 a	 state	may	not	 be	 essential	 for	 a	 system	 to	do	 justice.	We	must	





















do	criminal	 law.	 	This	proposition	is	 largely	true,	as	a	statement	of	currently-accepted	
social	and	legal	conventions	within	the	‘normal’	case	of	an	orderly	modern	state.	But	it	is	
not	an	absolute	 truth:	 it	 is	not	 something	essential,	 eternal,	or	 inherent	 to	 the	 idea	of	
criminal	law	or	the	state.		Criminal	law	is	in	reality	carried	out	by	human	beings;	it	is	only	
relatively	 recently	 in	human	history	 that	human	beings	have	carried	out	 criminal	 law	
primarily	through	the	social	institution	of	the	Westphalian	state.		There	have	been	other	
configurations	 of	 human	 governance	 in	 history,	 with	 criminal	 sanctions	 applied	 for	
example	by	religious	institutions,	communities,	and	other	organizations.21		More	recently,	
armed	 groups	 carrying	 out	 criminal	 law	 has	 raised	 new	 questions	 about	 legitimacy,	
legality,	 and	 the	 appropriate	 standards	 by	 which	 to	 assess	 such	 practices	 given	 the	
different	capacities	of	armed	groups.22	 	Thus,	on	a	deeper	normative	level,	it	is	at	least	































that	broader	genus.	 	ICL	may	provide	a	doorway	into	such	questions,	as	 it	 is	routinely	
carried	out	not	by	states	but	by	international	tribunals,	directly	applying	criminal	law	to	
persons.23		ICL	provides	an	opportunity	to	explore	criminal	law	under	alternative	forms	
of	 governance,	 and	 in	 so	 doing,	 to	 learn	 more	 about	 the	 more	 truly	 general	 case	 of	
criminal	law.24	
Of	course,	we	can	still	certainly	turn	to	the	rich	and	well-developed	thinking	in	the	









































on	 customary	 international	 law	 as	 a	 source	 of	 prohibitions	 is	 an	 error	 introduced	 by	
international	lawyers	and	reflects	a	failure	to	understand	the	full	implications	of	legality	
in	criminal	 cases.27	 	 I	 certainly	agree	 that	 some	problems	 in	 ICL	 flow	 from	habits	and	
thought	 patterns	 of	 international	 lawyers	 (see	 Chapter	 2).	 	 This	may	 however	 be	 an	
instance	where	 the	seeming	departure	 is	one	 that,	on	 further	 inspection,	proves	 to	be	
deontically	justifiable.	
In	 almost	 all	 of	 contemporary	 human	 experience	 with	 the	 criminal	 sanction,	 it	
seems	 quite	 plausible	 to	 regard	 lex	 scripta	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 just	 punishment.			


























the	writings	 be	 scattered	 in	multiple	 places,	 as	 it	 is	 in	 common	 law	 jurisprudence	 or	






example	 by	 multilateral	 treaty)	 is	 considerably	 more	 difficult	 than	 passing	 domestic	





















For	 example,	 it	 is	 often	 argued	 that	 the	 prohibition	 on	 retroactive	 law	was	 not	
applicable	in	ICL,	at	least	in	its	early	stages.32		That	argument	may	indeed	be	correct	as	a	
matter	of	positive	law,	but	it	does	not	help	us	with	our	question	of	whether	retroactivity	
is	normatively	 acceptable,	 i.e.	whether	 it	 is	 ‘just’.	 	 One	 of	 the	 arguments	 raised	 in	 the	





escape	 punishment	 for	 heinous	 deeds.33	 	 That	 argument	 is	 appealing	 but	 incomplete,	
because	it	has	a	purely	formal	structure:	it	does	not	specify	any	content	for	its	exception.		























importantly,	 such	 an	 account	 will	 require	 a	 convincing	 deontic	 theory	 about	 the	
underpinnings	and	outer	limits	of	the	legality	principle.	
As	 may	 be	 seen,	 the	 account	 I	 propose	 would	 not	 transplant	 the	 familiar	
requirement	of	written	legislation	(or	its	international	analogue,	a	treaty).35		Nor	would	










informed	 that	 they	 were	 to	 shoot	 Muslim	 civilians.	 He	 protested	 the	 order,	 and	 was	
presented	with	a	choice	of	either	participating	or	 joining	the	prisoners	and	being	shot	


























In	 classical	 liberal	 theories	 that	 conceive	 of	 individuals	 as	 atomistic	 entities	
entering	into	a	notional	social	contract	to	better	advance	their	personal	aims,	the	freedom	
to	preserve	one’s	own	life	is	the	ultimate	domain	reservé.40		To	many,	a	law	that	requires	
one	 to	 die	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 censure	 is	 futile.41	 	 As	 Paul	Kahn	 has	 argued,	 traditional	
contractarian	liberal	theories	have	trouble	grappling	with	sacrifice	(both	the	willingness	
of	 individuals	 to	 sacrifice	 themselves	 and	 the	 state	 or	 community’s	 claim	 to	 expect	




do	 so.	 	 Experience	 shows	 that	many	 humans	 can	 conceive	 of	 fates	worse	 than	 death	
(hence	the	phrase	‘death	before	dishonour’	or	indeed,	‘a	fate	worse	than	death’).		Thus,	
punishment	 for	 a	 refusal	 to	 fulfil	 an	 almost	 certainly	 lethal	duty	 is	not	necessarily	 an	
absurdity.	 	 Criminal	 laws	 may	 punish	 soldiers	 for	 desertion	 or	 insubordination	 or	
cowardice	in	the	face	of	the	enemy.	
Perhaps	duress	is	based	on	the	expectations	of	firmness	that	we	can	fairly	expect	



























‘soldier’	 is	 not	 homogenous;	we	would	 have	 to	 think	 about	 very	 different	 contexts	 of	





Developing	 a	 normative	 theory	 of	 the	 defence	 of	 superior	 orders	 could	 be	
illuminating	both	for	 ICL	and	for	general	criminal	 law	theory.	The	defence	of	superior	
orders	 is	 controversial	 doctrinally	 and	 normatively.47	 	 The	 defence	 precludes	
international	 criminal	 responsibility	 of	 persons	 who	 are	 obliged	 to	 carry	 out	 orders,	











































Cohen	 offers	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘role	 distance’	 from	 official	 roles,	 which	 may	 also	 be	 of	
assistance.51	The	defence	of	superior	orders	may	be	rooted	in	an	acknowledgement	of	the	




















reliable	 guide.	 	 For	 normal	 citizens,	where	 conduct	 is	 arguably	 criminal,	 the	 ‘thin	 ice	

























criticizing	 the	current	defence	 from	a	different	direction.	 	Article	33	of	 the	Rome	Statute	precludes	 the	
defence	in	relation	to	crimes	against	humanity;	however,	there	can	also	be	borderline,	ambiguous	orders	










regard	 the	 state	 as	 merely	 one	 useful	 human-created	 device	 to	 facilitate	 human	
governance.			





I	 have	 tried	 to	 show	 how	 a	 thoughtful	 account	 can	 raise	 new	 questions	 and	
perhaps	even	lead	us	to	rethink	our	understanding	of	fundamental	principles.	It	may	be	
that	familiar	formulations	of	principles	(for	example,	that	legality	requires	written	law)	
might	 not	 in	 fact	 be	 elementary.	 	 They	 might	 be	 generated	 by	 deeper	 underlying	
commitments,	and	only	become	applicable	and	appropriate	in	particular	contexts.		
	 In	 Part	 III,	 I	 will	 provide	 a	 more	 detailed	 illustration	 of	 the	 framework	 in	















In	 Part	 III,	 I	 illustrate	 the	 themes	 of	 this	 thesis	 by	 applying	 the	 proposed	
methodology	to	specific	problems	in	ICL.		In	doing	so,	I	will:	
(1) show	 that	 early	 legal	 reasoning	 in	 ICL	 often	 did	 not	 engage	 adequately	with	 the	
deontic	dimension,	generating	problems	and	contradictions;		
(2) showcase	 deontic	 analysis	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 coherentist	 approach	 to	 such	
analysis;		












Command	 responsibility	 raises	 fascinating	 issues	 for	 criminal	 law	 theory.	
Whereas	other	modes	of	 liability	 in	 ICL	were	 transplanted	 from	established	domestic	
analogues,	 command	 responsibility	 developed	 in	 international	 law.	 	 Accordingly,	
command	 responsibility	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 scrutinized	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	 domestic	
modes	of	liability,	which	have	been	refined	and	debated	by	jurists	and	scholars	in	many	
countries	 over	 centuries	 of	 experience.	 	 Command	 responsibility	 is	 a	 valuable	 and	











to	 a	 crime	 in	 order	 to	 be	 a	 party	 to	 it.	 	 I	 will	 show	 that	 early	 reasoning	 in	 Tribunal	
jurisprudence	engaged	inadequately	with	the	deontic	dimension,	producing	an	internal	




Chapter	 7	 considers	 another	 controversy,	 the	 mental	 fault	 requirement	 of	
command	responsibility.	 	Early	Tribunal	jurisprudence	disavowed	criminal	negligence,	





law	 theory	 can	 clarify	 and	 benefit	 ICL	 doctrine.	 	 Second,	 careful	 deontic	 analysis	 can	
sometimes	 help	 us	 avoid	 needlessly	 conservative	 doctrines	 which	 were	 based	 on	
unfounded	overestimates	of	the	relevant	constraints.		Third,	novel	doctrines	and	contexts	
of	 ICL	 can	 help	 us	 test	 and	 reconsider	 common	 assumptions	 in	 criminal	 law	 theory.	












In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 illustrate	 the	 themes	 of	 this	 thesis	 by	 exploring	 a	 particular	
contradiction	 in	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence,	 and	 the	 resulting	 controversy.	 	 The	
contradiction	 is	 that	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence:	 (a)	 recognizes	 the	 principle	 of	 personal	
culpability,	pursuant	to	which	a	person	must	contribute	to	a	crime	to	be	party	to	it;	and	















examination	 here	 should	 help	 clear	 out	 the	 most	 fallacious	 arguments,	 map	 out	 the	














(3)		 Under	 the	 doctrine	 of	 command	 responsibility,	 the	 Tribunals	 explicitly	 hold	 the	
commander	liable	as	a	party	to	the	crimes	of	the	subordinates.1			
(4)		 Therefore,	 to	 comply	with	 the	 system’s	 principles,	 command	 responsibility	 as	 a	
mode	 of	 liability	 must	 require	 that	 commander’s	 dereliction	 contributed	 to	 the	
crimes	of	subordinates.	
	
This	 syllogism	 is	 quite	 straightforward	 and	 demonstrates	 a	 contradiction.		















responsibility	 as	 a	 separate	 offence.	 However,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 has	 explicitly	




Strategy	 3	 –	 ‘Sui	 Generis’:	A	 third	 strategy	 has	 been	 to	 declare	 that	 command	










for	 inadequate	 reasons,	 we	 immediately	 discover	 an	 elegant	 solution.	 	 Command	
responsibility	in	international	courts	remains	a	mode	of	accessory	liability,	as	it	has	long	
been	 recognized.	 	 As	 such,	 it	 requires	 causal	 contribution.	 	 This	 requirement	 is	 not	

























command	 responsibility	 discourse	 became	 so	 complicated.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 Tribunal	
jurisprudence	took	an	early	wrong	turn	when	it	rejected	the	fundamental	requirement	of	
causal	contribution,	due	to	hasty	reasoning.		Subsequent	twists	and	turns	to	escape	the	
contradiction	 led	 to	 further	 convolutions.	 	 Literature	 and	 jurisprudence	 have	 now	
fractured	into	claims	that	command	responsibility	is	a	separate	offence,	a	new	sui	generis	
form	 of	 liability	 (whose	 nature	 is	 never	 explained),	 neither-mode-nor-offence,	 or	





My	 analysis	 sheds	 light	 on	 ongoing	 debates.	 	 First,	 the	 mainstream	 Tribunal	
approach	remains	problematic	and	in	need	of	justification.	 	 	Second,	whereas	the	ICTY	
majority	 decision	 in	Hadžihasanović	 on	 successor	 commanders	 has	 been	 vehemently	
criticized,	I	place	it	in	a	more	favourable	light:	it	is	best	supported	by	a	deontic	analysis.4		


























My	 inquiry	 here	 is	 not	 about	 possible	 legislative	 reforms,	 but	 rather	 the	 legal	






a	 complete	 treatment	 of	 both	 bodies	 of	 work.	 	 I	 delve	 into	 the	 vast	 literature	 and	































is	 how	 it	 was	 generally	 been	 understood	 and	 applied	 over	 the	 history	 of	 ICL,	 with	
























other	modes	 of	 liability	 (such	 as	 ordering,	 instigating,	 or	 joint	 commission).	 	 Second,	
where	 a	 commander	 does	 not	 initiate	 the	 crimes,	 but	 she	 knows	 of	 the	 crimes	 and	
contributes	to	them,	then	she	may	still	be	liable	through	‘aiding	and	abetting’	or	other	
complicity	doctrines.9	 	Third,	where	 the	commander	knows	of	 the	pending	or	ongoing	
















































The	 principle	means	 that	we	 punish	 people	 only	 for	 deeds	 for	which	 they	 are	
personally	 culpable.	 	 The	 principle	 of	 personal	 culpability	 has	 an	 objective	 aspect	 (a	
connection	to	the	crime)	and	a	subjective	aspect	(a	blameworthy	mental	state).		My	focus	
in	this	chapter	is	the	objective	aspect,	i.e.	that	we	hold	persons	responsible	only	for	their	



















actions,	 never	 mind	 your	 actions.	 	 For	 my	 own	 actions	 inevitably	 include	 my	
actions	of	contributing	to	your	actions.14			
	
The	 commitment	 to	 punish	 persons	 only	 for	 their	 own	 wrongdoing	 means	 that	 the	
accused	must	contribute	in	some	way	to	a	crime	to	be	liable	for	it.		ICL	scholars	Guénaël	
Mettraux	and	 Ilias	Bantekas	have	respectively	observed	that	 the	requirement	 that	 the	
accused	be	‘causally	linked	to	the	crime	itself	is	a	general	and	fundamental	requirement	
of	 criminal	 law’15	 and	 that	 ‘in	 all	 criminal	 justice	 systems,	 some	 form	 of	 causality	 is	
required.’16		
ICL	 jurisprudence	 recognizes	 that,	 for	 personal	 culpability,	 accessory	 liability	
requires	some	contribution	to	the	underlying	crime.		For	example,	the	ICTR	in	Kayishema	
affirmed	that	 it	 is	 ‘firmly	established	that	for	the	accused	to	be	criminally	culpable	his	




and	more	 indirect	contributors	are	 liable	as	accessories.19	 	 I	will	discuss	 the	principal-
































including	 by	 acting	 through	 others	 while	 still	 having	 ‘control’	 over	 the	 crimes.	 	 By	
contrast,	the	contribution	of	an	accessory	may	be	more	indirect:	the	accessory’s	actions	


















































questions	 from	 this	 chapter	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 brevity;	 however,	 for	 readers	who	 are	
interested,	I	make	my	analysis	available	in	Annex	1,	below.		In	short,	ICL	jurisprudence	–	




I	 should	address	 two	possible	points	of	 confusion.	 	First,	a	 surprisingly	common	
misperception	 in	 ICL	 jurisprudence	and	 literature	 is	 that	 the	accessory	 liability	model	

























Despite	 affirming	 the	 culpability	 principle	 and	 the	 contribution	 requirement	
entailed	 therein,	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 nonetheless	 goes	 on	 to	 assert	 that	 the	
requirement	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 command	 responsibility.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 Tribunal’s	
decision	in	Oric	acknowledges	that	modes	of	liability	require	a	causal	contribution,	and	
thus	 that	 superior	 responsibility	 ‘would	 require	a	 causal	 contribution	 to	 the	principal	
crime’,	yet	asserts	 that	causal	contribution	 is	not	required,	 ‘for	good	reasons’.33	 	 I	will	
scrutinize	the	quality	of	 those	reasons	below	(§6.5).	 	First,	 I	will	outline	how	the	anti-
contribution	position	emerged,	and	show	the	implications	of	that	position.		
The	doctrine	of	command	responsibility	provides	two	distinct	ways	to	prove	the	
dereliction	 by	 the	 commander:	 (a)	 failure	 to	prevent	 crimes	 and	 (b)	 failure	 to	punish	
crimes.34	 The	 first	 branch	 is	 satisfied	 where	 that	 the	 commander	 ‘failed	 to	 take	 the	
necessary	and	reasonable	measures’	to	try	to	prevent	the	crimes.35		The	‘failure	to	prevent’	





necessary	 measures	 to	 investigate	 and	 punish	 or	 to	 refer	 the	 matter	 to	 competent	





















punish	 the	 crime	 contribute	 to	 that	 same	 crime.	 	 From	 this	 observation,	 the	Tribunal	


























Consider	 the	 scenario	where	 subordinates	 commit	 not	 one	 crime	but	 a	 series	of	













Failure	 to	 punish	 prior	 crimes	
facilitates	 and	 encourages	 later	




committed.	 	At	 some	point	 the	 commander	 either	 learns	of	 the	 crimes	or	has	 enough	
information	 that	she	 ‘should	have	known’	or	 ‘had	reason	 to	know’	of	 the	crimes.	 	The	
commander	fails	to	take	reasonable	steps	to	have	the	crimes	investigated	and	prosecuted,	
and	 crimes	 continue	 to	 occur.	 	 Although	 this	 failure	 of	 the	 commander	 cannot	
retroactively	 contribute	 to	 the	 initial	 crimes,	 it	 can	 and	 does	 contribute	 to	 each	
subsequent	 crime.	 	 Her	 failure	 to	 punish	 the	 prior	 crimes	 facilitates	 the	 subsequent	
crimes,	in	comparison	to	the	legally	expected	baseline	of	her	diligent	response	to	crimes	
of	subordinates.		If	the	subordinates	know	of	the	lack	of	punishment,	they	may	perceive	
a	 reduced	 risk	 of	 punishment	 or	 a	 signal	 of	 punishment.	 	 But	we	do	not	 even	need	 a	
showing	of	such	knowledge,	because	the	commander	has	failed	to	deliver	a	deterrent	and	




Once	 we	 consider	 the	 scenario	 of	 multiple	 crimes,	 which	 is	 actually	 the	 most	
common	scenario	in	ICL,	we	see	that	actually	the	‘failure	to	punish’	branch	can	indeed	be	
reconciled	 with	 a	 requirement	 of	 causal	 contribution.	 	 Hence,	 there	 was	 no	
incompatibility	or	contradiction	that	would	require,	or	even	permit,	the	Tribunal	to	reject	
a	requirement	of	the	fundamental	principle	of	personal	culpability.		
I	 believe	 that	 the	Tribunal’s	 reasoning	 in	 those	 cases	 is	 an	 example	 of	 hurried	
doctrinal	 reasoning	 that	 did	 not	 engage	 adequately	 with	 deontic	 constraints.	 The	
Tribunal	abandoned	the	culpability	principle	all	too	insouciantly,	because	of	a	relatively	
superficial	doctrinal	argument	(textual	construction).		Indeed,	the	seeds	of	confusion	can	
be	 traced	 even	 further	 back,	 to	 the	drafters	 of	 the	 ICTY	 Statute,	who	blithely	merged	
criminal	and	non-criminal	provisions	of	Additional	Protocol	 I,	without	considering	the	
culpability	principle.42		Had	the	chambers	approached	the	provision	with	the	culpability	








To	 illuminate	 the	 implications	of	allowing	convictions	without	contributions,	 I	will	
outline	two	scenarios	of	 ‘non-contributory’	failures	to	punish.	(By	‘non-contributory’,	I	














In	 the	 isolated	 crime	 scenario,	 the	 commander	 has	 clearly	 failed	 in	 her	


















of	 the	 ‘successor	 commander’.	 	 This	 scenario	 arose	 in	 Hadžihasanović,	 in	 which	 a	
commander,	 Kubura,	 had	 taken	 up	 his	 command	 position	 after	 certain	 crimes	 were	









command,	became	aware	of	past	crimes	or	had	reason	to	know	of	 them,	and	 failed	 to	
punish	the	persons	responsible.		If	we	apply	the	doctrine	mechanistically	and	without	any	
concern	 for	 fundamental	 principles,	 this	 approach	 would	 meet	 all	 of	 the	 formal	
requirements	of	Article	7(3)	of	the	ICTY	Statute.	
On	 appeal,	 a	 bare	3-2	majority	 of	 the	Appeals	 Chamber	 recoiled	 from	 successor	
commander	liability,	over	some	strong	dissents	and	with	some	heated	judicial	language	
on	all	sides.45		The	majority	held	that	the	commander	must	at	least	have	been	in	command	
at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 crimes.	 	 The	 reasoning	 of	 the	majority	was	 not	 explicitly	 based	 on	
concern	 for	 the	 culpability	 principle,	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 doctrinal	 grounds	 that	 prior	
sources	and	authorities	did	not	seem	to	support	successor	commander	liability	for	past	
crimes.46	 	 Judges	 Shahabuddeen	 and	 Hunt,	 in	 dissent,	 would	 have	 allowed	 successor	
commander	liability.		
The	Hadžihasanović		decision	generated	major	controversy	and	has	spawned	a	large	
literature	 on	 successor	 commander	 liability.	 	 Rather	 than	 receiving	 applause	 for	 its	











culpability.	 	 Many	 scholars	 argue	 that	 the	 majority	 position	 creates	 a	 ‘loophole’,	 an	
‘arbitrary	 limitation’	 and	 a	 ‘gaping	 hole’	 through	 which	 perpetrators	 will	 ‘escape	
liability’.47		Within	the	ICTY,	trial	chambers	have	openly	expressed	their	discontent	and	
disapproval	of	the	majority	decision.48		A	trial	chamber	of	the	Sierra	Leone	Special	Court	
declined	 to	 follow	 the	majority	approach	and	 instead	adopted	 the	dissent	approach.49		
The	 ICTY	 Appeals	 Chamber	 itself	 almost	 overturned	 the	 majority	 position	 in	 a	 later	
decision	 (Orić).	 	 Separate	 opinions	 in	 the	Orić	 decision	 described	 the	Hadžihasanović	






































The	 culpability	 problem	 was	 not	 entirely	 overlooked.	 Judge	 Shahabuddeen,	








greater	 puzzle,	 because	 it	 involves	 a	 stark	 contradiction.	 That	 position	 (a)	 regards	
command	 responsibility	 a	 mode	 of	 accessory	 liability,	 (b)	 rejects	 the	 contribution	
requirement,	 and	 yet	 (c)	 proclaims	 compliance	with	 the	 culpability	 principle.	 	 Such	 a	
position	could	only	be	defended	with	a	new	deontic	account	of	personal	culpability,	which	
the	Tribunals	have	not	offered	or	even	attempted.		























			The	 second	most	 common	 objection	 is	 that	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 criminal	 liability	
would	be	narrower	than	the	full	scope	of	the	humanitarian	law	duty.58	 	This	objection	
illustrates	another	of	the	problematic	structures	of	argument	that	I	discussed	in	Chapter	
2.	 	The	objection	assumes	 that	 ICL	norms	must	be	 co-extensive	with	human	rights	or	
humanitarian	 law	 norms.	 	 The	 humanitarian	 law	 duty	 certainly	 does	 require	 the	
commander	to	punish	all	past	crimes,	regardless	of	whether	she	contributed	to	them.59		








has	 breached	 humanitarian	 law,	 triggering	 any	 relevant	 remedies	 under	 that	 law.		
Second,	 the	 commander	 may	 also	 personally	 face	 criminal	 law	 repercussions,	 if	 a	
lawmaker	with	jurisdiction	has	criminalized	non-contributory	derelictions	of	duty.	But	


















attempt	 to	 address	 the	 concern	 that	 the	 system	 is	 contradicting	 its	 recognized	
fundamental	principles.		
My	aim	here	is	not	to	criticize	the	Tribunals.		The	Tribunals	operated	in	a	pioneering	
phase	 of	 ICL.	 	 They	 were	 engaged	 in	 a	 fast-paced,	 massive,	 and	 complex	 task	 of	








grounds	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 reconciled	with	 the	 ‘failure	 to	 punish’	 branch	 of	 command	
responsibility.	In	Čelebići,	the	defence	argued	that	a	‘failure	to	punish’	should	give	rise	to	
accessory	 liability	 only	 if	 that	 failure	 is	 ‘the	 cause	 of	 future	 offences’.60	 	 The	 Chamber	





















crimes	 encouraged	 or	 facilitated	 by	 that	 failure.65	 	 There	 is	 nothing	 ‘illogical’	 about	







































But	 a	 culpability	 challenge	 requires	 a	 deontic	 analysis:	 one	 must	 actually	 assess	
compatibility	with	the	fundamental	principles	that	limit	our	license	to	punish	individuals.		
This	deontic	task	requires	an	assessment	of	whether	the	rules	are	just.73		







Čelebići	 Chamber	 somehow	 managed	 to	 detect	 ‘no	 support’	 for	 a	 contribution	
requirement,	 even	 though	 the	 Čelebići	 decision	 itself	 directly	 quoted	 passages	 from	
authorities	that	explicitly	support	the	requirement.		To	give	two	examples,	Čelebići	cites	




taking	 measures	 against	 subordinates	 who	 violate	 the	 law	 of	 war,	 he	 allows	 his	
subordinate	units	to	continue	to	commit	the	acts’.76	 	These	and	other	authorities	show	






























The	third	major	doctrinal	argument	against	a	contribution	requirement	 is	 that	 it	
would	 render	 command	 responsibility	 ‘redundant’	with	 other	modes	of	 liability.	 	 The	
Halilović	and	Oric	decisions	argued	that,	 if	causal	contribution	were	required,	then	the	
‘borderline	 between	 article	 7(3)	 [command	 responsibility]	 and…	 7(1)	 [the	 other	
modes]…would	 be	 transgressed	 and,	 thus,	 superior	 criminal	 responsibility	 would	
become	superfluous’.77			
This	 argument	 overlooks	 that	 command	 responsibility	 is	 already	 distinct	 from	
other	 modes	 of	 liability	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 modified	 mental	 element.	 	 Command	
responsibility	allows	conviction	based	on	a	‘had	reason	to	know’	or	‘should	have	known’	
standard.78	 	Hence,	 it	 is	not	 true	 that	 recognizing	 the	 contribution	 requirement	–	 and	






















foundation	 of	 criminal	 responsibility’	 and	 thus	 to	 only	 hold	 persons	 responsible	 for	
transactions	 in	which	 they	 ‘personally	 engaged	 or	 in	 some	 other	way	 participated’.81			
Technical	doctrinal	arguments,	such	as	reconciling	one	provision	with	another,	are	no	
answer	to	the	challenge	that	one	is	contradicting	one’s	stated	fundamental	principles.		To	






We	now	arrive	at	 the	next	 twist	 in	 the	discourse	on	command	responsibility.	 	 In		
Hadžihasanović,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 confronted	 the	 scenario	 of	 the	 ‘successor	
commander’,	which	places	the	problems	of	not	requiring	causation	in	particularly	stark	
relief.	 	 	 Faced	with	 defence	 objections	 to	 liability	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 ‘any	 involvement	
whatsoever	 in	 the	 actus	 reus’,83	 Judge	 Shahabuddeen,	 one	 of	 the	 dissenting	 judges,	
advanced	an	innovative	solution.		He	asserted	that:		
I	prefer	to	interpret	the	provision	as	making	the	commander	guilty	for	failing	in	his	
















The	 ‘separate	 offence’	 approach	 is	 preferable	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 arguments	



















































However,	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 option	 of	 declaring	 a	 new	 offence	 of	 breach	 of	
command	responsibility	is	not	legally	available	to	the	Tribunals,	for	reasons	I	will	explain	
in	a	moment.	 	To	be	clear,	 in	this	case	study	I	am	looking	at	the	plausible	 interpretive	
options	 for	 the	 Tribunals	 (and	 by	 extension	 the	 ICC);	 I	 am	 not	 engaged	 in	 the	 policy	
debate	of	which	approach	would	be	preferable	for	a	national	legislator	or	treaty	drafter.		
I	have	no	objection	to	 ‘separate	offence’	 legislation.87	 	 Indeed,	national	 legislation	or	a	
treaty	amendment	could	even	posit	both	concepts,	recognizing	command	responsibility	










	The	 Tribunal	 Statutes	 (and	 the	 ICC	 Statute)	 appear	 to	 recognize	 command	
responsibility	as	a	mode	of	liability,	not	as	a	crime.	 	For	example,	Article	28	of	the	ICC	



















More	 importantly,	 the	 ICTY	 Statute	 purports	 to	 reflect	 customary	 law,	 and	
customary	 law	 precedent	 was	 consistent	 that	 command	 responsibility	 is	 a	 mode	 of	
liability.		The	consistent	understanding	is	seen	in	jurisprudence,	from	Nuremberg	up	to	
the	Tribunals,	in	national	legislation,	and	in	State	practice;	for	example,	in	the	negotiation	
of	 the	Rome	Statute	 it	was	uncontroversial	 that	 command	 responsibility	 is	 a	mode	of	
liability.93		I	will	not	embark	here	on	a	lengthy	review	of	the	doctrinal	precedents;	to	do	
so	would	require	an	additional	chapter	of	this	thesis,	and	my	topic	here	is	not	to	recount	
earlier	 precedents,	 but	 to	 explore	 the	 Tribunal’s	 handling	 of	 the	 culpability	 principle.		
Other	scholars	have	admirably	canvassed	the	precedents	showing	that	it	was	a	mode	of	
liability.94			
Indeed,	Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 itself	acknowledges	 that	previous	customary	 law	
authorities	regarded	command	responsibility	as	accessory	liability.95		Even	the	Halilović	
decision,	in	which	an	ICTY	Trial	Chamber	creatively	advocated	for	the	separate	offence	
interpretation,	 actually	 demonstrates	 the	 long	 consistency	 of	 the	 ‘mode’	 approach.		























with	 the	exception	of	only	one	passage	 from	one	case	 that	only	arguably	supported	a	









would	 allow	 judges	 latitude	 to	 reinterpret	 provisions	 of	 their	 respective	 Statutes,	
especially	given	that	ICL	is	a	nascent	discipline	which	is	being	developed	each	day.		But	
the	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 discussion	 of	 applicable	 law	 has	 to	 be	 that	 the	 precedents	
support	 a	 mode	 of	 liability	 approach.	 	 As	 Barrie	 Sander	 notes,	 we	 must	 have	 some	







































Judges	 and	 scholars	 who	 argue	 that	 the	 commander	 is	 not	 charged	 with	 the	
underlying	 crime	 often	 cite	 an	 ‘entirely	 unreasoned’	 and	 ‘throwaway’100	 	 line	 in	 the	










unlawful	 confinement,	 and	 enslavement	 –	 i.e.	 the	 core	 crimes	 carried	 out	 by	 his	
subordinates.102		He	was	also	convicted	for	those	crimes.103			For	example,	he	was	found	
‘guilty	of	…	murder	as	a	crime	against	humanity	and	murder	as	a	violation	of	the	laws	or	
customs	 of	war)’	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 7(3)	 (command	 responsibility),	 and	 ‘guilty	 of	…	
torture	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 and	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 laws	 or	 customs	 of	 war’	



















There	 are	 alternative	 and	 more	 sophisticated	 argument	 for	 a	 separate	 offence	
approach.		Some	scholars	have	argued	for	a	separate	offence	interpretation,	based	not	on	
disingenuous	 claims	 about	 applicable	 law,	 nor	 as	 an	 expedient	 device	 to	 enable	
convictions	of	successor	commanders,	but	for	the	principled	reason	that	it	is	the	only	way	
to	 comply	 with	 fundamental	 principles.105	 	 I	 would	 endorse	 such	 an	 approach,	 for	
example,	 if	 it	were	 the	only	way	 to	 comply	with	 fundamental	 principles:	 in	 that	 case,	
canons	 of	 construction	 could	 allow	 a	 strained	 textual	 reading	 and	 a	 departure	 from	
precedents	 to	 avoid	 violating	 fundamental	 principles.106	 	 A	 coherentist	 legal	
interpretation	can	endorse	a	creative	re-reading,	if	it	is	the	best	way	to	make	sense	of	all	
considerations.		However,	in	my	view,	that	route	is	not	necessary,	because	the	precedents	































One	 of	 the	 later	 lines	 of	 response	 in	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 was	 to	 assert	 that	
command	 responsibility	 is	 a	 ‘sui	 generis’	 mode	 of	 liability,	 to	 which	 the	 contribution	
requirement	 simply	 does	 not	 apply.	 For	 example,	 the	Halilović	 decision	 declares,	 ‘the	
nature	of	command	responsibility	itself,	as	a	sui	generis	form	of	liability,	which	is	distinct	
from	 the	modes	of	 individual	 responsibility	 set	out	 in	Article	7(1),	does	not	 require	a	
causal	link.’	108		
Simply	invoking	the	label	sui	generis,	and	declaring	per	definitionem	that	this	new	









has	differences	 from	other	modes.	 	 Indeed	any	mode	must	be	distinct	 from	other	modes	 in	 some	way;	




that	 ICL	might	 raise	new	problems	 that	 lead	 to	new	thinking	 for	general	 criminal	 law	
theory.		Certainly	the	discovery	of	a	new	category	of	liability,	falling	outside	any	known	
category	 (i.e.	 separate	 offence,	 principal	 liability,	 accessory	 liability),	 would	 be	 a	
remarkable	example.	





Stewart	 has	 aptly	 described	 such	 arguments	 as	 ‘more	 of	 a	 smokescreen	 to	 ward	 off	
conceptual	criticisms	than	a	marked	normative	change’.111		
Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 has	 tied	 itself	 into	 increasingly	 tortuous	 knots	 trying	 to	
deny	 the	 contradiction	 between	 a	 mode	 that	 does	 not	 require	 contribution	 and	 the	
accepted	principle	that	modes	require	contribution.	An	illustration	of	this	convolution	is	
the	 equivocation	 and	 self-contradiction	 over	 whether	 responsibility	 ‘for’	 the	 crimes	
means	 responsibility	 ‘for’	 the	 crimes.112	 	 Some	 judgments	 seek	 to	 downplay	 the	


























Frequently,	 the	 judges	 struggle	 to	 describe	 an	 indirect	 liability	 that	 is	 neither	
personal	commission	nor	a	separate	offence.	114		However,	the	indirect	liability	that	these	
passages	 struggle	 to	 describe	 is	 already	 elegantly	 captured	 by	 an	 existing	 concept:	
accessory	liability.	This	terminological	and	conceptual	lack	of	clarity	might	be	a	sign	that	
ICL	is	still	a	relatively	young	field.		Criminal	law	theory	has	helpful	tools	to	offer	ICL.	
If	 there	 is	 indeed	 a	 new	 category	 that	 is	 neither	 a	 mode	 nor	 an	 offence,	 its	
proponents	should	clarify	what	this	new	twilight	category	is.	Once	we	are	told	what	this	






























punish,	 knowledge	 versus	 should	 have	 known,	 or	 contributory	 versus	 non-
contributory.115			
The	variegated	approach	is	preferable	to	the	two	previous	approaches:	it	does	not	
rely	 on	 obscurity.	 	 It	 recognizes	 the	 indirect	 liability	 of	 the	 commander	 where	 she	
contributed	to	crimes,	it	avoids	the	over-reach	of	a	non-causal	mode	of	liability,	and	it	still	





that	 is	textually	 implausible	and	unnecessarily	complicated.	 	The	relevant	texts	do	not	




in	 the	 discourse.	 The	 contribution	 requirement	 is	 not	 onerous:	 a	 non-contributory	
dereliction	arises	only	where	the	dereliction	did	not	even	increase	the	risk	of	any	crimes	
that	 occurred.116	 International	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 should	 focus	 on	 persons	 bearing	






















	(1)	 The	 Tribunal’s	 initial	 rejection	 of	 causal	 contribution,	 in	 what	 was	 then	 clearly	
understood	 to	 be	 a	 mode	 of	 liability,	 was	 based	 on	 hasty	 and	 inadequate	 doctrinal	
reasoning	which	did	not	adequately	consider	the	culpability	principle.			
(2)	 A	 lot	 of	 the	 argumentation	 on	 this	 topic	 (in	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 surrounding	
literature)	has	 featured	 the	 types	of	 reasoning	discussed	 in	Chapter	2,	 such	as	 simply	
maximizing	 crime	 control	 or	 attempted	 transplants	 from	 IHL	without	 considering	 the	
context	shift.117			
(3)	 Several	 of	 the	 main	 responses	 (the	 doctrinal	 responses,	 or	 simply	 invoking	 the	
adjective	‘sui	generis’	without	any	further	attempt	at	justification)	do	not	even	attempt	to	
address	the	violation	of	a	stated	fundamental	principle.			
(4)	 Many	 of	 the	 objections	 to	 the	 Hadžihasanović	 decision,	 or	 the	 contribution	
requirement	in	Article	28,	as	an	‘arbitrary’	barrier	to	prosecution118	fail	to	consider	that	
the	 contribution	 requirement	 is	 a	principled	 requirement	 for	 accessory	 culpability,	 in	
order	 to	 prevent	 arbitrary	 punishment.	 	 Thus,	 arguments	 against	 causal	 contribution	
must	either	overcome	the	extensive	authority	that	command	responsibility	is	a	mode	of	
liability,	or	alternatively	advance	a	new	conception	of	retroactive	culpability.		

























In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 also	 suggested	 a	 prescription	 to	 resolve	 these	 problems.	 	 The	
prescription	has	implications	for	other	institutions	with	similar	statutes	or	who	consult	
Tribunal	jurisprudence.			
My	prescription	 is	 to	undo	the	 first	mis-step	 that	 triggered	 the	entire	cascade	of	
complexities.	 	 By	 repairing	 the	 initial	 contradiction,	 we	 can	 restore	 command	
responsibility	 to	 relative	 simplicity.	 	 Command	 responsibility	 can	 remain,	 simply	 and	
elegantly,	a	mode	of	accessory	liability.			The	proposed	approach	instantly	reconciles	the	
pre-Tribunal	 authorities	and	cases,	 the	 ICC	Statute,	 and	 the	 culpability	principle.	 	The	
solution	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 clarity,	 because	 it	 relies	 on	 an	 established	 concept	 of	
criminal	law	(accessory	liability).			
There	are	several	possible	legitimate	concerns	about	this	proposed	solution.		First,	
one	 might	 fear	 that	 proving	 the	 ‘contribution’	 to	 a	 subsequent	 crime	 might	 be	
unacceptably	difficult,	posing	a	barrier	to	meritorious	cases.		I	argue,	however,	that	the	
contribution	 requirement,	 properly	 understood	 (§6.3.1),	 is	 satisfied	 by	 conduct	 of	 a	
nature	 that	 elevated	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 ensuing	 crimes	 –	 a	 standard	 which	 is	 generally	
obviously	met	by	failures	to	prevent	or	punish.121		























of	 non-contributory	 derelictions	 (eg	 the	 isolated	 crime	 or	 successor	 commander	




crimes	 committed	 by’	 subordinates.	 It	 also	means	 disregarding	 the	 explicit	 statutory	
requirement	 of	 causal	 contribution	 in	 Article	 28.	 	 There	 are	 legality	 problems	 with	
ignoring	 explicit	 statutory	 conditions	 for	 liability.	 	 I	 am	unconvinced	 that	 this	 limited	
problem	(non-contributory	derelictions)	warrants	that	degree	of	creativity	and	straining,	
and	the	attendant	credibility	and	legitimacy	costs.			
In	 my	 view,	 the	 inability	 to	 punish	 non-contributory	 derelictions	 before	
international	courts	is	an	acceptable	price	–	and	the	only	apparent	way	–	to	reconcile	the	
applicable	 law	 (mode	 of	 liability)	 with	 fundamental	 principles	 (culpability).			
International	courts	and	tribunals	should	devote	their	limited	resources	to	persons	most	
















case.125	 	 At	 confirmation	 of	 charges	 and	 at	 trial,	 the	 chambers	 generally	 adopted	 the	
position	advocated	here.		For	example,	these	early	decisions	avoided	opacity	about	the	
nature	of	command	responsibility	and	forthrightly	recognized	it	as	a	mode	of	liability.126	
They	 also	 affirmed	 the	 requirement	 of	 causal	 contribution,	 and	 did	 so	 not	 only	 for	
technical	doctrinal	reasons	but	also	out	of	respect	for	the	culpability	principle.127			
Matters	 were	 left	 less	 clear	 after	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 decision.	 	 Despite	 a	
unanimous	 conviction	 by	 the	 Trial	 Chamber,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 substituted	 an	
acquittal,	by	a	3-2	majority.		The	Appeals	Chamber	majority	decision	did	not	address	the	
specific	controversies	I	am	discussing	in	this	thesis;	instead	the	decision	was	based	on	
the	 commander’s	 duty	 to	 take	 measures.128	 	 However,	 if	 we	 count	 up	 the	 separate	





























responsibility	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 accessory	 liability,	 and	 expressly	 recognized	 the	 causal	
contribution	requirement,	again	consistent	with	the	analysis	advanced	here.129		I	should	







sought	 to	 prove	 the	 internal	 contradiction	 between	 rejecting	 the	 contribution	
requirement	in	a	mode	of	liability,	while	declaring	adherence	to	a	culpability	principle	
that	requires	contribution	in	modes	of	liability.			To	do	that,	I	had	to	untangle	numerous	
legal	 arguments	 and	 responses.	 	 Once	 that	 position	 is	 accepted,	 the	 next	 step	 in	 the	
analysis	would	be	to	proceed	to	the	normative	analysis	of	what	the	culpability	principle	
entails.	 	 I	 engaged	 in	 the	 deontic	 analysis	 of	 the	 contribution	 requirement	 in	 earlier	
works,131	and	I	will	expand	on	it	in	more	detail	in	the	book-length	continuation	of	this	





























Nonetheless,	 I	 outline	 the	 following	 very	 brief	 points	 about	 the	 subsequent	
deontic	questions,	because	those	questions	must	be	faced	in	future	jurisprudence,	and	
because	 it	 will	 help	 the	 reader	 appreciate	 the	 prescription	 I	 have	 advanced.	 	 The	
questions	in	the	next	step	of	analysis	would	be:	
• What	is	the	nature	and	extent	of	the	causal	contribution	required	by	the	principle?	




As	 for	 the	 extent	 of	 contribution,	 as	 I	 discuss	 elsewhere,133	 on	 a	 coherentist	
methodology,	the	best-supported	standard	is	that	the	accused’s	conduct	must	encourage	
or	 facilitate	 the	 crimes,	 including	 by	 rendering	 them	 easier	 or	 more	 likely	 (risk	
aggravation).		This	inclusive	standard	is	well	supported	in	juridical	practice	as	well	as	by	
the	 weight	 of	 normative	 arguments.134	 	 Early	 ICC	 jurisprudence	 has	 not	 yet	 been	
conclusive	 about	 the	 requisite	 extent	 of	 contribution,	 but	 most	 decisions	 have	 been	
indicating	 that	 it	 suffices	 if	 the	 dereliction	 increased	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 resulting	 crimes	








































negligence	due	 to	culpability	concerns,	 I	argue	 that	 the	 ‘should	have	known’	standard	
actually	maps	better	onto	personal	culpability	than	the	rival	formulations	developed	by	
the	 Tribunals.	 	 This	 is	 an	 instance	 in	which	 ICL,	 by	 highlighting	 special	 contexts	 and	











In	 Chapter	 6,	 I	 argued	 that	 command	 responsibility	 can	 be	 greatly	 simplified.	 I	
argued	that	the	Tribunals	made	an	early	mis-step	when,	based	on	hasty	reasoning,	they	
rejected	the	requirement	of	causal	contribution.		I	argued	that	command	responsibility	
can	 be	 greatly	 simplified:	 it	 remains	 a	mode	 of	 accessory	 liability,	 and	 it	 accordingly	
requires	 that	 the	 commander	 at	 least	 elevated	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 crimes	 through	 her	
derelictions.		
But	there	is	a	problem	for	my	account.		Or,	at	least,	it	seems	to	be	a	problem,	but	
perhaps	 it	 is	 something	more	 exciting	 –	 an	 opportunity	 for	 discovery.	 	 The	 apparent	
problem	 is	 the	 modified	 mental	 element.	 	 The	 fault	 element	 departs	 from	 normal	
subjective	standards	of	awareness:	 the	Tribunal	 test	 is	 ‘had	reason	to	know’	(‘HRTK’),	
whereas	the	ICC	test	for	commanders1	is	‘should	have	known’	(‘SHK’).		Are	such	standards	
justifiable	 in	a	mode	of	 liability?	 	Both	scholarly	 literature	and	Tribunal	 jurisprudence	




A	 wealth	 of	 thoughtful,	 principled	 scholarship	 advances	 strong	 concerns	 about	
negligence	 in	 command	 responsibility.	 These	 scholars	 have	 rightly	 pressed	 beyond	 a	
discourse	 that	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 precedential	 arguments	 (parsing	 authorities)	 and	
consequentialist	 arguments	 (maximizing	 impact).	 	 They	 helped	 usher	 in	 more	

































































that	 ‘sensitivity	 to	 criticism	 about	 the	 looseness	 of	 the	 mens	 rea	 requirement	 for	
command	 responsibility	 has	 been	 unfortunately	 coupled	 with	 reluctance	 to	 explore	
explicitly	the	theoretical	justifications	for	the	doctrine.’6		Like	her,	I	seek	to	help	develop	
that	 theoretical	 justification.7	 	 Whereas	 Martinez	 considered	 precedential,	
consequentialist,	 and	 deontic	 dimensions,	 I	 will	 focus	 particularly	 on	 the	 deontic	
justification,	 developing	 it	 in	 more	 detail.	 Other	 scholars,	 such	 as	 David	 Luban	 and	






















criminal	negligence	 is	not	simply	an	 ‘absence’	of	a	mental	state;	 it	 reflects	a	degree	of	
disregard	 for	 the	 lives	 and	 safety	 of	 others	 that	 is	 morally	 reprehensible,	 socially	
dangerous,	and	properly	punishable.			
Second,	 I	 address	 concerns	 about	 liability	 without	 the	 requisite	 mens	 rea	 for	
crimes	such	as	genocide.		Many	of	the	criticisms	of	command	responsibility	overlook	the	
distinction	 between	 principal	 and	 accessory	 liability;	 they	 condemn	 command	
responsibility	for	not	satisfying	the	requirements	for	principal	liability,	but	it	is	actually	
a	mode	of	accessory	liability.9		Accessories	need	not	share	the	mens	rea	for	the	principal’s	
offence.	 	 	 	 Accessory	 and	 principal	 liability	 signify	 different	 things	 and	 have	
correspondingly	different	requirements.		
Third,	I	argue	that	command	responsibility	is	a	justified	extension	of	aiding	and	













collective	 endeavour	 over	 time,	 which	 may	 be	 discerned	 in	 retrospect	 even	 if	 not	
consciously	 intended	 by	 its	 participants.)	 	 My	 point	 is	 that	 the	 many	 different	












intuition	 of	 justice	 about	 culpability	 in	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 circumstances,	 even	 if	 the	
groundwork	 for	 that	 intuition	 was	 neither	 explicitly	 articulated	 nor	 analytically	
developed.	
		While	our	normally-reliable	understandings	 tell	 us	 that	 criminal	negligence	 is	
less	 culpable	 than	 subjective	 advertence,	 command	 responsibility	 delineates	 and	
responds	to	a	special	set	of	circumstances	where	that	familiar	prioritization	breaks	down.		
The	negligently	ignorant	commander,	who	cares	so	little	about	the	danger	to	civilians	that	
she	 does	 not	 bother	 with	 even	 the	 first	 step	 of	 monitoring,	 actually	 shows	 greater	
contempt	than	the	commander	who	monitors	and	learns	of	a	risk	but	hopes	it	will	not	
materialize.	 	 	 Contrary	 to	 our	 normal	 assumption	 that	 ‘knowing’	 is	 ipso	 facto	 more	
culpable	than	‘not	knowing’,	the	relative	culpability	in	these	circumstances	hinges	on	why	
the	commander	does	not	know.	
Accordingly,	 even	 though	 a	 negligence-based	 mode	 of	 accessory	 liability	 may	
seem	to	challenge	our	normal	analytical	constructs,	I	think	that	on	closer	inspection,	the	
intuition	of	justice	underlying	command	responsibility	is	sound.		While	we	should	look	at	
post-WWII	rules	with	critical	care	(as	 they	may	reflect	over-reaching	 ‘victors	 justice’),	
command	responsibility	reveals	a	valuable	insight	and	contribution	to	criminal	law.		It	
responds	 to	a	particular	pathology	of	human	organization.	 	 It	 recognizes	 that	 in	some	
circumstances,	criminal	negligence	supplies	adequate	 fault	 for	accessory	 liability.	 	The	
criminally	indifferent	supervisor	of	dangerous	forces	does	not	merely	commit	her	own	




















in	 turn	 illuminate	 general	 criminal	 law	 theory	 by	 presenting	 new	 doctrines	 and	
problems.11		Third,	the	study	of	deontic	principles	can	be	enabling	as	well	as	restraining,	
by	 helping	 to	 avoid	 unnecessarily	 conservative	 approaches	 that	 overstate	 the	





In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 traditional	 central	 case	 of	 military	 command	
relationships,	and	thus	speak	of	‘commanders’.		I	will	touch	on	implications	for	civilian	
superiors	only	at	the	end.14	In	this	chapter,	I	merely	outline	the	justificatory	account.	I	am	


























Post-World	War	 II	 jurisprudence,	 which	 developed	 the	 command	 responsibility	
doctrine,	 had	 ‘almost	 universally’	 held	 that	 the	 commander	 cannot	 plead	 her	 lack	 of	
knowledge	 where	 it	 was	 created	 by	 her	 criminally	 negligent	 breach	 of	 her	 duty	 to	
inquire.17		ICTY	jurisprudence	acknowledges	this	clear	pattern	in	the	prior	case	law.18			
Nonetheless,	 the	 ad	hoc	Tribunals	departed	 from	 those	precedents	 and	 struck	 a	
different	path.		In	an	early	case,	Čelebići,	the	Prosecution	argued,	consistently	with	prior	
transnational	jurisprudence,	that	the	fault	requirement	is	satisfied	where	the	commander	

































To	 avoid	 these	 perceived	 pitfalls,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 required	 that	 the	
commander	must	have	in	her	‘possession’	information	sufficient	to	put	her	on	notice	that	
crimes	 were	 being	 committed	 (‘alarming	 information’).22	 	 Thus,	 a	 commander	 can	
generally	 remain	 passive.	 	 It	 is	 only	 once	 alarming	 information	 makes	 it	 into	 her	
‘possession’	that	she	is	required	to	take	steps.	
Other	 trial	 chambers	 in	 early	 cases	 –	 Bagilishema	 (ICTR)	 and	 Blaškić	 (ICTY)	 –	
attempted	 to	adopt	 interpretations	 consistent	with	earlier	 jurisprudence	 (i.e.	 the	SHK	
test).23	 	 Again,	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber	 rejected	 those	 attempts.	 	 In	
Bagilishema,	the	Appeals	Chamber	warned	that	‘[r]eferences	to	‘negligence’	in	the	context	
of	 superior	 responsibility	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 confusion	 of	 thought’.24	 	 In	Blaškić,	 the	

























and	commendable	 that	 the	Chambers	 showed	concern	 for	personal	 culpability.	 	Their	
caution	was	preferable	to	the	often-seen	tendency	(especially	in	early	jurisprudence)	to	
use	 reasoning	 techniques	 that	 maximized	 liability	 with	 inadequate	 attention	 to	
fundamental	principles.27		(As	I	noted	in	Chapter	2,	these	techniques	reflect	a	‘tendency’	
but	are	not	an	‘iron	rule’,	i.e.	I	in	no	way	suggest	that	jurists	always	fall	afoul	of	them.28)		































knowledge’.31	 	 In	 other	words,	 the	 commander	would	 have	 found	 out	 had	 she	 tried.32		
Third,	 the	dereliction	must	be	 ‘serious’.33	 	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	 a	 standard	of	 criminal	
negligence,	not	simple	civil	negligence.		Notice	also	that	the	commander	is	not	instantly	
liable	if	she	inherits	a	force	with	poor	reporting	mechanisms;	the	requirement	is	simply	
that	 she	 exercise	diligence	 to	 stay	 apprised,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 can	be	 expected	 in	 the	
circumstances.		
Thus,	the	liability	standard	in	the	prior	law,	and	as	advanced	by	the	Prosecution,	












information;	 the	 information	 only	 needs	 to	 ‘have	 been	 provided	 or	 available’	 to	 the	

















to	me	any	 information	about	any	crimes	by	our	 forces’.	 	As	a	 result,	her	subordinates	
manage	to	keep	from	her	any	information	about	the	ongoing	crimes.		On	the	Tribunals’	
approach,	she	would	be	acquitted,	because	she	does	not	have	such	information.		Yet	the	
reason	 should	 does	 not	 have	 the	 information	 is	 the	 egregiously	 inadequate	 reporting	
system	she	herself	created.36		
By	contrast,	the	SHK	test,	in	earlier	jurisprudence	and	in	the	ICC	Statute,	is	slightly	
broader.37	 	 The	 SHK	 test	 can	 be	 satisfied	 where	 the	 commander	 does	 not	 possess	
information	about	subordinate	criminal	activity,	if	that	lack	is	due	to	a	gross	dereliction	
of	 her	 duty	 to	 try	 to	 stay	 apprised,	 showing	 a	 culpable	 indifference	 to	 the	 lives	 and	
interest	she	was	entrusted	to	protect.	38		







































over-inclusive.	 The	 test	 is	 under-inclusive	 because	 it	 acquits	 the	 commander	 who	






information	 into	 the	 nebulously	 -defined	 ‘possession’	 of	 the	 passive	 commander.	 It	
lurches	from	too	little	of	an	expectation	–	indulging	and	even	encouraging	the	commander	
































required	 divergent	 interpretations.46	 I	 think	 that	 a	 national	 or	 international	 court	
applying	the	words	'had	reason	to	know’	in	future	could	choose	to	incorporate	post-WWII	
and	ICC	jurisprudence.		Moreover,	while	the	academic	literature	often	portrays	Tribunal	
jurisprudence	as	unquestioned	customary	 law,	and	 thus	 the	 ICC	 test	 as	a	departure,	 I	
argue	 that	 it	 is	 actually	 the	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 that	 departs	 from	 prior	 sources,	


























I	 will	 now	 offer	 a	 normative	 account	 of	 command	 responsibility	 as	 a	 mode	 of	
liability	 that	 includes	 a	 criminal	negligence	 standard.	 	My	argument	has	 three	planks.	
First,	 I	 respond	 to	 unease	 about	 criminal	 negligence,	 showing	 that	 it	 can	 be	 an	
appropriate	 standard	 for	 criminal	 liability,	 reflecting	 personal	 culpability.	 Second,	 I	
address	concerns	 that	 the	commander	may	not	share	 the	mens	rea	 for	 the	offence	by	
highlighting	the	different	standards	and	implications	of	accessory	and	principal	liability.		
Third,	I	will	use	Paul	Robinson’s	helpful	framework	for	assessing	inculpatory	doctrines47	









‘simple’	negligence	understates	 the	 rigour	and	nuance	of	 criminal	negligence.	 	George	

















punishment.52	 	 It	 is	also	 sometimes	argued	 that	negligence	cannot	be	deterred,	which	
seems	to	equate	negligence	with	accidents	or	mindlessness.53	Such	arguments	conclude	
that	 there	 is	 neither	 a	 consequentialist	 nor	 a	 deontic	 justification	 for	 punishing	
negligence.		
To	 respond	 to	 such	 concerns,	 I	 offer	 a	 very	 rudimentary	 sketch54	 of	 criminal	
negligence,	 to	 distinguish	 criminal	 negligence	 from	 mere	 blunders	 or	 simple	 civil	
negligence.	Criminal	negligence	requires	two	things.		First,	the	accused	must	be	engaged	
































The	 argument	 that	 criminal	 negligence	 does	 not	 correspond	 to	 any	 personal	
mental	state	seems	initially	to	be	convincing.	 	After	all,	a	negligence	analysis	seems	to	
simply	 compare	 the	 accused’s	 conduct	 to	 an	 objective	 standard.	 	 However,	 as	 many	
scholars	have	shown,	criminal	negligence	does	indeed	display	a	particular	blameworthy	
mental	state,	for	which	personal	culpability	is	rightly	assigned.	A	gross	departure	from	
the	 standard	 of	 care,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 an	 activity	 bearing	 obvious	 risks	 for	 others,	
demonstrates	a	‘culpable	indifference’59	or	‘culpable	disregard’60	for	the	lives	and	safety	of	



































minor	 slips,	 or	 ineptness,	 or	 falling	behind	 in	 reading,	 or	 taking	an	 ill-timed	vacation,	
could	lead	the	hapless	commander	to	be	held	liable	as	party	to	serious	crimes.67		Scholars	
are	quite	right	to	consider	such	scenarios	in	order	to	test	doctrines.		I	hope	that	the	above	
clarifications	 address	 these	 concerns.	 Precedents	 on	 command	 responsibility	 rightly	
emphasize	that	the	negligence	must	be	of	an	extent	showing	a	criminally	blameworthy	


























settled;	 there	 are	 some	 theorists	 who	 argue	 against	 it,	 and	 insist	 on	 subjective	
advertence.69		For	present	purposes,	rather	than	digressing	further	into	this	debate,	we	
can	 observe	 that	most	 legal	 systems,	 and	most	 of	 the	 scholarly	 literature,	 backed	 by	
convincing	normative	arguments	as	outlined	above,	supports	the	analysis	and	intuition	
that	 criminal	 negligence	 is	 a	 suitable	 basis	 for	 criminal	 liability.70	 	 On	 a	 coherentist	
account,	we	accept	that	we	may	not	arrive	at	complete	consensus	or	Cartesian	certainty.		






The	major	concern	 in	ICL	 literature	 is	not	with	the	appropriateness	of	criminal	
negligence	liability	per	se.		The	major	concern	is	with	negligence	linking	the	accused	to	
serious	crimes	of	subjective	mens	rea.71		That	objection	is	particularly	acute	for	crimes	
with	 special	 intent	 such	 as	 genocide.	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 mismatch	 between	 the	
commander’s	mental	state	and	the	mental	state	required	for	genocide	is	considered	by	
many	to	be	a	contradiction	or	incoherence.72				





















ICL	 has	 avoided	 a	 purely	 mental	 or	 a	 purely	 material	 approach,	 and	 has	 instead	
emphasized	 ‘control’	 over	 the	 crime	 as	 a	 distinguishing	 criterion.	 This	 approach	was	
explicitly	adopted	in	some	ICC	decisions	drawing	on	German	legal	theory,75	but	it	is	also	
implicit	 in	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence,76	 and	 has	 support	 in	 other	 legal	 systems	 and	
traditions	of	criminal	theory.77			
There	 are	 two	 main	 differences	 between	 accessories	 and	 principals.	 	 One	
difference,	 as	discussed	 in	Chapter	6,	 is	 the	material	requirement.	Principals	make	an	





































	As	 a	 result,	 accessories	 need	 not	 share	 in	 the	 paradigmatic	mens	 rea	 for	 a	 given	
offence.82		As	the	ICTR	noted	in	Akayesu,	‘an	accomplice	to	genocide	need	not	necessarily	
possess	the	dolus	specialis	of	genocide’.83	 	 In	Kayishema,	 the	ICTR	held	that	aiders	and	
abettors	‘need	not	necessarily	have	the	same	mens	rea	as	the	principal	offender’.84		ICTY	

































You	 may	 be	 familiar	 with	 one	 of	 the	 criticisms	 commonly	 made	 against	 joint	
criminal	 enterprise	 (JCE),	 that	 JCE	 enables	 conviction	 without	 satisfaction	 of	 special	
mental	 elements.	 	 But	 that	 criticism	 cannot	 simply	 be	 transplanted	 to	 command	
responsibility.			That	criticism	is	sound	in	relation	to	JCE,	because	JCE	is	a	form	of	principal	
liability.89		The	extended	form	(JCE-III)	is	rightly	criticized	for	imposing	principal	liability	
without	 meeting	 the	 culpability	 requirements	 for	 principal	 liability.	 	 But	 command	
responsibility	 is	 accessory	 liability,	 and	 thus	does	not	 require	paradigmatic	mens	 rea.		
Modes	of	accessory	liability	must	be	evaluated	under	the	respective	standards.	
Unfortunately,	the	accessory-principal	distinction	has	been	frequently	overlooked	






































crime	 himself’.90	 	 Judge	 Shahabuddeen	 disparaged	 the	 plausibility	 of	 a	 commander	
‘committing’	 hundreds	 of	 rapes	 in	 a	 day.91	 	 Guénaël	 Mettraux	 argues	 that	 ‘turning	 a	
commander	into	a	murderer,	a	rapist	or	a	génocidaire	because	he	failed	to	keep	properly	
informed	seems	excessive,	inappropriate,	and	plainly	unfair.’92		Mirjan	Damaška	objects	




are	 much	 more	 varied	 and	 nuanced	 in	 what	 they	 signify.	 	 The	 latter	 two	 objections	
(Mettraux,	Damaška)	were	valuable	correctives	in	the	debate	at	the	time,	as	the	debate	
sometimes	overlooked	deontic	constraints.		However,	on	reflection	those	objections	are	
also	 slightly	 overstated.	 Command	 responsibility	 does	 not	 ‘turn’	 a	 commander	 into	 a	
‘murderer’	 or	 ‘rapist’.	 	 Interestingly,	 even	 ordinary	 language	 tracks	 the	 difference	
























‘aiding	 and	 abetting’	 crimes,	 or	 Jean-Pierre	 Bemba	 Gombo	 is	 convicted	 for	 command	
responsibility	for	sexual	violence,	that	expresses	something	more	indirect	than	ordering	
the	crimes.	 	There	are	many	different	 roles	a	person	might	play	 in	relation	 to	a	given	
crime.	These	different	roles	entail	different	censure	and	different	legal	consequences,	and	
they	 have	 correspondingly	 different	 standards.	 Accessories	 are	 condemned,	 not	 for	







That	 still	 leaves	 the	 hardest	 question.	 So	 far	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 (i)	 criminal	
negligence	is	an	appropriate	building	block	in	criminal	law	and	(ii)	accessories	need	not	
share	the	paradigmatic	mens	rea	for	the	principal’s	offence.		But	you	may	still	ask:	is	it	
justified	 to	 use	 that	 particular	 building	 block	 –	 negligence	 -	 in	 a	mode	 of	 liability	 for	
serious	crimes?			























his	writings	on	 ‘imputed	 criminal	 liability’.97	 	He	notes	 that	 for	 any	given	offence,	 the	
‘paradigm	of	 liability’	 –	 i.e.	 the	 satisfaction	of	every	element	of	 the	offence	–	does	not	
always	determine	criminal	liability.		Even	where	all	of	the	elements	of	the	paradigm	are	
proven,	 there	 are	 exceptions	 that	 can	 exculpate	 the	 accused.	 	 These	 exceptions	 are	
commonly	 grouped	 together	 and	 analysed	 as	 ‘defences’.98	 The	 key	 insight	 from	 Paul	
Robinson	was	to	look	at	the	mirror	image	of	defences.			
Paul	Robinson	pointed	out	that	there	is	another	type	of	exception	to	the	‘paradigm	
of	 liability’,	 namely	 inculpatory	 exceptions,	 whereby	 a	 person	 can	 be	 convicted	 even	
though	 he	 or	 she	 did	 not	 personally	 satisfy	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 offence.	 	 Examples	
include	 acting	 through	 an	 innocent	 agent	 or	 transferred	 intent.	 These	 inculpatory	
doctrines	are	not	traditionally	grouped	together	and	analysed	as	a	category.		Robinson	
proposed	 a	 search	 for	 consistent	 principles	 underlying	 these	 established	 inculpatory	




is	 causally	 responsible	 or	 causally	 contributed	 to	 its	 commission	 by	 another.100	 	 The	
second	is	‘equivalence’,	arising,	for	example,	where	the	accused	had	a	mental	state	that	is	


















Because	 the	 institution	 of	 armed	 forces	 is	 a	 familiar	 one	 to	 us,	 we	 might	 be	
tempted	to	fall	back	on	our	usual	habits	of	thought	about	liability	for	‘mere’	negligence.		



















‘given	 licence	 to	 turn	 ordinary	 men	 into	 lethally	 destructive,	 and	 legally	














and	 even	 instincts	 of	 self-preservation,	 replacing	 them	with	 habits	 of	 obedience	 and	
loyalty	 to	 the	 group.	 	 The	 result	 is	 a	more	 effective	 fighting	 force,	 but	 it	 also	 breeds	
pathological	organizational	behaviour.		
The	 danger	 is	 never	 far	 away.	 	 Even	 the	 most	 well-trained	 armies,	 acting	 for	








Command	 responsibility	 is	 a	 justified	 extension	 of	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 by	
omission,	 to	 recognize	 the	 special	 duty	 of	 commanders.	 	 In	 normal	 contexts,	 ‘I	 didn’t	
know’	 would	 often	 exculpate.	 	 But	 it	 does	 not	 exculpate	 where	 the	 commander	 has	














time	of	 the	 accessory’s	 contribution.	Thus	 it	must	 always	be	 a	matter	 of	 risk.	 	Hence,	
juridical	 practice	 across	 legal	 systems	 contemplates	 different	 degrees	 of	 subjective	




even	 the	 subjective	 standard	must	 deal	 in	 uncertainties	 about	 the	 likelihood	 and	 the	
nature	of	crimes.			
Second,	 we	 must	 not	 underestimate	 the	 culpability	 of	 criminal	 negligence.	
Criminal	 negligence	 does	 not	 encompass	 modest	 lapses	 and	 imperfect	 choices.	 As	
discussed	above,	 the	 fault	standard	requires	a	gross	dereliction	 that	shows	a	culpable	
disregard	for	the	lives	and	legal	interests	of	others.109			
Third,	 in	 the	 aggravating	 context	 of	 command	 responsibility,	 that	 culpable	
disregard	is	especially	wrongful.		In	the	context	of	the	exceptional	dangerousness	of	the	
activity,	 the	 repeatedly-demonstrated	 risks	 of	 egregious	 crimes,	 and	 the	 imbalance	 of	
military	power	and	civilian	vulnerability,	a	culpable	disregard	for	the	dangers	is	simply	
staggering.	 In	 sum,	 the	 commander	 does	 not	 get	 exonerated	 by	 creating	 her	 own	
ignorance	through	defiance	of	a	duty	of	vigilance	which	exists	precisely	because	of	the	
glaring	danger.		
When	 I	 first	 began	 this	 project,	 I	 accepted	 the	 standard	 prioritization	 that	



































My	 two	 main	 points	 are	 as	 follows:	 First,	 criminal	 negligence	 is	 adequately	





and	that	 the	differences	should	be	teased	out	at	sentencing.	 	However,	 I	am	no	 longer	
















The	 foregoing	 account	 of	 command	 responsibility	 has	 several	 implications	 for	
how	we	understand	command	responsibility.	
	 1.	Criminal	negligence:	First,	rather	than	disavowing	criminal	negligence	as	an	






shied	 away	 from	 this,	 which	 was	 understandable	 in	 those	 early	 days,	 given	 the	
unexplored	 normative	 implications.	 	 For	 example,	 one	 might	 imagine	 hectic	












and	 to	make	 the	 ‘had	 reason	 to	 know’	 test	 appear	 subjective.	While	 the	 caution	was	
understandable,	we	can	now	say	on	reflection	that	the	requirement	of	‘possession’	is	not	








meant	that	she	was	not	negligent	 in	not	getting	to	the	reports.	 	The	test	 is	 inadequate	
(under-reaching),	because	where	a	commander	arranges	inadequate	reporting	so	that	no	
alarming	information	makes	it	to	her	‘possession’,	she	gets	an	acquittal.114	The	test	does	






overtly	 embraces	 criminal	 negligence	 and	 the	 duty	 to	 inquiry	 –	 should	 be	 openly	
defended.		The	SHK	test	is	a	better	match	with	precedents,	and	has	better	consequences,	
but	was	rejected	because	it	was	thought	to	be	unfair.		However,	on	closer	reflection,	the	
SHK	 test	 is	 not	 only	 deontically	 justifiable:	 it	 actually	 maps	 better	 onto	 personal	
culpability.116		Thus,	ICL	should	return	to	the	post-World	War	II	jurisprudence:	where	the	
commander	has	created	her	own	ignorance	deliberately	or	through	criminal	negligence	
in	 her	 duty	 to	 inquire,	 that	 is	 adequate	 to	 establish	 the	 fault	 element	 for	 command	
responsibility.117	 	 The	 ICC	 seems	 to	 have	 returned	 to	 this	 path	 in	 its	 early	
















5.	 Mode	 of	 liability:	 Fifth,	 and	 finally,	 command	 responsibility	 can	 indeed	 be	
recognized	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 liability.	 	 Thoughtful	 scholars,	 uncertain	 about	 whether	
negligence	in	a	mode	of	liability	can	be	justified,	have	suggested	that	it	should	be	recast	
as	a	separate	offence.	 	 I	have	attempted	here	to	address	the	principled	concerns,	or	at	
least	 to	outline	 the	path	 to	do	so.	 	The	account	 I	have	offered	complies	with	personal	
culpability.	 	 It	 also	 maintains	 fidelity	 to	 the	 long	 line	 of	 precedents	 indicating	 that	
command	responsibility	is	a	mode	of	accessory	liability,	so	that	creative	re-interpretation	
is	 not	 needed.	 Command	 responsibility,	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 liability,	 rightly	 expresses	 the	
commander’s	 indirect	 responsibility	 for	 the	 crimes	 facilitated	 by	 her	 culpable	













capacity	 to	meet	 the	 requisite	 standard.	 	 I	have	emphasized	above	 that,	with	criminal	
negligence,	we	condemn	persons	for	failing	to	exert	their	faculties	as	the	activity	obviously	












guideposts	 for	 interpreting	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 doctrine,	 and	 particularly	 the	 types	 of	
organization	within	which	it	applies.	I	have	argued	that	a	mode	of	liability	incorporating	





also	 the	 deontic	 justification.123	 	 When	 consider	 what	 types	 of	 group	 or	 level	 of	
organization	is	needed,	we	have	to	consider	at	what	point	the	rationale	for	the	deontic	
justification	 for	 this	mode	of	 liability	no	 longer	pertains.	 	Beyond	that	outer	 limit,	one	





and	gives	non-military	superiors	a	more	generous	 test	 (that	 the	superior	 ‘consciously	






















But	perhaps	 the	more	generous	 treatment	 for	civilian	 leaders	should	not	be	so	
quickly	condemned.	One	of	the	tendencies	I	discussed	in	Chapter	2	is	that	ICL	scholars	




consider	 that	 the	 problematic	 rule	 might	 be	 the	 unilaterally-imposed	 one;	 perhaps	




Further	 study	 may	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 principled	 case	 for	 the	 bifurcated	
approach.	The	considerations	given	above	–	extreme	danger	of	the	activity,	training	and	




















At	 first	 glance,	 command	 responsibility	 seems	 problematic,	 because	 it	 does	 not	
comport	 with	 our	 usual	 heuristics	 and	 constructs	 developed	 in	 typical	 criminal	 law	
settings.	 	However,	 this	an	 instance	where	ICL	settings	and	doctrines	can	enable	us	to	










Command	 responsibility	 extends	 this	 concept	 with	 a	 modified	 fault	 element.	 	 That	
modified	fault	element	is	rooted	in	personal	culpability,	recognizing	the	responsibilities	




monitoring	 and	 repressing	 crimes,	 and	 a	 failure	 to	 meet	 that	 baseline	 effectively	
facilitates	and	encourages	crimes.		
Command	responsibility	rightly	conveys	that	the	commander	defying	this	duty	is	
indirectly	 responsible	 for	 the	harms	unleashed,	 just	 as	 a	person	 criminally	derelict	 in	
monitoring	a	dam	may	be	responsible	if	the	dam	bursts	on	civilians	below.		This	message	
of	 command	 responsibility	 is	 expressively	 valuable	 and	 deontically	 justified.		
Furthermore,	the	commander	choosing	not	to	try	to	require	reports	makes	a	choice	every	




















I	 conclude	 this	 thesis	with	 three	 final	 overarching	 sets	 of	 observations.	 	 First,	 I	make	












patterns	of	practice,	 consistency	with	analytical	 constructs,	 normative	argumentation,	
and	 casuistic	 testing.	 	 And	 indeed	 they	 are	 the	 same	 considerations.	 	 I	 suggest	 that	
coherentism	is	the	best	underlying	theory	to	explain	how	we	engage	in	both	legal	and	
normative	 analysis.	 	We	 form	 the	best	 understandings	 that	we	 can	by	drawing	on	 all	
available	clues.			
I	 think	 that	 this	 method	 (mid-level	 principles,	 coherentist	 reconciliation)	
implicitly	underlies	a	 lot	of	valuable	criminal	 law	theory.	 	For	example,	 in	Chapter	7,	 I	





a	 class,	 but	 that	 inculpatory	 doctrines	 had	 not	 been	 studied	 as	 a	 class	 for	 unifying	
principles.	He	studied	patterns	of	practice,	he	hypothesized	some	mid-level	constructs	to	
categorize	 and	 explain	 the	 practice,	 he	 assessed	 which	 of	 those	 constructs	 are	
normatively	 justifiable,	 and	 then	 he	 generated	 prescriptions	 for	 a	 more	 analytically	
consistent	and	normatively	sound	body	of	law.		In	the	case	of	Paul	Robinson’s	framework,	
this	 method	 enabled	 analytical	 systematization	 and	 normative	 evaluation	 of	 the	
underlying	justifications	for	inculpatory	doctrines.		
In	Chapters	6	and	7,	 I	worked	with	propositions	 that	were	arguably	 immanent	
within	 ICL	practice	 (for	example,	 that	 culpability	 requires	 causal	 contribution,	or	 that	
principals	have	paradigmatic	mens	rea).		I	took	those	propositions	as	starting	hypotheses,	
but	was	prepared	 to	 abandon	 them	 if	 there	were	 convincing	 reasons	 to	do	 so.	 	 (Both	
propositions	proved	to	be	analytical	useful	and	normatively	convincing,	so	I	did	not	reject	
them	as	guiding	constructs.2)			


























philosophical	certainty	 is	unattainable;	we	seek	a	 level	of	confidence	sufficient	 for	 the	
decision	 at	 hand.	 	 For	 the	 punishment	 of	 individuals,	 a	 high	 level	 of	 confidence	 is	
appropriate.		But	the	body	of	available	clues	provides	more	than	enough	support	for	these	






in	normative	analysis.	 	After	all,	 you	might	wonder	 if	 recourse	 to	practice	 reflects	 the	
‘naturalist	fallacy’:	am	I	impermissibly	conflating	an	‘is’	(legal	practice)	with	an	‘ought’	
(deontic	principles)?		I	refer	to	practice	for	two	reasons.		One,	insofar	as	we	are	working	





























and	 normative	 reasoning.	 	 I	 believe	 that	 legal	 reasoning	 involves	 seeking	 the	 best	
reconciliation	of	all	of	the	types	of	considerations	that	are	recognized	in	legal	analysis:	
text,	context,	coherence	with	surrounding	legal	norms,	objects	and	purposes,	pertinent	
authorities	 and	precedents,	 and	 general	 principles.7	 	 Often	we	 cannot	 achieve	 perfect	
‘coherence’	 among	 all	 of	 the	 clues;	 some	may	outright	 conflict.	 	 An	 example	of	 this	 is	




























One	 of	 my	 main	 contributions	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 highlight	 that	 there	 is	 an	
alternative	to	the	traditional	scholarly	Cartesian	impulse	that	all	propositions	must	be	
grounded	in	a	deeper	underlying	theory,	each	supported	by	a	level	below	until	we	reach	











Many	 scholars	 I	 know	 assume	 a	 classical	 foundationalist	 model,	 and	 yet	 they	 apply	
coherentist	methods,	even	without	formal	awareness	of	coherentism.		As	a	result,	they	
think	they	are	foundationalists	taking	a	shortcut	or	being	incomplete.		I	draw	attention	to	
the	coherentist	 ‘web’	alternative	to	the	classical	 ‘linear’	model	of	 justification.	 	We	can	
still	be	rigorous,	but	rigour	requires	a	different	structure	of	substantiation,	tested	by	all-




















(1)	 The	 deontic	 dimension.	 	 Legal	 analysis	 in	 criminal	 law,	 including	 ICL,	
requires	not	just	the	familiar	source-based	analysis	and	teleological	analysis,	but	also	a	
third	type	of	reasoning,	which	I	have	called	deontic	analysis.		Deontic	analysis	differs	from	







reasons.	 	First,	 it	clarifies	important	normative	constraints,	 in	order	to	ensure	that	the	
system	does	not	treat	persons	unjustly.		Second,	and	less	obviously,	it	can	also	help	shape	
better	 policy.	 	 Where	 doctrines	 are	 needlessly	 conservative	 due	 to	 an	 ungrounded,		
fallaciously	 restrictive	 impression	 of	 the	 constraining	 principles,	 coherentist	 deontic	
analysis	can	pave	the	way	to	more	effective	laws.11		
(3)	 Learning	 from	 criticisms.	 	 I	 examined	 the	 most	 important	 criticisms	 of	
‘liberal’	 accounts	 (accounts	 concerned	 with	 deontic	 constraints).	 	 I	 argued	 that	 a	
sophisticated	and	humanistic	approach	to	deontic	principles	can	learn	from	and	avoid	
common	 criticisms	 of	 liberal	 accounts.	 	 A	 ‘liberal’	 account	 need	 not	 entail	 unsound	







‘liberal’	 (and	 in	which	 it	 is	 commonly	used	 in	criminal	 law	 theory),	 it	 simply	 requires	
respect	for	individuals	and	thus	requires	justification	for	the	punishment	of	individuals.	
(4)	Open-minded	and	reconstructive.	 	 I	examined	thoughtful	arguments	 that	
familiar	(deontic)	principles	of	justice	from	national	systems	may	not	be	appropriate	or	
applicable	in	ICL	contexts.		I	concluded	that	deontic	principles	do	matter	in	ICL,	but	the	















study	 of	 extreme	 or	 special	 cases	 may	 lead	 us	 to	 realize	 that	 there	 are	 implicit	

















out	 for	 prospective	 human	 aims	 (it	 is	 not	 just	 pointlessly	 retributive).	 Its	 constraints	
reflect	respect	for	humanity.		The	constraints	are	human-created	concepts	(as	opposed	
to	a	priori	Platonic	 forms),	 and	 they	are	 clarified	 through	human	processes.	 	There	 is	
reason	to	doubt	the	common	claim	that	criminal	law,	or	constraints	like	the	culpability	or	
legality	 principle,	 are	 purely	 Western	 preoccupations,	 given	 similarities	 emerging	 in	
practices	in	diverse	regions	(before	colonization	and	before	the	emergence	of	criminal	
law	in	Europe),	and	empirical	studies	showing	widely-shared	commonalities	in	senses	of	
justice.	 Because	 these	 principles	 are	 human	 constructs,	 shaped	 and	 refined	 through	






I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 scholarship	 should	 be	 attentive	 not	 just	 to	 outcomes	





tended	 to	 rely	 heavily	 on	 source-based	 and	 teleological	 reasoning,	 with	 somewhat	
weaker	 deontic	 reasoning.	 	 Early	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 and	 literature	 often	 approached	
fundamental	principles	as	if	they	were	doctrinal	rules,	using	doctrinal	tools	rather	than	
deontic	analysis.16			
	(2)	 Value	 of	 criminal	 law	 theory.	 Furthermore,	 early	 ICL	 discourse	was	 not	








can	 help	 clarify	 ICL,	 and	 the	 use	 of	 such	 concepts	 in	 ICL	 has	 already	 improved	
tremendously.19		
(3)	 Alertness	 to	 patterns.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 be	 alert	 to	 possible	 systematic	
distortions	in	reasoning.		I	have	pointed	out	numerous	illustrations	of	some	problematic	










In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 dissected	 two	 controversies	 in	 command	 responsibility	 in	
considerable	detail.			Nonetheless,	those	two	chapters	were	are	only	toes	in	the	water.		As	
I	 noted,	 I	 skimmed	 over	 several	 debates	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 providing	 succinct	
illustrations.	 	 For	 example,	 how	 much	 causal	 contribution	 is	 required	 for	 accessory	




















bifurcation	 in	 the	Rome	Statute	appropriate?	 	What	precisely	 is	required	 for	 ‘effective	
control’?		The	law	has	generally	approached	the	latter	question	using	source-based	and	
teleological	analyses.		However,	there	is	a	deontic	dimension:	if	the	‘should	have	known’	
test	 is	 deontically	 justified	 in	 specific	 circumstances,	 then	 the	 ‘effective	 control’	 test	











terms,	 but	 the	normative	 grounding	 is	 surprisingly	unexplored.	 	 Such	an	 inquiry	may	






















illuminate	 both	 this	 specific	 doctrine	 and	 also	 general	 criminal	 law	 theory.28	 	 	 Third,	
situations	of	extreme	duress,	such	as	in	the	Erdemović	case,	can	help	us	better	articulate	
the	deontic	underpinnings	of	the	duress	defences,	such	as	‘expectations	of	firmness’	from	








doctrine	 has	 engendered	 fierce	 controversy,	 particularly	 with	 the	 dispute	 in	 ICTY	
jurisprudence	 over	 whether	 the	 assistance	must	 be	 ‘specifically	 directed’	 toward	 the	
crimes.31		The	battlefield	is	drawn	between	two	camps,	one	favouring	a	‘knowledge’	test	
and	 one	 favouring	 a	 ‘purpose’	 test,	 but	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 both	 are	 flawed.	 	 The	
‘knowledge’	 test	 seems	 too	 broad,	 as	 it	 encompasses	 contributions	 that	 do	 not	 seem	






















	 Co-perpetration	 in	 large-scale	 crimes.	 	 ICL	 also	 provides	 a	 rich	 context	 to	
examine	individual	responsibility	in	massive	collective	enterprises.		ICL	has	adopted	co-
perpetration	 doctrines	 from	 national	 systems,	 but	 those	 doctrines	 were	 generally	
designed	 for	 much	 smaller	 groups	 of	 perpetrators.	 	 Contexts	 involving	 hundreds	 or	
thousands	of	contributors,	with	very	different	degrees	of	contribution,	invite	us	to	clarify	
the	outer	limits	of	culpability.	
Control	 theory.	 	 The	 coherentist	 method	 is	 useful	 not	 just	 for	 studying	
fundamental	 principles	 but	 also	 for	 the	 other	 organizing	 constructs	 we	 use	 to	 refine	
criminal	law.		For	example,	the	ICC	has	adopted	the	‘control	theory’	to	delineate	between	
principals	and	accessories.33		The	control	theory	is	a	construct	that	can	be	analyzed	as	a	
‘mid-level	 principle’.34	 	 It	 is	 is	 analytically	 helpful,	 because	 it	 helps	 understand	 and	
systematize	 the	practice,	and	normatively	attractive,	because	 it	provides	a	 sufficiently	
grounded	 and	 convincing	 basis	 to	 distinguish	 principals	 from	 accessories.	 	 Of	 course,	
there	 are	many	 controversies	 and	 disputes	 about	 the	 control	 theory,35	 but	 it	 is	well-
established	enough	to	at	 least	work	with	 it	as	a	starting	hypothesis.	 	On	a	coherentist	
method,	we	would	 then	ask:	 is	 it	useful?	 	What	are	 its	 implications?	 	Are	 there	better	
(more	normatively	convincing	and	analytically	fitting)	theories?			
		 		
At	 the	 time	of	 this	writing,	 the	resurgence	of	 ICL	has	been	underway	 for	about	
twenty-five	years,	which	 seems	 like	quite	 a	while	 in	 the	 span	of	our	human	 lifetimes.		
However,	 compared	 to	 the	 history	 of	 criminal	 law,	 it	 is	 still	 an	 extremely	 recent	 and	
nascent	experimental	development.		ICL	is	a	fast-moving	field.		When	I	started	work	on	
the	project,	my	main	 concern	was	hasty	 reasoning	 that	neglected	deontic	 constraints.		
























the	 culpability	 principle	 as	 recognized	 by	 the	 Tribunal	 itself.	 	 However,	 an	
understandable	 question	 about	my	 proposed	 solution	 is	whether	 omissions	 can	 ever	






the	 ‘normative’	 conception,	which	 considers	 that	 humans	 have	 duties,	 and	 failures	 to	
meet	those	duties	can	have	consequences.	 	On	the	normative	conception,	we	compare	




























would	 not	 hesitate	 to	 find	 that	 the	 pilot’s	 omission	 to	 fulfil	 her	 duty	 was	 indeed	 a	
contributing	factor,	and	that	the	crash	was	a	result	of	her	culpable	inaction.			
To	give	other	examples,	most	people	have	no	difficulty	recognizing	that	a	failure	to	
feed	 prisoners,	 despite	 a	 duty	 to	 do	 so,	 contributes	 to	 their	 starvation.	 	 Or,	 as	 Miles	
Jackson	notes,	a	cleaner	who	deliberate	omits	to	lock	a	door	in	order	to	assist	robbers	
thereby	 facilitates	 the	 robbery.40	 	 The	naturalistic	 conception	neglects	morally	 salient	
features	 of	 causation,	 because	 it	 focuses	 incorrectly	 on	 only	 one	 aspect	 of	 causation	
(‘causal	energy’)	and	neglects	other	aspects	(‘counterfactual	dependence’).41	 	As	Victor	
Tadros	argues,	any	theory	that	ignores	the	fact	that	a	lack	of	rain	causes	crops	to	fail	is	
not	 a	 viable	 theory	 of	 causation.42	 	 Tribunal	 jurisprudence	 reflects	 the	 mainstream	
understanding;	 for	 example,	 the	 ‘substantial	 effect’	 test,	 when	 applied	 to	 omissions,	























substantially less likely’.43	 	 Similarly,	 ICC	 jurisprudence	 has	 generally	 supported	 the	
normative	conception.44		
On	the	normative	conception,	it	is	easy	to	see	that	a	commander’s	omission	to	take	
appropriate	 steps	 to	 inculcate	 respect	 for	 humanitarian	 law,	 to	 establish	 a	 system	 of	
discipline,	 and	 to	 repudiate	 and	 punish	 crimes,	 thereby	 encourages	 or	 facilitates	
subsequent	crimes,	in	comparison	with	the	situation	that	would	have	pertained	had	she	






difficult	 or	 more	 speculative	 than	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 acts.45	 	 This	 view	
overestimates	the	clarity	of	the	impact	of	acts.		Assessing	the	impact	of	an	act	also	entails	
a	‘hypothetical’	assessment.		Whether	for	acts	or	omissions,	the	counterfactual	analysis	
equally	 involves	 imagining	 a	 hypothetical	 alternative	 world.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 daily	
practice	of	criminal	 law	shows	that	 the	 impact	of	acts	can	often	be	equally	difficult	 to	
assess.	 	 For	 example,	 did	 one	 blow	 among	 many	 other	 blows	 hasten	 the	 death?		
Conversely,	the	impact	of	omissions	can	be	quite	clear,	as	in	the	case	of	the	pilot	choosing	
to	 slump	 passively	 during	 a	 routine	 landing	 and	 thus	 crashing	 the	 plane.	 	 The	 real	
difficulty	 is	 not	 the	 difference	 between	 acts	 and	 omissions,	 but	 rather	 the	 inherent	
challenges	 of	 assessing	 impacts	 on	 behaviour	 of	 other	 human	 beings.	 This	 is	 why	
accessory	liability	only	requires	‘contribution’	as	opposed	to	full	‘causation’.		
This	thesis	does	not	aim	to	delve	into	or	add	to	the	already	extensive	discussion	on	
that	 philosophical	 debate;	 my	 aim	 is	 to	 explore	 other	 specific	 issues	 in	 command	

































which	 is	 concerned	 with	 fundamental	 moral	 constraining	 principles	 (culpability,	
legality).	 	I	refer	to	these	as	“deontic”	constraints,	because	they	respect	the	agency	and	
dignity	of	the	persons	affected	by	the	system.		The	main	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	to	




law	 may	 not	 even	 be	 appropriate	 in	 ICL,	 because	 ICL	 deals	 with	 extraordinary	
circumstances	and	collective	conduct.		I	argue	that	principled	constraints	of	justice	must	
be	 respected,	 but	 also	 that	 unusual	 circumstances	 may	 generate	 deontically-justified	
refinements	of	our	understandings.	 	 I	draw	 lessons	 from	common	criticisms	of	 liberal	





best	 solution.	 	 ‘Coherentism’	 stipulates	 that	 we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 identify	 a	 bedrock	
comprehensive	 ethical	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 discuss	 the	 justice	 of	 particular	 doctrines.		
Instead,	we	 can	work	productively	 at	 a	middle	 level,	 using	 all	 of	 the	 available	 clues	–	
including	patterns	of	practice,	normative	arguments,	and	considered	judgments.		We	can	
test	these	clues	against	each	other	to	form	the	best	hypotheses	we	can.		The	coherentist	
account	 accepts	 that	 the	 currently	 prevailing	 understandings	 of	 the	 principles	 are	
contingent	human	constructs.		Nonetheless,	a	human	and	fallible	conversation	can	let	us	
do	valuable	analytical,	normative,	and	critical	work.		
Thus,	 the	major	contribution	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 lay	the	groundwork	for	even	the	
possibility	of	doing	criminal	law	theory	in	ICL.	This	topic	is	relatively	philosophical	and	




First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	ensure	that	persons	are	not	 treated	unjustly.	 	Recent	 ICL	
jurisprudence	 and	 scholarship	 shows	 intensified	 interest	 in	 deontic	 constraints;	 this	
thesis	will	assist	 jurists	and	scholars	engaging	in	such	analyses.	 	Second,	clarifying	the	
constraints	 can	 also	 help	 produce	more	 effective	 criminal	 law,	 because	 it	 helps	 avoid	









includes	 the	 coherentist	 approach	 to	 deontic	 reasoning.	 	 Third,	 I	 demonstrate	 the	
framework	 by	 applying	 it	 to	 a	 specific	 controversy:	 the	 doctrine	 of	 command	
responsibility.			
I	 select	 command	 responsibility	 as	 a	 case	 study	 because	 it	 raises	 novel	 and	
important	questions.	Command	responsibility	originated	in	international	law,	and	thus	
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